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 Subsidiarity is a principle in Catholic social thought that informs the distribution 
of authority among levels of the political and social order. First expressly articulated by 
Pope Pius XI in his 1931 encyclical letter Quadragesimo Anno, the roots of the concept 
go back further to Pope Leo XIII and to Thomistic social theory. But subsidiarity is 
frequently subject to the criticism that it is vague and indeterminate and thereby an 
ineffective guide to politics and public policy. Much of the discussion of subsidiarity 
proceeds as though the principle were merely one of devolution of authority to the local 
level. Moreover, the principle is often taken to be a procedural norm, counseling “small is 
better” regardless of the underlying substantive question to which one is applying the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
The thesis of this dissertation is that it is only through an adequate examination of 
concrete policy issues that subsidiarity’s import can be fully measured and appreciated 
and only by asking what the common good requires in particular instances through the 
exercise of political prudence that the proper distribution of authority can be determined. 
The account of subsidiarity advanced in the dissertation is one of “functional pluralism,” 
denoting that subsidiarity focuses upon the multiple ends of differentiated political 
  
societies and thereby seeks to determine the goods they pursue and the means that are 
properly adapted to those ends. The dissertation argues that federalism and localism as 
informed by the principle of subsidiarity provide a safeguard for fundamental concerns of 
Catholic social thought, such as human rights and the common good. 
After examining the concepts of subsidiarity in Catholic social thought and 
federalism in American constitutional law and considering their relation, the dissertation 
discusses three areas in which a richer and analytically sharper understanding of the 
principle of subsidiarity can make an important contribution to policy debates over the 
role of federalism and localism in law and public policy. The three policy questions 
addressed in the dissertation are physician-assisted suicide, FDA preemption, and school 
finance.
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In bodies politic, the power of the representative is always limited; and that which 
prescribeth the limits thereof is the power sovereign. For power unlimited is absolute 
sovereignty. And the sovereign, in every commonwealth, is the absolute representative of 
all the subjects; and therefore no other can be representative of any part of them, but so 
far forth as he shall give leave. 
–Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 
 
The theory of sovereignty, whether proclaimed by John Austin or Justinian, or shouted in 
conflict by Pope Innocent or Thomas Hobbes, is in reality no more than a venerable 
superstition. It is true to the facts only in a cosy, small and compact State, although by a 
certain amount of strained language and the use of the maxim, “whatever the sovereign 
permits he commands,” it can be made not logically untenable for any conditions of 
stable civilisation. As a fact it is as a series of groups that our social life presents itself, all 
having some of the qualities of public law and most of them showing clear signs of a life 
of their own, inherent and not derived from the concession of the State. 
–John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State 
 
From physician-assisted suicide, federal preemption, education, and other 
controversial domestic political questions to the proper role of the United Nations in 
international affairs, debates about what level of political authority should appropriately 
bear responsibility provoke widespread public debate.  At the same time as these practical 
matters command attention, theoretical disagreements persist over subsidiarity and 
federalism, twin concepts concerned precisely with the apportionment of power among 
levels of authority.  The application of subsidiarity to contemporary legal and public 
policy debates remains confused and contested over seventy years after Pope Pius XI’s 
classic articulation of the principle of subsidiarity in Quadragesimo Anno. 
Resolution of the practical political disagreements over the apportionment of 
authority is hampered by the limits of the available conceptual tools used to address such 
issues.  Driven largely by concerns of economic efficiency and inter-jurisdictional 
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competition,1 most of the federalism debate pays scant attention to other, richer 
theoretical justifications for distributing power between the national government and the 
states. Similarly, some contend that federalism lacks a “persuasive normative theory” to 
explain and justify the apportionment of power between the national and state 
governments.2 Though “we Americans love federalism,” Edward Rubin and Malcolm 
Feeley write, it remains a “national neurosis” because it “conjures up images of Fourth of 
July parades down Main Street, drugstore soda fountains, and family farms with tire 
swings in the front yard” even though, in their view, “there is no normative principle 
involved that is worthy of protection.”3 This renders debate over such issues as 
physician-assisted suicide, preemption, and education seemingly intractable, as 
competitive federalism alone is frequently unable to express many of the concerns at play 
in deciding whether such issues should be resolved at the national, state, or local level. 
Much of the literature in the federalism debate, furthermore, is couched at a high level of
abstraction involving constitutional provisions such as the Commerce Clause and the 
 
1 A view captured by Sheryll Cashin in the term “competitive federalism.”  See Sheryll D. Cashin, 
Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 552, 582 (1999) (describing “competitive federalism” as the theory according to which 
“[t]he preferences of all individuals in society are better met in a system of multiple governments offering 
different packages of services and costs than of a single monopoly government, even a democratic one, 
offering a single package reflecting the preferences of the majority”) (citations omitted). 
2 Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the Court’s ‘Unsteady Path’: A Theory of 
Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447, 1447 (1995): 
The [Supreme] Court’s decisions setting forth jurisdictional limitations on national power have 
waffled famously.  Taken as a whole, they flunk requirements of either good law or good policy: 
The decisions are inconsistent with constitutional text and with one another, and they lack a 
persuasive normative theory to justify the first inconsistency or to resolve the second. 
3 Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA 
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Fourteenth Amendment, with relatively less attention paid to the practical policy issues 
affected by the outcome of 
In American Catholic social thought, this problem is heightened by the uncertain 
relation between subsidiarity and American federalism and localism.  Subsidiarity seems 
almost infinitely malleable, adopted by participants on every side from neo-conservatives 
to welfare state liberals to communitarians.4 A recurring theme in the literature on 
subsidiarity is that the principle of subsidiarity is indeterminate, vague, and ultimately 
unhelpful to the resolution of concrete legal and policy questions.  As Justice Antonin 
Scalia once remarked with characteristic subtlety, subsidiarity “deserves a place 
alongside such other unquestionably true and indubitably unhelpful propositions as ‘do 
good and avoid evil’ and ‘buy low and sell high.’”5 “In such a tractionleess 
environment,” writes Patrick Brennan, “subsidiarity is malleable and easily manipulated,
and therefore unthreatening to all but the biggest consolidators
 
4 See, e.g., Franklin Foer, The Catholic Teachings of George W., THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 5, 
2000, at 18 (contending that then-candidate George W. Bush’s view of “compassionate conservatism” owes 
much to subsidiarity and that “[to] reconcile their capitalist faith in self-interest with Catholicism’s 
abnegation of self-interest, [neo-conservatives] have not only highlighted subsidiarity, they have redefined 
Pius [XI]’s concept of it–removing any statist inflection and making it a devolutionary doctrine”); David 
Hollenbach, S.J., Afterword: A Community of Freedom, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 323, 330-32 (R. Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach, S.J. eds., 1994) 
(“The principle of subsidiarity demands that government be limited, but it is neither a libertarian principle 
nor an endorsement of…neo-liberalism….Nor, despite efforts to maintain the opposite, is it a principle 
compatible with those forms of American neo-conservatism that supported Reaganite views of political 
economy.”).  
5 Antonin Scalia, Subsidiarity a l’Americaine: C’est a Dire Preemption, in MAASTRICHT, 
SUBSIDIARITY AND ITALIAN- EC RELATIONS  4 (1992). 
6 Patrick McKinley Brennan, Harmonizing Plural Societies: The Case of LaSallians, Families, 
Schools—and the Poor, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 131, 133 (2006). 
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The Church’s own teaching documents contribute to this apparent uncertainty by 
speaking of subsidiarity as counseling devolution of authority in some circumstances but 
centralization of authority in others. In Quadragesimo Anno, for example, Pius XI writes 
that “it is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher 
association to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller 
and lower societies.”7 By comparison, John XXIII in Pacem in Terris writes roughly 
forty years later that there are “problems which, because of their extreme gravity, 
vastness and urgency, must be considered too difficult for the rulers of individual States 
to solve with any degree of success” and require the intervention of “universal 
authority.”8 While this devolutionary interpretation of subsidiarity is an important and 
enduring expression of the principle, so also the root of the word itself—from the Latin 
subsidium for “help” or “assistance”—evokes the responsibility of the higher authority
aid the lower, more local authority and to interven
In fact, recent work on the principle of subsidiarity has helpfully clarified that the 
entire enterprise of treating subsidiarity as a devolutionary principle is misguided. “[T]he 
point of subsidiarity,” writes Russell Hittinger, “is a normative structure of plural social 
forms, not necessarily a trickling down of power or aid.”9 Although “subsidiarity is often 
described or deployed in a defensive sense—as to what the state may not do or try to 
 
7 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 79 (1931).  The Catechism of the Catholic Church states 
the principle as “[a] community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of 
a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions . . . .”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 1883 
(1994).  
8 POPE JOHN XXIIII, PACEM IN TERRIS ¶ 140 (1963). 
9 Russell Hittinger, Society, Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social Thought, in CIVILIZING 
AUTHORITY: SOCIETY, STATE, AND CHURCH 119, 135 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2007).   
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accomplish,” continues Hittinger, “the principle is not so much a theory about state 
institutions, nor of checks and balances, as it is an account of the pluralism and sociality 
of society.”10 Although the later chapters of this dissertation will treat topics in public 
policy and law, I follow Joshua Hochschild in noting that “[i]nsofar as it recommends a 
pattern of organizing social life in general, and not just that part of social life which 
touches the state, the principle has implications for the choices of families, 
neighborhoods, and commercial enterprises, indeed for all social agents, individual and 
corporate.”11 
Indeed, subsidiarity is the Catholic social tradition’s rejoinder to Hobbes’ theory 
of sovereignty expressed in the epigraph to this Introduction. For Hobbes, sovereignty is 
absolute, so subsidiary units of the social order—churches, groups, smaller units of 
government—exist merely at the sufferance of the sovereign. By contrast, for Catholic 
social theory (as for the Anglican political theorist John Neville Figgis who contributes 
the other half of the introductory epigraph), politics is essentially pluralistic. Subsidiarity 
is not merely a “formal principle,” as Johannes Messner notes in his classic work Social 
Ethics, but “because it is rooted in the order of being and ends, assigns quite different and 
concrete responsibilities, competencies, and rights to definite narrower social units.”12 
But the principle of subsidiarity is often taken to be a procedural norm, counseling “small 
is better” regardless of the underlying substantive question to which one would apply the 
 
10 Id. at 136. 
11 Joshua P. Hochschild, The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Agrarian Ideal, in FAITH, 
MORALITY, AND CIVIL SOCIETY, 37, 37 (Dale McConkey & Peter Augustine Lawler eds., 2003). 
12 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 210-11 (J.J. 
Doherty trans., 1949). 
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principle of subsidiarity. The thesis of this dissertation is that it is only through an 
adequate examination of concrete policy issues that subsidiarity’s import can be fully 
measured and appreciated. It is only by asking what the common good requires in 
particular instances through the exercise of political prudence that the proper distribution 
of authority can be determined. Not surprisingly, the three policy issues taken up later in 
the dissertation will, upon careful examination, reveal that they are not susceptible to 
simplistic solutions of localism or nationalism. 
This dissertation proposes to (1) examine the concepts of subsidiarity in Catholic 
social thought and federalism in American constitutional law, (2) consider their relation, 
and (3) discuss three areas in which a richer and analytically sharper understanding of the 
principle of subsidiarity could make a vital contribution to debates now occurring in the 
United States over the role of federalism and localism in law and public policy.  
Subsidiarity, it will be argued, provides a normative principle beyond competitive 
efficiency whereby we can assess when a nationally-determined solution is to be 
preferred to a state-by-state or locally-determined solution (and vice-versa) to a policy 
matter.  Seeking to play on the famous “political safeguards of federalism” debate 
inaugurated by Herbert Wechsler and Jesse Choper,13 the dissertation will argue that 
federalism and localism as informed by the principle of subsidiarity provide a safeguard 
 
13 The quite different focus of Wechsler’s and Choper’s arguments was that the national political 
process would adequately protect federalism.  See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of 
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: 
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175-93 (1980). 
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for fundamental concerns of Catholic social teaching such as human rights and the 
common good.14 
The three areas to which subsidiarity and federalism can contribute, on this 
account, are physician-assisted suicide, federal preemption, and school finance.  These 
issues were chosen because of their relevance to the federalism/subsidiarity issue insofar 
as one of the central questions in these policy debates concerns the level of government 
most appropriately responsible for each.  The urgency of these issues and the 
insufficiency of the current framework within which they are discussed–despite their 
obvious pertinence to subsidiarity and federalism–will give rise to the theoretical 
treatment in Chapters One and Two of the dissertation.  The first two chapters will 
examine and reconstruct subsidiarity in general and as incarnated in American federalism 
in particular.  In these chapters–the theoretical backbone of the dissertation–I will attempt 
to offer an alternate framework for debates over what level of government is most 
appropriately responsible for setting law or policy on an issue.15  Chapters Three through 
 
 
14 Though the title refers only to “federalism,” I mean to treat both federalism (understood as the 
relation between the national and state governments) and localism (understood as the relation among the 
federal, state, and local governments), as both are relevant to the issues addressed in the dissertation.  The 
scope of what I term “localism” is set out by Richard Briffault: “[T]he legal powers of contemporary 
American local governments, the practical social and political ramifications of local legal power in a 
system characterized by wide divergences in local fiscal capabilities and needs and the ideological 
commitment to localism that sustains and legitimates local autonomy.”  Richard Briffault, Our Localism: 
Part I–The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1990).  See also Richard 
Briffault, Our Localism: Part II–Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990). 
15 One aspect of subsidiarity that will not be addressed is its use as a governing norm in the 
constitutional order of the European Union as required by Article 5 of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, though 
some sources on subsidiarity in the E.U. will be relevant to the discussion.  See MAKING SENSE OF 
SUBSIDIARITY: HOW MUCH CENTRALIZATION FOR EUROPE? (David Begg, Jacques Cremer, Vittorio Grilli, & 
Jeremy Edwards eds. 1993); Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union: 
Some Cautionary Tales from American Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1612 (2002); Jean Schere, 
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Five turn to the aforementioned practical issues, not merely as an application of the 
theory of subsidiarity and federalism developed in Chapters One and Two but as an 
argument that mutually illuminates the theory of subsidiarity and federalism and the 
specific policy issues themselves.  In the discussion, much will turn on the substantive 
moral judgments made in the specific context of these legal and policy debates and not 
merely on adherence to an abstract commitment that “small (or big) is always beautiful.” 
“As with other natural law principles,” Johannes Messner writes, “the application of the 
principle of subsidiary function is also dependent on the situation.”16 Because “natural 
law principles possesses a general character,” “[t]he application of all natural law 
principles depends on circumstances,” Messner argues, which does not imply that they 
are “devoid of content…because of their supposedly formal character.”17
 
Subsidiarity and Federalism in the European Union, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 175 (2000); and Reimer 
von Borries & Malte Hauschild, Implementing the Subsidiarity Principle, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369 (1999). 
16 MESSNER, supra note 12, at 214. 
17 Id. at 211. 
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CHAPTER ONE: SUBSIDIARITY IN CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT 
 
Introduction 
This opening chapter examines the principle of subsidiarity as articulated in 
modern Catholic social teaching. Statements of the principle have historically been terse 
and straightforward even if the application of subsidiarity to concrete policy issues has 
not. For example, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, released in 2004 
by the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, devotes only two pages to the principle of 
subsidiarity.1  The historical origins of subsidiarity are rooted in the Church’s opposition 
to totalitarianism and various forms of collectivism2 and a concomitant affirmation of 
human dignity.3  The task of this introductory chapter is to provide some focus to the 
discussion of subsidiarity by surveying the history of the principle in papal social 
teachings and its roots in Catholic political theory.  The conclusions of this chapter, in 
turn, will inform the application of subsidiarity to American federalism in Chapter Two 
and to three contemporary policy debates in Chapters Three through Five. 
Before turning to the treatment of subsidiarity in papal social teaching, though, it 
is helpful to consider certain pitfalls posed by the current debate over subsidiarity.  One 
 
1 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church (2004), 81-82. The Catechism of the Catholic 
Church states the principle as “[a] community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a 
community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions….”  CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC 
CHURCH ¶ 1883 (1994). 
2 Louis Dupré, The Common Good and the Open Society, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 172, 191 (R. Bruce Douglass & David Hollenbach, S.J. 
eds., 1994).  
3 Joseph A. Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question, 48 JURIST 298, 
301-02 (1988). 
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obstacle in arriving at a precise understanding of subsidiarity is the tendency, as 
suggested earlier, to view the principle as one of limited government alone.4  As 
summarized by Robert Sirico of the libertarian-leaning Acton Institute, this view holds 
that “[t]he clear meaning of the subsidiarity principle is to limit the powers and 
responsibilities assumed by the higher orders of society.  In nearly every occasion in 
which the principle has been invoked in the last one hundred years of Catholic social 
teaching, it is in the context of limiting the uses of power.”5  The U.S. Catholic bishops’ 
1986 letter on the economy, Economic Justice for All, expresses a similar view in some 
paragraphs of the document: “This principle [of subsidiarity] states that, in order to 
protect basic justice, government should undertake only those initiatives which exceed 
the capacities of individuals or private groups acting independently.  Government should 
not replace or destroy smaller communities and individual initiative.”6 
While this “liberal” interpretation of subsidiarity is an important and enduring 
expression of the principle in the literature, other sources suggest a less “libertarian” 
aspect to subsidiarity.7 In the words of Quadragesimo Anno, “every social activity ought 
 
 
4 See Christopher Wolfe, Subsidiarity: The ‘Other’ Ground of Limited Government, in 
CATHOLICISM, LIBERALISM, AND COMMUNITARIANISM: THE CATHOLIC INTELLECTUAL TRADITION AND THE 
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF DEMOCRACY, 81 (Kenneth L. Grasso, Gerard V. Bradley, & Robert P. Hunt eds., 
1995). 
5 Robert A. Sirico, Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and Application, 11 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549, 557 (1997). 
6  NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL: CATHOLIC SOCIAL 
TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY ¶ 124 (1986). 
7 I use the terms “liberal” and “libertarian” here cautiously, for there are important differences in 
the conception of personhood underlying classical liberalism–with its emphasis on individual autonomy–
and subsidiarity.  See Jean Bethke Elshtain, Catholic Social Thought and Liberal America, in CATHOLICISM 
AND LIBERALISM, supra note 2, at 151, 159-62 (describing Catholic social thought in general and 
subsidiarity in particular as “begin[ning] from a fundamentally different ontology from that assumed and 
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of its nature to furnish help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and 
absorb them.”8 Joseph Komonchak notes that subsidiarity has both negative (libertarian) 
and positive (communitarian) aspects: 
The principle of subsidiarity requires positively that all communities not only 
permit but enable and encourage individuals to exercise their own self-
responsibility, and that larger communities do the same for smaller ones....It 
requires negatively that communities not deprive individuals and smaller 
communities of their right to exercise their self-responsibility.  Intervention, in 
other words, is only appropriate as “helping people help themselves.”9   
 
Part of the confusion over subsidiarity—but also, perhaps, an aspect of the 
principle’s richness—is its combination, then, of both “libertarian” and “communitarian” 
elements.  Progress in our understanding and application of subsidiarity will require a 
careful assessment of these considerations and determining when intervention or 
assistance (subsidium) from a higher authority is needed and when devolution of 
responsibility is warranted.  More precisely, we will need to determine when authority is 
properly located at a higher level and when authority is properly recognized in the 
smaller community. This conclusion, in turn, will require a discussion of subsidiarity’s 
 
required by individualism, on the one hand, and statist collectivism, on the other” and “refus[ing] stark 
alternatives between individualism and collectivism”).  The terms “libertarian” and “communitarian” in the 
discussion to follow, then, are used in a broad sense (not, except by analogy, as designating a particular 
political philosophical position) and merely denote different aspects of subsidiarity as a principle favoring 
limited government but also government intervention where appropriate. 
8 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 79 (1931) reprinted in THE CHURCH AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF THE MODERN WORLD: THE SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS OF PIUS XI (Terence P. McLaughlin, 
C.S.B. ed., 1957).  All citations to Quadragesimo Anno are to the edition found in McLaughlin’s book. 
9 Komonchak, supra note 3, at 302 (emphasis in original).  See also Dupré, supra note 2, at 191: 
The principle of subsidiarity . . . prevents the common good from assuming an existence 
independent of private concerns, and thus turning into social ideology.  Only a social 
system based on subsidiarity can avoid turning the state into either a mere legal sanction 
of private interests (as in nineteenth-century liberalism) or into a personification of a 
common good in which individual interests are not adequately represented (as in the 
dictatorial states of the twentieth century). 
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political theoretical and “anthropological” dimensions, i.e., its grounding in a conception 
of the person in society.  Rather than as a principle only of economic efficiency or limited 
government, subsidiarity is best viewed as an aspect of Catholic social thought’s 
emphasis on the human person adequately understood.10 Subsidiarity, as will be argued 
during the course of this chapter, cannot be properly understood apart from an adequate 
appreciation of the Catholic theory of political authority, of the state, and of associational 
life. 
The chapter will proceed chronologically through the treatment of subsidiarity in 
five major documents and periods: (1) Leo XIII’s doctrine of the state and nascent 
articulation of subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum;11 (2) Pius XI’s formulation in 
Quadragesimo Anno of the principle of subsidiarity and the primary influences on him;12 
 
 
10 See Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning 
of Subsidiarity, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 615 (1993) (“The principle of subsidiarity insists that the state and 
all other forms of community exist for the individual.”). 
11 The term “subsidiarity” does not occur in Leo’s writings, but some statements are rightly viewed 
as anticipations of the concept. See POPE LEO XIII, RERUM NOVARUM ¶ 52 (1891) reprinted in THE 
CHURCH SPEAKS TO THE MODERN WORLD: THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF LEO XIII (Etienne Gilson ed., 1954): 
It is not right, as We have said, for either the citizen or the family to be absorbed by the State; it is 
proper that the individual and the family should be permitted to retain their freedom of action, so 
far as this is possible without jeopardizing the common good and without injuring anyone. 
Though the translation and paragraph numbering of the Gilson edition differ slightly from other English 
editions of the encyclical (most prominently, the translation of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, 
the forerunner to the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops), the care taken by Gilson in translating and 
annotating the text renders his edition more helpful than others. 
12 The intellectual fathers of subsidiarity are usually considered to be the Bishop Wilhelm 
Emmanuel von Ketteler and Heinrich Pesch, while the primary figure behind Quaragesimo Anno, Oswald 
von Nell-Breuning, credited Gustav Gundlach with “first formulat[ing] this non-rational insight into a 
principle and g[iving] it the name under which it has since become so famous.”  Komonchak, supra note 3, 
at 299-300 (quoting JOHANNES SCHWARTE, GUSTAV GUNDLACH, S.J. (1892-1963) (1975)).  For a summary 
of the historical background and especially the German influences on subsidiarity, see Thomas C. Kohler, 
In Praise of Little Platoons, in BUILDING THE FREE SOCIETY: DEMOCRACY, CAPITALISM, AND CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING 31 (George Weigel & Robert Royal eds., 1993).  A thorough treatment of Ketteler’s 
influence on Catholic social doctrine can be found in Martin J. O’Malley, Catholic Rights Discourse in 
Nineteenth-Century Germany: Bishop Ketteler Protected Religious and Social Freedoms from the Equal 
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(3) the further development of the Catholic theory of the state and of subsidiarity in John 
XXIII’s Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris; (4) the understanding of the state and the 
implications for subsidiarity advanced in Dignitatis Humanae, the Declaration on 
Religious Freedom at the Second Vatican Council; and (5) the treatment of subsidiarity 
and its relation to solidarity in John Paul II, most especially in Centesimus Annus.  
I. Subsidiarity in Modern Catholic Social Teaching 
Preface: Exegetical Considerations 
Before examining the sequence of encyclicals and papal pronouncements that 
form the corpus of official Catholic teaching on subsidiarity, a word about the appropriate 
exegetical approach toward these texts is in order.  In an essay examining the historical 
contexts in which the popes have written their social encyclicals over the past century, 
John Coleman helpfully suggests four possible exegetical approaches.13 First, we can try 
to ascertain the mind of each encyclical’s author, so far as we can determine the actual 
author of a letter if not the pope himself.  As Coleman points out, however, this approach 
is not terribly promising insofar as Oswald von Nell-Breuning is peculiar in both 
claiming credit for writing a social encyclical (Quadragesimo Anno) and in providing an 
 
Threats of Secularizing Liberalism and Anti-Catholic Absolutism (2007) (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston 
College).  For Nell-Breuning’s own assessment of subsidiarity in Quadragesimo Anno, see OSWALD VON 
NELL-BREUNING, S.J., REORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL ENCYCLICAL DEVELOPED AND 
EXPLAINED (1936). 
13 John Coleman, S.J., Development of Church Social Teaching, in READINGS IN MORAL 
THEOLOGY NO. 5: OFFICIAL CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 169 (Charles E. Curran & Richard A. 
McCormick, S.J. eds., 1986). 
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extensive account of the drafting of it.14 A second approach (which Nell-Breuning 
himself suggests in his essay on the drafting of Quadragesimo Anno) would look simply 
to the text of the encyclical, much as textualists in other fields emphasize the plain 
meaning of, for example, constitutions or statutes over other sources. Coleman’s third 
approach “look[s] to movements, disputed questions, etc., to which the encyclical 
responds” and thereby arrives at an understanding of a letter’s historical context.15  
Finally, the fourth (and, for Coleman, favored) approach “see[s] any encyclical in 
continuity with the other writings, allocutions, and actions of the papacy.”16 
I agree with Coleman that the fourth exegetical approach has the benefit of 
placing each encyclical within the larger framework of each pontificate’s work, though a 
thorough examination of each papacy is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I 
will adopt a synthesis among all of Coleman’s approaches, selectively reading an 
encyclical alongside writings of those who were directly involved in its drafting or 
otherwise influential, but also parsing the words of the encyclical text itself and locating 
an encyclical amid a larger framework of the disputes, writings, and events of the 
relevant period. 
In each of the succeeding sections of the chapter, I will discuss the treatment of 
subsidiarity in the major documents of four popes (Leo XIII, Pius XI, John XXIII, and 
John Paul II) and one council (Vatican II), with attention paid, where appropriate, to the 
 
14 Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J., The Drafting of Quadragesimo Anno, in READINGS IN MORAL 
THEOLOGY NO. 5, supra note 13, at 60-68. 
15 Coleman, supra note 13, at 179. 
16 Id. at 181. 
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work of influential figures in the development of the principle of subsidiarity as reflected 
in these major documents. 
A. Leo XIII 
Elected pope in 1878 at the age of 67, Leo XIII is widely acknowledged to be the 
progenitor of modern Catholic social teaching, even if a significant body of social 
teaching preceded his pontificate.17 Though he issued at least twelve documents that 
could be considered to comprise his social teaching,18 Leo’s 1891 encyclical Rerum 
Novarum is the most complete and enduring expression of his social theory.  Rerum 
Novarum contains lengthy sections on topics that will recur in papal social encyclicals for 
the next century and that bear on subsidiarity, such as private property, the Church’s 
hostility toward liberalism and socialism, the rights of workers, and the role of the 
Church in the social order.  It is, however, Leo’s nascent expression of the principle of 
subsidiarity throughout Rerum Novarum that we will explore here. As noted by John 
Courtney Murray, further elaboration of the principle of subsidiarity and related concepts 
 
17 For treatments of the pre-Leonine social tradition, see PAUL MISNER, SOCIAL CATHOLICISM IN 
EUROPE: FROM THE ONSET OF INDUSTRIALIZATION TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR (1991) and MICHAEL J. 
SCHUCK, THAT THEY BE ONE: THE SOCIAL TEACHINGS OF THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1740-1989 (1991). 
18 In his collection SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS, Joseph Husslein, S.J., includes Inscrutabili (Evils of 
Society), Quod Apostolici Muneris (The Socialists), Arcanum (Christian Marriage), Diuturnum (Civil 
Government), Immortale Dei (Christian Constitution of States), In Plurimis (Abolition of African Slavery), 
Libertas Humana (Human Liberty), Sapientiae Christianae (Chief Duties of Christian Citizens), Laetitiae 
Sanctae (Rosary and Social Question), Annum Sacrum (Consecration of Mankind to the Sacred Heart), and 
Graves de Communi (Christian Popular Action) in addition to Rerum Novarum. JOSEPH HUSSLEIN, S.J., 
SOCIAL WELLSPRINGS: FOURTEEN EPOCHAL DOCUMENTS BY POPE LEO XIII (Bruce Publishing Company 
1940).  For a discussion of Husslein’s own important role in transmitting the papal social encyclicals to the 
American Catholic Church, see Stephen A. Werner, Joseph Husslein, S.J., and the American Catholic 
Literary Revival: ‘A University in Print’, 87.4 CATH. HIST. REV. 688 (2001). 
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“are substantially in the line set by Leo XIII when he defined the relation of government 
to the social and economic order.”19 
Leo ushered in the era of the “Leonine synthesis” in Catholic social doctrine, 
which “reached its creative high-water mark in the 1930s between the two world wars, 
but its effects were consolidated at the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).”20 Leo’s 
writing on social matters was broadly influenced by the commitment to Thomism 
advanced in his 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris. This allegiance to Thomism was itself the 
product of a contingent philosophical history and the influence of a small circle of 
nineteenth century Jesuit Thomists, a history recounted in recent years by Alasdair 
MacIntyre and Gerald McCool.21 Indeed, the Italian Jesuit Thomist Luigi Taparelli 
D’Azeglio is arguably the defining influence on the early formulation of what would 
become the principle of subsidiarity and on much else in Leo’s reappropriation of 
Thomism.22 
 
19 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
551, 553 (1953). 
20 Russell Hittinger, Introduction to Modern Catholicism, in THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN 
CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE, 3, 13 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 
2006). 
21 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 72-73 (1990); GERALD MCCOOL, CATHOLIC THEOLOGY IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY: THE QUEST FOR A UNITARY METHOD (1977). 
22 For an overview of the neo-Thomists of the period and their influence on Leo, see JOE 
HOLLAND, MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: THE POPES CONFRONT THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 1740-1958 
119 (2003); MCCOOL, supra note 21; Thomas C. Behr, Luigi Taparelli and the Nineteenth-Century Neo-
Scholastic ‘Revolution’ in Natural Law and Catholic Social Sciences (2000) (Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY 
Buffalo) [hereinafter Behr, ‘Revolution’]; Thomas C. Behr, Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio, S.J. (1793-1862) and 
the Development of Scholastic Natural-Law Thought as a Science of Society and Politics, 6 J. MKTS. & 
MORALITY, 99 (2001) [hereinafter Behr, Development]. 
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 1. Rerum Novarum 
Rerum Novarum’s theory of subsidiarity—to the extent such a distinct theory can 
be said to exist—is detailed amid the encyclical’s discussion of four discrete topics: 
private property, the family, the role of the state, and the significance of associations.  The 
encyclical begins with a famous (and controversial) discussion of private property.  In his 
eagerness to distance the Church from various forms of socialism, some argue that Leo 
implicitly adopted a modern, Lockean theory of private property that sits uneasily with 
the Church’s historical teaching on private property.23 Whatever the merits of that 
argument, themes advanced in the paragraphs of Rerum Novarum on private property will 
mark future discussions of subsidiarity and do not turn, for the most part, on the theory of 
private property advanced in the letter. Nonetheless, the early paragraphs of Rerum 
Novarum set the church’s social teaching down on one side or another of several 
contentious issues in modern political theory. Leo asserts the link between human nature 
and private property at ¶ 6, but this argument is part of a larger argument about human 
nature and the foundations of politics. Leo, then, stands in the long line of Catholic—and 
particularly Thomist—argument regarding natural law and moral knowledge. 
The argument of ¶¶ 7-17 begins with an assertion about the proper relation of the 
person to the state: “Man precedes the State [respublica], and possesses, prior to the 
 
23 See Ernest L. Fortin, A.A., “Sacred and Inviolable:” Rerum Novarum and Natural Rights, 53 
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 203 (1992); Andrew Lustig, Natural Law, Property, and Justice: The General 
Justification of Property in John Locke, 19.1 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 119 (1991); Paul Weithman, Natural 
Law, Property, and Redistribution, 21.1 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 165 (1993); Andrew Lustig, Property, Justice, 
and the Common Good: A Response to Paul J. Weithman, 21.1 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 181 (1993). 
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formation of any State [civitas], the right of providing for the sustenance of his body.”24 
This assertion about the person and the state leads Leo to conclude, by way of a historical 
argument, that private property is “pre-eminently in conformity with human nature” (¶ 
11). Similarly, the family has “rights and duties which are prior to those of the 
community, and founded more immediately in nature” (¶ 13).25 This argument regarding 
private property and the family builds to Leo’s rejection of “the main tenet of socialism, 
community goods” as “directly contrary to the natural rights of mankind” (¶ 15). 
It might be difficult at first glance to see the relevance of this discussion of private 
property, the family, and socialism to subsidiarity, but Leo lays the groundwork for such 
an argument in ¶ 17 with his claim that it is “impossible to reduce civil society to one 
dead level.” This argument will, however, turn not toward a discussion of levels of civil 
society and the apportionment of responsibility among them—as one would expect were 
subsidiarity the principal subject—but instead to the topic of natural differences among 
human capacities and the inequality that results. The next several paragraphs of the 
encyclical take up the appropriate response to the plight of the poor and the responsibility 
of the state and civil society to alleviate the condition of the poor, all while taking care 
not to frame the discussion in terms of class struggle (¶¶ 19-30). 
This aspect of social harmony is on display, for example, in ¶ 19, where Leo 
writes that “[j]ust as the symmetry of the human frame is the result of the suitable 
 
24 RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 11, ¶ 7.   
25 See also id. ¶ 12, in which Leo writes of “the family, the ‘society’ of a man’s house—a society 
very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, and one older than any State.  Consequently, it 
has rights and duties peculiar to itself which are quite independent of the State.” 
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arrangement of the different parts of the body, so in a State it is ordained by nature that 
these two classes [the ‘wealthy’ and ‘working men’] should dwell in harmony and 
agreement.” But lest this assertion of irreducible harmony among the classes in society 
lead to neglect of the poor, Leo moves to a set of exhortations regarding the church’s 
charitable work. “The Church…intervenes directly in behalf of the poor,” he writes, “by 
setting on foot and maintaining many associations which she knows to be efficient for the 
relief of poverty” (¶ 29).26  
One of the principal questions posed by the contemporary debate over 
subsidiarity—when is intervention by a higher level of civil authority in the affairs of a 
local community warranted?—is expressly addressed only once in Rerum Novarum, in ¶ 
36.  Paragraphs 31 and following treat the proper role of the state, and ¶ 35 asserts that 
the state “must not absorb the individual or the family; both should be allowed free and 
untrammeled action so far as is consistent with the common good and the interests of 
others.” Paragraph 36 then proceeds to ask when the state must intervene.  The clearest 
requirement for such intervention, according to Leo, is where it is necessary for “peace 
and good order”27 (anticipating the terms of state intervention in matters of religious 
freedom advanced in Dignitatis Humanae). But Leo goes on to argue that “the limits [of 
the intervention of public authority] must be determined by the nature of the occasion 
 
26 The Church’s own charitable work is a theme running throughout papal social teaching, even 
where the tradition is at pains to emphasize the responsibility of the state and the wider society.  See POPE 
BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST (2005) ¶¶ 31-39. 
27 The examples of what constitutes “peace and good order” illustrate that Leo has in mind more 
than mere avoidance of civil war or warding off the Hobbesian state, as when he writes “that all things 
should be carried on in accordance with God’s laws and those of nature” and “that the discipline of family 
life should be observed and that religion should be obeyed.” RERUM NOVARUM, supra note 11, ¶ 36. 
 20 
which calls for the law’s interference—the principle being that the law must not 
undertake more, nor proceed further, than is required for the remedy of the evil or the 
removal of the mischief” (¶ 36). 
The paragraphs of Rerum Novarum that arguably bear most directly on 
subsidiarity are Leo’s short but suggestive discussion of civil society and associations at ¶ 
51 and following: 
These lesser societies and the larger society differ in many respects, because their 
immediate purpose and aim is different. Civil society exists for the common good, 
and hence is concerned with the interests of all in general, albeit with individual 
interests also in their due place and degree….Private societies, then, although they 
exist within the body politic, and are severally part of the commonwealth, cannot 
nevertheless be absolutely, and as such, prohibited by public authority. For, to 
enter into a “society” of this kind is the natural right of man; and the State has for 
its office to protect natural rights, not to destroy them; and, if it forbid its citizens 
to form associations, it contradicts the very principle of its own existence, for both 
they and it exist in virtue of the like principle, namely, the natural tendency of 
man to dwell in society. (¶ 51).  
 
Leo immediately qualifies this assertion of associational rights with the claim that 
“[t]here are occasions, doubtless, when it is fitting that the law should intervene to 
prevent certain associations, as when men join together for purposes which are evidently 
bad, unlawful, or dangerous to the State” (¶ 52). 
With this spare statement of the limits of state intervention, Leo laid the 
groundwork for the elaboration of subsidiarity in later papal documents. Reconstructing 
Leo’s discussion of subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum, we can identify three main themes 
running through the paragraphs of Rerum Novarum that bear on subsidiarity: (1) a 
rejection of socialism and an inchoate preference for the limited state; (2) a defense of 
private property; and (3) an extended treatment of the role of the family. We can already 
 21 
see in this, the first and perhaps most important document in the papal social tradition, 
subsidiarity being invoked as an aspect of the Church’s rejection of totalitarianism, 
which, in turn, was originally an argument directed toward socialism and its rejection of 
private property rights.  Following the criticism of socialism by way of a defense of 
private property, the encyclical then turns to a treatment of civil society and the role of 
the state. In summary, Leo’s argument is that (1) differences and inequalities are based on 
differing capacities, which gives rise to the condition of the poor; (2) assistance to the 
poor requires the intervention of the state, just as the state otherwise intervenes 
appropriately for peace and good order; and (3) associations of workers and, more 
generally, public and private societies are a means of complementing the role of the state. 
 2. Aeterni Patris and Immortale Dei 
Though Rerum Novarum is, by a considerable margin, the document from the 
reign of Leo with which most are familiar, it is important to note the setting of Rerum 
Novarum among the other major encyclicals of Leo’s pontificate. Two warrant particular 
attention for our purposes: Leo’s 1879 encyclical on Christian philosophy, Aeterni Patris, 
and his 1885 letter on the Christian constitution of states, Immortale Dei. 
Reading Rerum Novarum apart from Aeterni Patris, it is difficult to appreciate the 
place of Leo’s (and his successors’) social teaching within the Catholic intellectual 
tradition generally and the Thomist tradition more specifically. Even if it is difficult to 
trace each turn in twentieth century social teaching to its Thomist roots, Thomism is both 
a methodological and substantive component of Catholic social teaching, including the 
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principle of subsidiarity.28 Methodologically, the Thomism of Aeterni Patris supplied a 
resource for criticism of modern rationalism, as argued by Alasdair MacIntyre: 
Aeterni Patris summoned its readers to renewal of an understanding of 
intellectual enquiry as the continuation of a specific type of tradition, that which 
achieved definitive expression in the writings of Aquinas, one the appropriation of 
which could not only provide the resources for radical criticism of the conception 
of rationality dominant in nineteenth-century modernity…but also preserve and 
justify the canonical status of the Bible as distinct from, yet hegemonic over, all 
secular enquiry.29 
 
Substantively, the legacy of Thomism is apparent in the prevalence of natural law theory 
in Catholic social teaching. In contrast to, for example, the resort to scriptural metaphors 
often encountered in Protestant social ethics (such as the American Social Gospel 
Movement of the early twentieth century), Catholic social teaching has frequently relied 
on philosophical forms of argument that do not presuppose the principles of Christian 
revelation. 
 The foregoing discussion of Rerum Novarum may mislead the reader into 
believing that document was an encyclical on church and state. To be clear, Rerum 
Novarum was not a document on church and state as such but rather was addressed to 
economic matters, particularly the relationship of capital and labor. A shorter and more 
explicit statement of Leo’s views on church and state is to be found six years before 
Rerum Novarum in his encyclical Immortale Dei. There one finds the initial articulations 
of a broadly Thomist understanding of the state and society: 
 
28 For a recent attempt to recover the relevance of Aquinas to subsidiarity, see Nicholas Aroney, 
Subsidiarity, Federalism, and the Best Constitution: Thomas Aquinas on City, Province and Empire, 26 
LAW & PHIL. 161 (2007). 
29 MACINTYRE, supra note 21, at 25. 
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Man’s natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling 
apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the 
means of developing his mental and moral faculties. Hence, it is divinely ordained 
that he should lead his life—be it family, or civil—with his fellow men, amongst 
whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied. But, as no society can 
hold together unless some one be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the 
common good, every body politic must have a ruling authority, and this authority, 
no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for 
its Author.30 
 
Immortale Dei’s purpose, however, was not to contribute to an overall Catholic theory of 
the state and the relationship among social forms, as would be most relevant to a 
treatment of subsidiarity. Instead and as noted by John Courtney Murray in his seminal 
articles on Leo’s doctrine of church and state, the predominant concern in Immortale Dei 
and related encyclicals was the problem of religious freedom—religious freedom in the 
modern state, the role of conscience with respect to the state, and the church’s role in the 
modern state.31 
 3. Luigi Taparelli D’Azeglio 
Luigi Taparelli (1793-1862) taught the future Leo XIII at the Collegio Romano in 
the 1820s and was a decisive influence on Leonine social doctrine and on Leo’s adoption 
of Thomism.32 Appreciation of Taparelli’s significance is hindered in the Anglophone 
world by the lack of any English translations of his work and only passing attention to 
 
30 POPE LEO XIII, IMMORTALE DEI ¶ 3 (1885). 
31 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII on Church and State: The General Structure of the 
Controversy, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 1 (1953); John Courtney Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Separation of 
Church and State, 14 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 145 (1953); Murray, supra note 19, at 551; John Courtney 
Murray, S.J., Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government: II. Government and the Order of Culture, 15 
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 1 (1954). 
32 In much of the following discussion, I am indebted to Thomas C. Behr’s Luigi Taparelli and the 
Nineteenth-Century Neo-Scholastic ‘Revolution’ in Natural Law and Catholic Social Sciences.  See Behr, 
‘Revolution’, supra note 22. 
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Taparelli in the work of historians of nineteenth century theology such as Gerald McCool. 
In Heinrich Rommen’s minor classic The State in Catholic Thought, for example, 
Taparelli is mentioned only three times, two of which are citations to his opposition to 
universal suffrage.33 From the important recent dissertation and subsequent writings of 
historian Thomas Behr, however, we can begin to understand the influence of Taparelli on 
the initial stages of modern Catholic social teaching. 
Taparelli was an important part of the nineteeth century Thomist revival that 
culminated in Aeterni Patris. He was also a regular contributor to the Jesuit periodical 
Civiltà Cattolica for several years and is credited with developing the concept of “social 
justice.”34 Taparelli’s most significant work was Theoretical Treatise on Natural Right 
Based on Fact (Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale appoggiato sul fatto), which he 
compiled in response to the lack of any textbook on natural law that was free, in his view, 
from misleading doctrines.35 As summarized by Thomas Behr, “[h]is thoroughly 
Thomistic intention was to merge a deductive, theoretical approach with an inductive 
histoico-sociological approach in a dialectical method that would form the basis of a 
modern science of society and politics.”36 
 
33 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 110, 437, 458 (1945).  In his book 
Social Catholicism in Europe: From the Onset of Industrialization to the First World War, Paul Misner 
covers Taparelli’s contribution to Leonine social doctrine in two pages, though Misner calls attention to the 
influence of Taparelli and to the Jesuit periodical Civiltà cattolica with which Taparelli was closely 
associated.  See MISNER, supra note 17. 
34 See Behr, Development, supra note 22, at 99. See also Walter T. Odell, The Political Theory of 
Civiltà Cattolica from 1850 to 1870 (1969) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University). 
35 Pius XI cites and commends Saggio teoretico di diritto naturale in a footnote to his encyclical 
Divini Illius Magistri as “a work never sufficiently praised and recommended to University students.”  
POPE PIUS XI, DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI ¶ 50 n.33 (1929). 
36 Behr, Development, supra note 22, at 102-03. 
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Taparelli’s most important contribution to Catholic social doctrine was his 
development of the basic framework for later discussions of the principle of subsidiarity. 
As Behr argues, Taparelli used a series of metaphors derived from grammar to illustrate 
the concept of “Hypotactic Right,” “[t]he natural and just relationships between the 
myriad of associations that human beings tend to form, ranging from the family to the 
State and beyond.”37 Behr explains that Taparelli borrowed the term “hypotactic” from 
the rules of Greek grammar governing “the modalities of coordination between clauses, 
specifically, the arrangement of inferior clauses within the functioning of the whole 
sentence.”38 “Hypotactic Right” (dritto ipotattico), then, “convey[s] the rights of social 
groupings, within their just relationships, organized toward the common good.”39 Behr 
concludes: 
The principles [Taparelli] elaborates in this regard have found their place, though 
indirectly and imperfectly, in Catholic social doctrine, known as the “principle of 
subsidiarity,” first explicitly used by Pius XI in the social encyclical, 
Quadragesimo Anno. Indeed, the Greek hypo taxis can be rendered directly into 
Latin as sub sedeo. The Latin expression subsidia applied, then, not just to mean 
“help” but in the first instance to auxiliary troops within the Roman legion, as 
they “sat below” ready in reserve to support the battle. The “help” in this context 
is from the bottom up, not from the top down, as the inferior and mediating 
groups all participate in achieving the common good of the more perfect 
association. While Taparelli uses the legion as an analogy for society in various 
contexts, the rights and obligations derived from the laws of subsidiarity vary 




37 Id. at 104. 




As the principle of subsidiarity came to be expressed in the social thought of Pius 
XI and later popes, we will see that some of the original inspiration for the principle in 
Taparelli’s and Leo’s Thomism came to be forgotten or neglected. For example, 
Taparelli’s articulation of Hypotactic Right is clearly not a principle of devolution, as the 
principle of subsidiarity is so often understood in later Catholic social teaching. Rather, 
the principle of subsidiarity is, at least as originally articulated in the nineteenth century 
Thomists, a principle of right social ordering toward the common good. As will be argued 
in later chapters, however, the variation among the “rights and obligations derived from 
the laws of subsidiarity” does indeed depend on contingent historical circumstances when 
we would seek to employ subsidiarity in navigating contemporary policy questions. 
B. Pius XI 
Pius XI deepened and broadened the themes that gave rise to the principle of 
subsidiarity and provided the principle its name.  Rather than address concrete 
examples—family, workers’ associations, relief of the poor—Pius speaks of abstract 
“higher” and “lower” orders.  As a young Milanese seminary student, Achille Ratti, the 
future Pius XI, sat in an audience listening to Leo lecture on the importance of 
philosophical education. Ratti was fresh from obtaining doctorates in theology, 
philosophy, and canon law, and returned to Milan, eventually becoming Cardinal 
Archbishop of the Ambrosian see in 1921.  A year later and upon the death of Benedict 
XV, Achille Ratti was elected pope and took the name Pius XI, reigning from 1922 to 
1939, covering the period from the wake of World War I to the eve of World War II. 
During those seventeen years, it seems a productive day did not pass for Pius unless he 
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issued a condemnation of one sort or another—among others, Communism, socialism, 
fascism, atheism, artificial contraception, coeducation, and persecution of the Mexican 
and German churches were condemned by Pius.  Racism and anti-Semitism were also 
due to meet his wrath in encyclicals that were being drafted at the time of Pius’ death.41 
The focus of our inquiry here is Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, 
his most famous encyclical, passages of which are the locus classicus for any discussion 
of the principle of subsidiarity.  Our examination of Quadragesimo Anno will proceed in 
three parts: first, we will examine the text of the letter itself, particularly those sections 
pertaining to subsidiarity; second, we will place Quadragesimo Anno alongside another 
encyclical of Pius’, Divini Illius Magistri (On the Christian Education of Youth); and 
third, we will consider Quadragesimo Anno in light of commentary upon it by its 
acknowledged author, Oswald von Nell-Breuning, particularly in his book, 
Reorganization of Social Economy: The Social Encyclical Developed and Explained. 
 1. Quadragesimo Anno 
Quadragesimo Anno is addressed to “the social question,” the problem of human 
relations.  The early paragraphs of the encyclical recount the nineteenth century historical 
context for Rerum Novarum (¶¶ 3-9) and present a broad summary of Rerum Novarum’s 
teaching (¶¶ 10-14).  Pius then seeks to summarize—optimistically—the 
accomplishments of Rerum Novarum over the forty years since the letter was issued.  
After a brief note on the letter’s effect on the Church, Pius XI argues that Rerum 
 
41 THE HIDDEN ENCYCLICAL OF PIUS XI, (Georges Passelecq & Bernard Suchecky eds., Steven 
Rendall trans., 1997). 
 28 
                                                
Novarum has affected civil authority by (re)enforcing a view of the state as not a mere 
guardian of law and good order but also as the caretaker of the common good by 
watching over the community and its parts.  This portion of the encyclical concludes with 
a discussion of Rerum Novarum’s lessons for associations and argues that “the individual 
members of the association secure, as far as possible, an increase in the goods of the 
body, of soul, and of property.”42 
Paragraphs 78-80 of Quadragesimo Anno are the classic text on subsidiarity. 
Paragraph 78 offers a diagnosis of the ills wrought by individualism, which has 
deracinated social life and left the individual “alone” with the state: “[B]ecause things 
have come to such a pass through the evil of what we have termed ‘individualism’ that, 
following upon the overthrow and near extinction of that rich social life which was once 
highly developed through associations of various kinds, there remain virtually only 
individuals and the State” (¶ 78).43 Pius argues that the intervention of the state is not 
expected to achieve the common good, and he writes of not expecting “universal well-
being…from its [the state’s] activity.” He further argues that the state has assumed too 
many tasks and thereby become over-burdened, which “is to the great harm of the State 
itself; for, with a structure of social governance lost, and with the taking over of all the 
burdens which the wrecked associations once bore, the State has been overwhelmed and 
crushed by almost infinite tasks and duties” (¶ 78). 
 
42 QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 8, ¶ 32.  
43 Pius XI’s argument here anticipates the work of Robert Putnam on the decline of associational 
life. See ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 
(2000). 
 29 
                                                
In subtle contrast to Leo’s concern in Rerum Novarum that the market not replace 
the state in the coordination of economic life, Pius’ concern in Quadragesimo Anno is 
directed more at relieving the state of the crushing burden of “infinite tasks” and the 
accumulation of too much authority in the state as a result of the decline of associational 
life. Pius seeks to remedy this over-burdening of the state with an assertion of the 
principle of “subsidiary function” as classically expressed in ¶ 79 of Quadragesimo 
Anno: 
Just as it is gravely wrong to take from individuals what they can accomplish by 
their own initiative and industry and give it to the community, so also it is an 
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and disturbance of right order to assign 
to a greater and higher association what lesser and subordinate organizations can 
do. For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish help to the 
members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.44 
 
The discussion of subsidiarity—limited to just three paragraphs in an encyclical of 149 
paragraphs—concludes with Pius exhorting the central authority of states to leave 
subordinate associations to handle their own affairs and thereby improve the condition of 
the polity: 
The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups 
handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise 
dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and 
effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone can do them: 
directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity 
demands. Therefore, those in power should be sure that the more perfectly a 
graduated order is kept among the various associations, in observance of the 
principle of “subsidiary function,” the stronger social authority and effectiveness 
will be the happier and more prosperous the condition of the State.45 
 
 
44 QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, supra note 8, ¶ 79. 
45 Id. at ¶ 80. 
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These crucial paragraphs on subsidiarity belie the interpretation of Quadragesimo 
Anno as an unduly corporatist or collectivist document that provided license to 
overreaching state authority in the 1930s. Indeed, the principle of subsidiarity in 
Quadragesimo Anno serves as the corrective to the corporatist model of state intervention 
in economic affairs that is arguably advanced in the earlier paragraphs of the encyclical. 
It is difficult to overstate the import of Quadragesimo Anno for all later discussion of 
subsidiarity. Later ecclesial authorities will cite ¶ 79 repeatedly as the clearest articulation 
of subsidiarity, just as the language of assignment of authority, where proper, to the 
“lesser and subordinate” community will influence the understanding of subsidiarity 
among political theorists.46 
 2. Divini Illius Magistri 
Written in 1929 amid the explosive growth of parochial education in the United 
States, Divini Illius Magistri is important to our treatment of subsidiarity for at least two 
reasons. First, it is a rare encyclical addressed to all of the faithful and not merely to the 
bishops or clergy. Second, and of particular note for an American audience, it is almost 
certainly the only papal encyclical to cite authoritatively a decision of the United States 
Supreme Court.47 The encyclical is, then, important for this dissertation for purposes of 
 
 
46 See, e.g., ROMMEN, supra note 33, at 301 (“All organizational forms have their intrinsic values 
and their objective ends, the upper form does not make the lower one superfluous; it must never abolish it, 
nor may it take over its functions and purposes.”). 
47 DIVINI ILLIUS MAGISTRI, ¶ 33, ¶ 37 n.28 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). 
For a discussion of Pierce and subsidiarity, see Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, 
Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 144-45 (2000): 
Perhaps Pierce and the cluster of values and maxims for which it is thought to stand are best 
defended not in terms of parents’ individual “rights” against government, and certainly not in 
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the discussion of school finance in Chapter Five. More broadly, however, it provides 
another, complementary view of the social theory that Pius presented in Quadragesimo 
Anno. 
Pius begins by arguing for the essentially social character of education, which is 
based in the importance of the family in the social order (¶ 9). The encyclical then 
distinguishes between two “societies,” the imperfect society of the family and the perfect 
society of civil society: 
In the first place comes the family, instituted directly by God for its peculiar 
purpose, the generation and formation of offspring; for this reason it has priority 
of nature and therefore of rights over civil society. Nevertheless, the family is an 
imperfect society, since it has not in itself all the means for its own complete 
development; whereas civil society is a perfect society, having in itself all the 
means for its peculiar end, which is the temporal well-being of the community; 
and so, in this respect, that is, in view of the common good, it has pre-eminence 
over the family, which finds its own suitable temporal perfection precisely in civil 
society. (¶ 10).  
 
A third society, the Church, is, according to Pius, a supernatural society that aims at the 
end of eternal salvation (¶ 10). 
Education, the encyclical argues, belongs to all three societies: the family, civil 
society, and the Church “in due proportion, corresponding…to the co-ordination of their 
respecting ends” (¶ 12). The state’s responsibility is to safeguard the right of the family to 
oversee the education of children, particularly in matters of religious education (¶ 39). 
Anticipating the later expressions of subsidiarity’s encouragement of the “higher” 
 
terms of ownership and property, but instead in terms of subsidiarity. Maybe we should think of 
the family, as it appears in Pierce and in contemporary debates about civic education, parental 
authority, and religious freedom, as the original “mediating institution.” 
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authority to aid the “lower” authority when necessary, Pius also discusses the role of the 
state in protecting children where parental authority is improperly exercised. “It also 
belongs to the State to protect the rights of the child itself,” he writes, “when the parents 
are found wanting either physically or morally in this respect, whether by default, 
incapacity or misconduct, since, as has been shown, their right to educate is not an 
absolute and despotic one” (¶ 39). In such cases, the state “supplies deficiencies” in the 
society of the family, always with a view toward the common good. 
These exceptional interventions aside, the state’s primary role with respect to 
education is to “encourage[]” and “assist[]” “the initiative and activity of the Church and 
the family, whose successes in this field have been clearly demonstrated by history and 
experience” (¶ 40). The state supplements the work of other societies when they are 
unable to achieve the ends of education, for the state “more than any other society is 
provided with the means put at its disposal for the needs of all” (¶ 40). Of particular 
import for the principle of subsidiarity is Pius’ insistence that the state “should respect the 
inherent rights of the Church and of the family concerning Christian education, and 
moreover have regard for distributive justice” (¶ 42). Among the possible violations of 
such a right is a state’s insistence that children be educated in public schools. Such a 
monopoly of education is, according to Pius, “unjust and unlawful” insofar as it “forces 
families to make use of government schools, contrary to the dictates of their Christian 
conscience, or contrary even to their legitimate preferences” (¶ 42). 
Two years before Quadragesimo Anno, then, we see that Pius’ social thought has 
already advanced an understanding of the social order that reflects many of Leo’s neo-
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Thomist principles and will echo in later papal social encyclicals. In particular, Pius 
adopts Taparelli’s insistence on the historical and contingent application of the natural 
law to circumstances and Leo’s view of the family as a primordial society within society. 
Pius goes beyond Leo’s late-nineteenth century scholasticism, however, in his willingness 
to address more fully the limits of the state and to develop a theory of the state apart from 
and beyond the debates over religious freedom that will continue to rage in Catholic 
thought for another three decades until the Second Vatican Council. 
 3. Oswald von Nell-Breuning 
Oswald von Nell-Breuning, S.J. (1890-1991) was a follower of the German Jesuit 
economist Heinrich Pesch.48 Nell-Breuning wrote his doctoral dissertation on the 
morality of stock markets, taught for most of his career in Frankfurt at the Hochschule 
Sankt Georgen and the Goethe University, and is widely acknowledged to be the primary 
drafter of Quadragesimo Anno.49 
Reorganization of Social Economy is a study guide of sorts, reprinting sections of 
Quadragesimo Anno and then commenting on the text of the encyclical. In his discussion 
of the Leonine doctrine of the state, Nell-Breuning observes that Pius, while following 
Leo’s basic doctrine, “is far from overrating the state’s possibilities.”50 Instead, “[t]he 
 
48 For a general overview of Pesch’s thought, see Richard E. Mulcahy, S.J., The Welfare 
Economics of Heinrich Pesch, 63 Q.J. ECON. 342 (1949). 
49 See OSWALD VON NELL-BREUNING, REORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL 
ENCYCLICAL DEVELOPED AND EXPLAINED (Bernard W. Dempsey, S.J. ed. & trans., 1936) and The Drafting 
of Quadragesimo Anno, in READINGS IN MORAL THEOLOGY NO. 5, supra note 13, at 60. See also Philip 
John Chmielewski, The Ethics of Work: An Analysis of the Concept of Labor as Presented by Major 
Economic Writers of the Modern Age 255-311 (1987) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). 
50 REORGANIZATION OF SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 51, at 201. 
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reason for beginning his discussion [of the reconstruction of the social order] with the 
state is, characteristically enough, not the intention of having the state assume new 
responsibilities, but, on the contrary, to demand that it refrain from activities into which it 
has intruded or, in part, been forced.”51 
In response to this crisis of the state, Nell-Breuning argues that Pius diagnosed 
“an offense against the principle of all social life.”52 According to Nell-Breuning, this 
principle is the “famous principle of Subsidiarity or Social Activities” or “the principle of 
Subsidiarity of Associations, a fundamental principle of Christian social doctrine which 
renders it essentially different from every collectivistic and one-sidedly exaggerated 
universalistic social philosophy.”53 Recognizing the weight of the scholastic tradition 
within which the encyclical is placed, Nell-Breuning attempts to ground the principle of 
subsidiarity in Thomism by way of an extended discussion of “whole” and “parts,” of 
“society” and the “individual.” According to Nell-Breuning, the key claim in the Thomist 
tradition and now reflected in subsidiarity is that the person is both an individual but also 
social, and “we proceed from the individual and the society at the same time.”54 
At the conclusion of his brief treatment of subsidiarity, Nell-Breuning himself 
moves beyond Pius and anticipates the writings on subsidiarity of John XXIII in at least 
two respects.  First, Nell-Breuning argues that subsidiarity is essential for the protection 
of rights, a view we encountered briefly in Divini Illius Magistri but not otherwise readily 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 206. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 206-07 (emphasis in original). 
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associated with Pius XI.  Failing to recognize “the principle of subsidiarity of 
associations” leads, according to Nell-Breuning, to either individualism or collectivism, 
both of which “are contrary to reality” and lead to a “reversal of social order.”55 Second, 
in contrast to Pius’ concerns about over-reaching state authority and totalitarianism, Nell-
Breuning is willing to allow that subsidiarity is vital for the rehabilitation of state 
authority and creates the conditions for state intervention to secure the common good 
where necessary. Indeed, Nell-Breuning argues that by restricting state authority to the 
“supreme governing of communities,” such “moderation increases esteem and prestige” 
with respect to political authority.56  
C. John XXIII 
By moving directly from Pius XI to John XXIII, I do not mean to diminish the 
pontificate of Pius XII (1939-1958), surely one of the dominant figures in twentieth 
century Catholicism. But Pius XII, unlike his immediate predecessor and his successors, 
never composed a major social encyclical. His reign was, of course, dominated by World 
War II and its aftermath, and his famous Christmas addresses contain a masterful if 
“constrained and restricted repetition of some central values of the Catholic tradition of 
social thought, values such as the importance of maintaining the moral character of the 
state.”57 Pius XII’s pontificate was also influential in developing the Catholic theory of 
the state in central respects, including in its initial formulation of the question of 
 
55 Id. at 208. 
56 Id. at 209. 
57 John P. Langan, S.J., The Christmas Messages of Pius XII (1939-1945): Catholic Social 
Teaching in a Time of Extreme Crisis, in MODERN CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING: COMMENTARIES & 
INTERPRETATIONS 175, 188-89 (Kenneth R. Himes, O.F.M. ed., 2005). 
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Catholicism and democracy, even if there is little in Pius XII’s writings that can be 
accounted a direct contribution to the church’s teaching on subsidiarity.58 
1. Mater et Magistra 
In a volume devoted to a consideration of John XXIII’s Mater et Magistra (and a 
sequel to an earlier volume that traced the major themes of Catholic social thought from 
Leo XIII to Pius XII), Jean-Yves Calvez notes that the “first new striking aspect in the 
thought of John XXIII” was a “more frequent and more important intervention of the 
State” than found in the earlier papal social tradition.59  Indeed, subsidiarity is invoked in 
Mater et Magistra primarily to argue for the state’s intervention in economic affairs. 
“[T]he civil power must also have a hand in the economy…,” writes John XXIII, “[a]nd 
in this work of directing, stimulating, co-ordinating, supplying and integrating, its 
guiding principle must be the ‘principle of subsidiary function’ formulated by Pius XI in 
Quadragesimo Anno.”60 Later, John XXIII cites subsidiarity as a cautionary principle 
against state ownership of property and interference with private enterprise, such that 
“the State and other agencies of public law must not extend their ownership beyond what 
is clearly required by considerations of the common good properly understood” (¶ 117) 
and “public authority must encourage and assist private enterprise, entrusting to it, 
wherever possible, the continuation of economic development” (¶ 152). 
 
58 Id. at 181-83. 
59 JEAN-YVES CALVEZ, S.J., THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF JOHN XXIII: MATER ET MAGISTRA 45 
(George J. M. McKenzie, S.M. trans., 1965). 
60 POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA ¶¶ 52-53 (1961). 
 37 
                                                
Also important is Mater et Magistra’s discussion of socialization and the role the 
concept plays in the social tradition’s understanding of the role of the state. “[O]ne of the 
principal characteristics which seem to be typical of our age is an increase in social 
relationships,” writes John XXIII, “in those mutual ties, that is, which grow daily more 
numerous and which have led to the introduction of many and varied forms of 
associations in the lives and activities of citizens, and to their acceptance within our legal 
framework” (¶ 59). Rather than a depersonalizing threat, John XXIII sees socialization as 
offering the potential for the fulfillment of human rights and international cooperation: 
[T]his sort of development in social relationships brings many advantages in its 
train. It makes it possible for the individual to exercise many of his personal 
rights, especially those which we call economic and social and which pertain to 
the necessities of life, health care, education on a more extensive and improved 
basis, a more thorough professional training, housing, work, and suitable leisure 
and recreation. (¶ 61). 
 
From these texts, Calvez draws the lesson that John XXIII set out to “formulate 
the Church’s doctrine” with respect to state intervention “in calmer and less belligerent 
tones.”61 If Leo XIII was at pains to “put upon a solid footing…the government’s right to 
intervene in economic and social questions,” Pius XI posed “the question of restraining 
the momentum of State control in full development.”62 In Mater et Magistra, though, we 
see a strong assertion of subsidiarity as more than merely a principle of limitation or 
devolution alone: 
To a person who views the principle of subsidiarity as no more than a principle of 
limitation, it may seem strange to hear John XXIII declare that “State intervention 
 
61 CALVEZ, supra note 59, at 48. 
62 Id. 
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….relies upon (innititur) the principle of subsidiarity.” There will be no little 
surprise simply because such a person has not sufficiently understood that within 
the very action of intervention is contained its limitation.63 
 
Calvez concludes by noting that, in Mater et Magistra, “the application of the principle of 
subsidiarity in the thinking of John XXIII is not so much a question of delimiting certain 
areas which could in part lie outside any action by the State, as it is a matter of the way in 
which the State intervenes.”64 
  2. Pacem in Terris 
 Pacem in Terris is, as Russell Hittinger notes, nothing less than “a compendium of 
twentieth-century Catholic social, legal, and political thought.”65 Few, if any, documents 
in the papal encyclical tradition present as thorough and detailed a view of the Church’s 
teaching on the social order. The document ranges so broadly, however, that its treatment 
of subsidiarity is limited to just two places, even if the discussion of, for example, human 
rights is not easily read apart from the Catholic doctrine of the state to which the principle 
of subsidiarity is a major component. The first mention of subsidiarity occurs in the 
encyclical’s treatment of the juridical order. John XXIII counsels legislators that “[t]he 
good order of society also requires that individuals and subsidiary groups within the State 
be effectively protected by law in the affirmation of their rights and the performance of 
their duties, both in their relations with each other and with government officials.”66 
 
63 Id. at 49 (emphasis in original). 
64 Id. at 50 (emphasis in original). 
65 Hittinger, supra note 20, at 23. 
66 POPE JOHN XXIIII, PACEM IN TERRIS ¶ 169 (1963). 
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 Were that the only mention of subsidiarity in the document, it would hardly be 
worthy of note as a contribution to the church’s teaching on subsidiarity. But in a later 
section, John XXIII develops a remarkable view of subsidiarity and its relation to the 
international order. The encyclical moves from a consideration of economic and political 
matters in nation-states to an argument about the role of political authority in the global 
community. “The same principle of subsidiarity which governs the relations between 
public authorities and individuals, families and intermediate societies in a single State,” 
he writes, “must also apply to the relations between the public authority of the world 
community and the public authorities of each political community” (¶ 140). Recall that 
the initial articulation of the principle of  subsidiarity in Quadragesimo Anno held out the 
possibility of intervention in the matters of the lower association but did so within the 
framework of the state and subsidiary associations. In Pacem in Terris, John XXIII 
argues that there are “problems which, because of their extreme gravity, vastness and 
urgency, must be considered too difficult for the rulers of individual States to solve with 
any degree of success” and thereby require the help of international authorities to resolve 
(¶ 140). The potentially far-reaching implications of this view are muted somewhat, 
however, by the immediate qualification that “it is no part of the duty of universal 
authority to limit the sphere of action of the public authority of individual States, or to 
arrogate any of their functions to itself” (¶ 141). “On the contrary,” John XXIII 
concludes, “its essential purpose is to create world conditions in which the public 
authorities of each nation, its citizens and intermediate groups, can carry out their tasks, 
fulfill their duties and claim their rights with greater security” (¶ 141). 
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 During John XXIII’s short but influential pontificate, we see two developments in 
Catholic social teaching with respect to subsidiarity. First, the ambivalence regarding 
state intervention that periodically marked the articulation of subsidiarity amid fears of 
totalitarianism earlier in the twentieth century was replaced by a much stronger insistence 
on the importance of state intervention where appropriate, even if limited by other 
considerations. Second, John XXIII expanded the teachings of Pius XII regarding the 
global order and its role in securing social justice and invoked subsidiarity to defend the 
intervention, where appropriate, of international authority in the affairs of states. 
D. Vatican II 
1. Gaudium et Spes and Dignitatis Humanae 
It may seem unusual to place Gaudium et Spes, the Second Vatican Council’s 
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, and Dignitatis Humanae, the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom, alongside papal social encyclicals that take up the 
principle of subsidiarity and other themes in Catholic social teaching more directly. By 
way of illustration, the leading collection of Catholic social teaching documents, edited 
by David O’Brien and Thomas Shannon for Orbis Press, does not even include Dignitatis 
Humanae.67 I include Dignitatis Humanae among the major statements of the Catholic 
understanding of subsidiarity, however, on account of its signal contribution to the 
 
67 CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE (David J. O’Brien and Thomas A. 
Shannon eds., 1992). 
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Catholic doctrine of the state and the influence on the document of John Courtney 
Murray, S.J.68 
First, a brief word on Gaudium et Spes. While primarily concerned with an 
assessment of the church’s place in modernity, Gaudium et Spes includes substantial 
discussions of political authority and the person. The Constitution echoes John XXIII on 
socialization: 
Among those social ties which man needs for his development some, like the 
family and political community, relate with greater immediacy to his innermost 
nature; others originate rather from his free decision. In our era, for various 
reasons, reciprocal ties and mutual dependencies increase day by day and give 
rise to a variety of associations and organizations, both public and private. This 
development, which is called socialization, while certainly not without its 
dangers, brings with it many advantages with respect to consolidating and 
increasing the qualities of the human person, and safeguarding his rights.69 
 
In two additional places, Gaudium et Spes sounds the theme of subsidiarity. In its 
discussion of interdependence and the common good, Gaudium et Spes states that 
“[e]very social group must take account of the needs and legitimate aspirations of other 
groups, and even of the general welfare of the entire human family.”70 Finally, Gaudium 
et Spes echoes John XXIII in Pacem in Terris on subsidiarity and the role of international 
organizations: 
It is the role of the international community to coordinate and promote 
development, but in such a way that the resources earmarked for this purpose will 
be allocated as effectively as possible, and with complete equity. It is likewise this 
 
68 For an extensive treatment of the debate over the Declaration at the Council, see RICHARD J. 
REGAN, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL (1967).  A 
summary of the subsequent reception of Dignitatis Humanae in the Church is provided by HERMINIO RICO, 
JOHN PAUL II AND THE LEGACY OF DIGNITATIS HUMANAE (2002). 
69 GAUDIUM ET SPES ¶ 5 (1965). 
70 Id. ¶ 26. 
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community’s duty, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity, so to regulate 
economic relations throughout the world that these will be carried out in 
accordance with the norms of justice.71 
 
Moving to Dignitatis Humanae, for those who take from the document simply a 
development or outright change in the Church’s teaching on religious freedom, it may be 
surprising to learn that the document raises at the outset the same topic as many of the 
social encyclicals we have encountered thus far: the role of the family. Indeed, the 
document speaks of the family as a society, much as Pius XI did in Divini Illius Magistri: 
“The family, since it is a society in its own original right, has the right freely to live its 
own domestic religious life under the guidance of parents.”72 Further echoing Pius XI, 
the document argues that parents “have the right to determine, in accordance with their 
own religious beliefs, the kind of religious education that their children are to receive,” 
and that government is limited in its imposition of education that burdens this religio
freedom.73 
The central teaching of Dignitatis Humanae is, of course, on the role of the state 
in protecting religious freedom above and beyond the safeguarding of religious 
education. In the first paragraph, the document asserts that “constitutional limits should 
be set to the powers of government, in order that there may be no encroachment on the 
 
71 Id. ¶ 86. 
72 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE ¶ 5 (1965) (emphasis added). 
73 Id.: 
Government, in consequence, must acknowledge the right of parents to make a genuinely free 
choice of schools and of other means of education, and the use of this freedom of choice is not to 
be made a reason for imposing unjust burdens on parents, whether directly or indirectly. Besides, 
the right of parents are violated, if their children are forced to attend lessons or instructions which 
are not in agreement with their religious beliefs, or if a single system of education, from which all 
religious formation is excluded, is imposed upon all. 
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rightful freedom of the person and of associations.”74 The ensuing discussion of limits to 
state authority in religious matters presents a doctrine of the state that, as Pietro Pavan 
argues, differs from both “the Catholic-confessional”75 model of previous Catholic social 
teaching and “the laicist or neutralistic” state against which Dignitatis Humanae is partly 
directed.76 For purposes of the principle of subsidiarity, the document contains a rich set 
of reflections on the possibilities of and limits to state intervention. 
The “society of societies” terminology that can be traced back to Taparelli is 
found in Dignitatis Humanae’s assertion that the protection of religious freedom rests on 
each aspect of society “in the manner proper to each.”77 Dignitatis Humanae carves out a 
special place for the freedom and autonomy of religious communities, which “are a 
requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself.”78 Within the limits of 
public order, “religious communities rightfully claim freedom in order that they may 
govern themselves according to their own norms,” and “have the right not to be hindered 
 
74 Id. ¶ 1. 
75 Pietro Pavan, Ecumenism and Vatican II’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, in RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM: 1965 & 1975 7, 29 (Walter J. Burghardt, S.J. ed., 1976). 
76 Pietro Pavan, Declaration on Religious Freedom, in 4 COMMENTARY ON THE DOCUMENTS OF 
VATICAN II 63, 64 (Herbert Vorgrimler ed., 1969). 
77 DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 72 ¶ 6: 
Since the common welfare of society consists in the entirety of those conditions of social life 
under which men enjoy the possibility of achieving their own perfection in a certain fullness of 
measure and also with some relative ease, it chiefly consists in the protection of the rights, and in 
the performance of the duties, of the human person. Therefore the care of the right to religious 
freedom devolves upon the whole citizenry, upon social groups, upon government, and upon the 
Church and other religious communities, in virtue of the duty of all toward the common welfare, 
and in the manner proper to each. 
78 Id. ¶ 4. 
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in their public teaching and witness to their faith, whether by the spoken or by the written 
word.”79 
Dignitatis Humanae is an unlikely source of insight for the principle of 
subsidiarity. The document is short (merely fifteen paragraphs) and is almost entirely 
directed at the problem of religious freedom that had vexed Catholic social doctrine for 
over a century. But the document contains the basis for a still-to-be-written contemporary 
Catholic theory of the state to match Rommen’s towering achievement from 1945, 
including the suggestive endorsement of a constitutionally limited state, the place of 
religious communities in the modern state, and the distinction between public order and 
the common good. For these reasons, the document develops the principle of subsidiarity 
in new and still unexplored directions. 
2. John Courtney Murray. S.J. 
John Courtney Murray was a widely acknowledged source for what became 
Dignitatis Humanae, and Murray wrote extensively about Dignitatis Humanae in the two 
years between the Council’s promulgation of the document and his untimely death in 
1967.80 The focus of Murray’s work was the issue of religious freedom and the relation 
of church and state, a topic distinct from but related to the broader questions of politica
 
79 Id. 
80 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 672 (Walter 
M. Abbott ed., 1966); John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Declaration on Religious Freedom, in VATICAN II: 
AN INTERFAITH APPRAISAL 565 (John H. Miller ed., 1966); John Courtney Murray, S.J., The Declaration on 
Religious Freedom, in WAR, POVERTY, FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN RESPONSE 3 (Franz Böckle ed., 1966). 
Just before the Council took up the debate over Dignitatis Humanae, Murray published his classic essay 
The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 503 (1964). 
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theory in which subsidiarity finds a place. In his early essays on Leo XIII’s doctrine of 
the state, Murray noted the nascent articulation of subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum: 
A third classic text [Rerum Novarum, ¶ 51] states the essential action required of 
government; it is action, not properly intervention. It is an action in favor of those 
free associations within the commonwealth upon which, according to the 
principles of right social order, there falls in the first instance the responsibility 
for promoting the particular social goods which integrate the common 
good….This principle struck at the social theory and polity, individualist in 
philosophical origin and totalitarian in political tendency, which denied and 
destroyed all intermediary institutions between the individual and the state.81 
 
Additionally, toward the end of his famous 1960 collection of essays, We Hold These 
Truths, Murray writes about subsidiarity as a manifestation of medieval natural law 
theory. The principle of subsidiarity, according to Murray, “asserts the organic character 
of the state—the right to existence and autonomous functioning of various sub-political 
groups, which united in the organic unity of the state without losing their own identity or 
suffering infringement of their own ends or having their functions assumed by the 
state.”82 
Without more, it is difficult to know what Murray means by “the organic 
character of the state,” though he may simply be referring to the hierarchical conception 
of the state and of political authority that would be familiar to anyone formed in the 
scholastic tradition. Murray continues with an application of subsidiarity to the modern 
state that is clearly important for the view of religious freedom adopted five years later at 
the Council: “This principle [subsidiarity] is likewise the assertion of the fact that the 
 
81 Murray, supra note 19, at 552. 
82 JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J., WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION 334 (1960). 
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freedom of the individual is secured at the interior of institutions intermediate between 
himself and the state (e.g., trade unions) or beyond the state (the church).”83 
In this brief and merely suggestive discussion of subsidiarity in Murray, we see 
him synthesizing the social tradition while also developing it. Murray highlights the 
possibility of state intervention in Leo XIII but notes its limits, which serves his 
objectives well when the question of the state and religious freedom is taken up at the 
Council. 
E. John Paul II 
In the long pontificate of John Paul II, he issued several encyclicals that could be 
accounted social encyclicals, including Sollicitudo Rei Socialis and Evagelium Vitae. For 
our purposes, we will focus on his major social encyclical written for the one-hundredth 
anniversary of Rerum Novarum, Centesimus Annus. In Centesimus Annus , we see the 
clearest articulation in John Paul’s social thought of the proper role of the state and also 
the juxtaposition of subsidiarity with solidarity, a move encountered a few years earlier in 
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis.84 Centesimus Annus is, then, important for our discussion of 
subsidiarity for three reasons: (1) its reaffirmation of the possibility of state intervention, 
 
83 Id. 
84 See POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS ¶ 39 (1987): 
The exercise of solidarity within each society is valid when its members recognize one another as 
persons. Those who are more influential, because they have a greater share of goods and common 
services, should feel responsible for the weaker and be ready to share with them all they possess. 
Those who are weaker, for their part, in the same spirit of solidarity, should not adopt a purely 
passive attitude or one that is destructive of the social fabric, but, while claiming their legitimate 
rights, should do what they can for the good of all. The intermediate groups, in their turn, should 
not selfishly insist on their particular interests, but respect the interests of others. 
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(2) its emphasis on a limited state, and (3) placing solidarity alongside subsidiarity as a 
principle for Catholic social doctrine. 
First, as with Rerum Novarum, the primary focus of Centesimus Annus’ treatment 
of the state is with respect to intervention in economic affairs.  Writing about economic 
policies such as wages and hours, John Paul argues that 
The State must contribute to the achievement of these goals both directly and 
indirectly. Indirectly and according to the principle of subsidiarity, by creating 
favorable conditions for the free exercise of economic activity, which will lead to 
abundant opportunities for employment and sources of wealth. Directly and 
according to the principle of solidarity, by defending the weakest, by placing 
certain limits on the autonomy of the parties who determine working conditions, 
and by ensuring in every case the necessary minimum support for the unemployed 
worker.85 
 
The encouragement of private enterprise combined with the direct intervention of the 
state directly to ensure conditions of economic justice is by now a familiar argument from 
the preceding papal social tradition.  
Second, although some Catholic neo-conservatives perhaps overstate the view 
that Centesimus Annus straightforwardly endorses American-style liberal capitalism and a 
limited state,86 the encyclical does offer a longer and more emphatic argument for 
limiting the reach of the state than any encyclical since Quadragesimo Anno. John Paul 
criticizes overreaching state intervention in economic matters as a manifestation of the 
“Social Assistance State”: 
 
85 POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS ¶ 15 (1991) (emphasis added). 
86 For a representative expression of this view, see Richard John Neuhaus, The Liberalism of John 
Paul II, 73 FIRST THINGS 16 (1997). 
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In recent years the range of such intervention has vastly expanded, to the point of 
creating a new type of State, the so-called “Welfare State.” This has happened in 
some countries in order to respond better to many needs and demands, by 
remedying forms of poverty and deprivation unworthy of the human person. 
However, excesses and abuses, especially in recent years, have provoked very 
harsh criticisms of the Welfare State, dubbed the “Social Assistance State.” 
Malfunctions and defects in the Social Assistance State are the result of an 
inadequate understanding of the tasks proper to the State. Here again the principle 
of subsidiarity must be respected: a community of a higher order should not 
interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter 
of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to coordinate 
its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the 
common good.87 
 
This aspect of Centesimus Annus, however, must be placed alongside the 
reaffirmation, just a few lines earlier, of the traditional doctrine that the state may 
intervene to secure the “sure guarantees of individual freedom and private property, as 
well as a stable currency and efficient public services.”88 John Paul argues that 
The State has the further right to intervene when particular monopolies create 
delays or obstacles to development. In addition to the tasks of harmonizing and 
guiding development, in exceptional circumstances the State can also exercise a 
substitute function, when social sectors or business systems are too weak or are 
just getting under way, and are not equal to the task at hand. Such supplementary 
interventions, which are justified by urgent reasons touching the common good, 
must be as brief as possible, so as to avoid removing permanently from society 
and business systems the functions which are properly theirs, and so as to avoid 
enlarging excessively the sphere of State intervention to the detriment of both 
economic and civil freedom.89 
 
The teaching of Centesimus Annus with respect to state intervention is, then, rooted in the 
traditional insistence both on the possibility of the active, intervening state (a theme 
 
87 CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 85, ¶ 48 (emphases added). 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (emphasis added). 
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highlighted in Rerum Novarum and Pacem in Terris) and on the limits of such state 
intervention (emphasized in Quadragesimo Anno and Dignitatis Humanae). 
 What is truly novel in Centesimus Annus is the assertion of solidarity as a 
principle in social doctrine alongside subsidiarity. Indeed, associational life, which was 
invoked in Rerum Novarum and its progeny as an aspect of subsidiarity (thereby 
protecting associations from unwarranted interference from the state), is invoked in 
Centesimus Annus as an aspect of solidarity. “Apart from the family, other intermediate 
communities exercise primary functions and give life to specific networks of solidarity,” 
writes John Paul II.90 This shift to solidarity in the thought of John Paul II can partly be 
ascribed to his overriding anthropological concerns and his insistence—derived from his 
phenomenological philosophical background—that political theory begin with the human 
person properly understood. “Man remains above all a being who seeks the truth and 
strives to live in that truth,” he writes in the conclusion to the section of Centesimus 
Annus that details his views on subsidiarity and solidarity, “deepening his understanding 
of it through a dialogue which involves past and future generations.”91 In other social 
encyclicals, such as Solicitudo Rei Socialis, John Paul II combined the discussion of 
solidarity with an analysis of the emerging context of globalization and the preferential 
option for the poor.92 
 
 
90 Id. ¶ 49. 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., SOLLICITUDO REI SOCIALIS, supra note 84, ¶ 42: 
Today, furthermore, given the worldwide dimension which the social question has assumed, this 
love of preference for the poor, and the decisions which it inspires in us, cannot but embrace the 
immense multitudes of the hungry, the needy, the homeless, those without medical care and, above 
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The papal social tradition broadly and the teaching on the principle of subsidiarity 
have developed significantly since Rerum Novarum. In the pertinent sections on 
subsidiarity in Rerum Novarum, Leo worked within the scholastic framework to advance 
a social theory that began with the family and private property and then built up to the 
initial formulation of a doctrine of the state. By contrast, the paragraphs of Centesimus 
Annus under examination here adopt the phenomenological framework of John Paul II 
and begin with the modern state, in both its possibilities and pitfalls, and conclude with 
the human person and human relationships in solidarity as the center of Catholic social 
teaching. 
II. Conclusion: Subsidiarity and the Common Good 
In a 1988 article addressing the ecclesiological question of subsidiarity’s role 
within the church, Joseph Komonchak provides nine elements of the principle of 
subsidiarity as it has evolved in the church’s social teaching: 
1. The priority of the person as the origin and purpose of society: civitas propter 
cives, non cives propter civitatem. 
2. At the same time, the human person is naturally social, only able to achieve 
self-realization in and through social relationships—what is sometimes called 
the “principle of solidarity.” 
3. Social relationships and communities exist to provide help (subsidium) to 
individuals in their free but obligatory assumption of responsibility for their 
own self-realization.  This “subsidiary” function of society is not a matter, 
except in exceptional circumstances, of substituting or supplying for 
individual self-responsibility, but of providing the sets of conditions necessary 
for personal self-realization. 
4. Larger, “higher” communities exit to perform the same subsidiary roles 
toward smaller, “lower” communities. 
 
all, those without hope of a better future. It is impossible not to take account of the existence of 
these realities. 
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5. The principle of subsidiarity requires positively that all communities not only 
permit but enable and encourage individuals to exercise their own self-
responsibility and that larger communities do the same for smaller ones. 
6. It requires negatively that communities not deprive individuals and smaller 
communities of their right to exercise their self-responsibility.  Intervention, in 
other words, is only appropriate as “helping people help themselves.” 
7. Subsidiarity, therefore, serves as the principle by which to regulate 
competencies between individuals and communities and between smaller and 
larger communities. 
8. It is a formal principle, needing determination in virtue of the nature of a 
community and of particular circumstances. 
9. Because it is grounded in the metaphysics of the person, it applies to the life 
of every society.93 
 
 A review of Komonchak’s proposed elements shows their consonance with the 
themes noted in the foregoing discussion: the importance of anthropological 
considerations, the place of the common good, and the significance of associations.  Even 
if useful as a handy summary of the principle of subsidiarity as it has developed in papal 
social teaching, however, Komonchak’s elements—and other, usually quite similar, 
attempts to summarize subsidiarity as it has developed in Catholic social teaching—are 
less helpful in answering the central question of this dissertation: how does subsidiarity 
relate to American constitutional federalism and localism? 
To answer that very different question, a voice from outside the Catholic tradition, 
the English Reformed theologian Jonathan Chaplin, offers a helpful framework. In 
response to the question of what the state “may do as it acts subsidiarily towards the 
lesser communities,” Chaplin argues that “three particular kinds of activities may 
 
93 Komonchak, supra note 3, at 301-02. 
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conveniently be distinguished: enabling, intervening, and substituting.”94 These three 
“activities,” or, as we might term them, “subsidiary functions” form a continuum among 
minimal (“enabling”) to maximal (“substituting”) aspects of intervention by the state or 
by centralized political authority. 
Chaplin’s category of “substituting activities,” in which “the state directly 
assumes tasks specifically belonging to lesser communities” is, generally speaking, 
“ruled out.”95 As examples, Chaplin cites nationalized industries or “a centrally planned 
economy,” though he allows for exceptional circumstances in which “a particular 
community is chronically deficient and incapable of performing basic functions” (91-92). 
In such cases, temporary substitution for the lesser community may be consistent with 
subsidiarity. 
Chaplin’s argument moves to a rejection of hierarchical political authority, which 
he associates with Thomist metaphysics and, he argues, poses problems for the 
understanding of subsidiarity in Catholic social teaching. Even without following 
Chaplin’s argument in that regard, though, his reformulation of the three activities 
(enabling, intervening, and substituting) is an important clarification to the contemporary 
debate and allows us to move to the argument of the following chapters. Enabling, 
according to Chaplin, is finally “the task of creating legal conditions” and thereby “the 
 
94 Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity as a Political Norm, in POLITICAL THEORY AND CHRISTIAN 
VISION 81, 90 (Jonathan Chaplin & Paul Marshall eds., 1994) [hereinafter Chaplin, Political Norm].  For a 
comparative perspective on the Catholic principle of subsidiarity and “sphere sovereignty” in Calvinist 
thought, see Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity and Sphere Sovereignty: Catholic and Reformed Conceptions 
of the Role of the State, in THINGS OLD AND NEW: CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING REVISITED 175 (Francis P. 
McHugh & Samuel M. Natale eds., 1993). 
95 Chaplin, Political Norm, supra note 94, at 90. 
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preferably by means of subordinate authorities, namely, those of member societies in an 
definitive function of the state.” “The distinctive end of the state,” argues Chaplin, “is the 
creation of a framework of public law embodying the norms of justice and the 
requirements of the common good” (95). So also intervention in the affairs of lower 
communities is necessary “when any failure on their part to fulfill their duties bears 
consequences for the common good.” Finally, when “mere intervention proves 
insufficient to protect the common good, substitution may be necessary” (96). 
As summarized by Chaplin, “enabling activities” are those that “involve the 
creation of the necessary legal, economic, social and moral conditions in which lesser 
communities can flourish” (90). This activity arguably comes closest to the original 
meaning of subsidiarity as “help” or “assistance” and to Taparelli’s older conception of 
Hypotactic Right. “Intervening activities,” by contrast, are “interventions in the internal 
affairs of a lesser community,” which “are justified when there is some obvious 
deficiency or distortion within them which may affect the common good.” Importantly, 
such intervening functions are “justified not in terms of the benefits accruing to the 
particular communities themselves, but to those accruing to the common good” (91). 
Once again, then, we see in Chaplin’s sympathetic interpretation and reconstruction of the 
Catholic social tradition on the principle of subsidiarity a rejection of an unduly cramped 
view of subsidiarity as a principle of devolution or otherwise a libertarian directive. 
Instead, the common good serves as the motivation for such intervention, not the 
narrower good of particular communities. As formulated by Johannes Messner, the 
principle of subsidiarity “obliges the state authority to take heed of the common good, 
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organization of the state community based on the federative and corporative 
principles.”96
 
96 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 214 (J.J. Doherty 
trans., 1949). Messner goes on to note that this relation between subsidiarity and the common good has 
important implications for the theory of the state. See id.: 
The principle of subsidiarity function, however, certainly does not signify a weak state standing 
without authority face to face with a pluralistic society. On the contrary, the more strongly the 
character of society develops in its federative and corporative branches, both regional and 
occupational, in conjunction with a plurality of free associations based on economic group 
interests, the more clearly does the common good principle call for a state with strong authority 
which will enable it, in a pluralistic society with diversified competencies and interests, to carry 
out its essential functions: namely, to care for the common good and the general interest. 
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CHAPTER TWO: SUBSIDIARITY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
Introduction 
When subsidiarity has (infrequently) arisen as a topic of political discussion in the 
United States, advocates of subsidiarity-based restrictions on the power of the national 
government have usually been associated with the libertarian aspects of subsidiarity 
discussed in Chapter One. At the same time, American constitutional law is amid a raging 
debate over the character of American federalism that was inaugurated by the Supreme 
Court’s federalism decisions in, to cite the most prominent recent cases, United States v. 
Lopez,1 United States v. Morrison,2 and Board of Trustees v. Garrett.3 Many suspect that 
advocacy of federalism is a jurisprudential mask worn by the Supreme Court to conceal 
its underlying policy preferences in these cases (just as, some may argue, subsidiarity is 
adopted as a theological mask to advance certain policy preferences): “[F]ederalism du 
jour merely serves as a convenient shill for the policy preferences of the current members 
of the Supreme Court,” writes Ronald Krotoszynski.4 I intend to argue that this view is 
 
1 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating portions of the Gun Free School Zones Act as exceeding 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
2 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating portions of the Violence against Women Act as exceeding 
Congress’s power under both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
3 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act as applied to 
the states and state employees as exceeding Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment and 
violating the provisions of state sovereign immunity in the Eleventh Amendment). 
4 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the ‘Sounds of Sovereignty’ but Missing the Beat: Does 
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misguided, not least in its failure to appreciate fully subsidiarity’s role as a possible 
theoretical justification for federalism.5 
All this is not to say, of course, that the Catholic principle of subsidiarity and 
American federalism are identical, though several commentators note the close family 
resemblance between them.  It would be too strong to say, with Robert Sirico, that 
subsidiarity “has found its political expression in the American concept of federalism.”6 
A more balanced view would hold “that federal arrangements…are one possible 
expression, in history, of the principle of subsidiarity.”7 A subtle difference between 
federalism and subsidiarity is that American constitutional federalism enumerates powers 
for the national government but does not expressly reserve any powers to the states; 
subsidiarity, by contrast, offers guidance for the distribution of political authority both
“up” (toward higher levels of authority–international or national actors, as we saw 
especially in our discussion of Pacem in Terris) and “down” (toward lower levels of
authority–local communities and families, as we saw especially in our discussio
XI).  “[A]lthough federalism conveys a general sense of a vertical distribution, or 
 
5 Though he mentions subsidiarity only in passing, my views here, as will be discussed in the 
conclusion to this chapter, are consonant with John O. McGinnis’s as found in his article, Reviving 
Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 
490-91 (2002) (“Because the Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence seems designed to protect the decentralized 
order and mediating institutions that Alexis De Tocqueville, the great analyst of American democracy, 
viewed as our society’s distinctive principle, perhaps the appellation that summarizes the Rehnquist Court’s 
approach best is Tocquevillian.”). 
6 Robert A. Sirico, Subsidiarity, Society, and Entitlements: Understanding and Application, 11 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 549, 549 (1997). 
7 GEORGE WEIGEL, SOUL OF THE WORLD: NOTES ON THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC CATHOLICISM 193 
n.17 (1996). See also Fred Crosson, Catholic Social Teaching and American Society, in PRINCIPLES OF 
CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING 165, 171 (David A. Boileau ed., 1998) (“It would be hard to think of a more 








balance, of power,” George Bermann writes, “it is not generally understood as ex
a preference for any particular distribution of that power, much less dictating any 
particular inquiry into the implications of specific governmental action for that 
distribution.  In this respect, federalism and subsidiarity, though of course close
are quite different.”8  This chapter will summarize and evaluate the recent debate over 
American constitutional federalism as it has evolved in a series of Supreme Court 
decisions and as the Catholic principle of subsidiarity might relate to and illumi
Part I of this chapter will take up the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence 
two sections. Part I-A will treat the evolution of Commerce Clause jurisprudence f
the New Deal expansion of national power to recent cases curtailing the scope of 
congressional authority.9 Part I-B will examine the scope of Congress’ power under § 5 
                                                 
8 George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Communi
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 404 (1994). 
9 The New Deal era presents an especially important example of the interaction between 
subsidiarity and American federalism. Within American Catholicism and in the wake of Quadragesimo 
Anno, differing views over subsidiarity marked the disagreements between John A. Ryan and the G
American Catholic Central-Verein Movement’s leading figures (Frederick P. Kenkel and William J. 
Engelen). See CHARLES E. CURRAN, AMERICAN CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS: TWENTIETH CENTURY 
APPROACHES 26-129 (1982); PHILIP GLEASON, THE CONSERVATIVE REFORMERS: GERMAN-AMERICAN 
CATHOLICS AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1968); DAVID J. O’BRIE
ty and 
erman-




es Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994).   John 
 
: THE NEW DEAL YEARS (1968); and AARON I. ABELL, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM AND SOCIAL 
ACTION: A SEARCH FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 1865-1950 (1960).  
In American constitutional law, the 1930’s witnessed the famous “switch-in-time” reinterpretation 
of the Commerce Clause and the scope of the national government’s authority. The historiography of the 
New Deal Court is currently undergoing considerable revision, with many scholars now contending that the 
Court did not simply alter its Commerce Clause jurisprudence in response to President Roosevelt’s “court 
packing” plan (an “externalist” explanation) but instead developed “internalist” constitutional doctrin
assess–and eventually uphold–various New Deal programs.  See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE N
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
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of the Fourteenth Amendment, from its original understanding during Reconstruction and
in such early cases as United States v. Harris10 and the Civil Rights Cases11 through 
recent decisions12 restricting Congress’ substantive and remedial powers under that 
Amendment. Part II will depart from the set of doctrines narrowly related to federalism
and will examine two constitutional doctrines that are also relevant to subsidiarity, 
namely the freedom of association and parental due process liberty. Associational rights, 
grounded in constitutional doctrine in the First Amendment, are, I will argue, perhaps the 
closest thing in American constitutional law to the Catholic principle of subsidiarity.13 
Finally, Part III will briefly conclude the chapter by bringing the principle of subsidiarity 
to bear on the American debate over constitutional federalism by asking what a regime
constitutional federalism informed
of what I will term “functional pluralism.” 
The final three chapters of the dissertation will turn to a series of controversial 
political and legal issues to which these concerns of federalism and subsidiarity cou
applied.  I hope to stand in contrast to the view that subsidiarity and federalism are 
inherently “nationalist” or “localist” and always favor (or disfavor) an expansion of 
nationally (especially judicially, but also legislatively) determined rights and policies.  
                                                                                                                                              
A. Ryan himself criticized the Court’s anti-New Deal rulings in DECLINING LIBERTY AND OTHER PAPERS 
194-208 (1927). 
10 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
11 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
12 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 
(1997) (invalidating portions of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as exceeding Congress’ authority 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
13 The Supreme Court itself has not invoked subsidiarity by name with the sole exception of 
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The three areas that will serve as applications of subsidiarity to American federalism are
physician-assisted suicide, federal preemption, and school finance.  Subsidiarity, it will 
be argued, will sometimes temper and sometimes reinforce federalist impulses, belying 
the easy conclusion that subsidiarity always favors the devolution of decision-making. 
Instead, I intend to argue in Chapters 
subsidiarity suggestively cross-cuts ideological (both Americ
l) categories. 
I. The Supreme Court’s Federalism Jurisprudence 
In a series of decisions from New York v. United States14 in 1992 and United 
States v. Lopez in 1995 through United States v. Morrison in 2000 and Board of Trustees 
v. Garrett in 2001, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of congressional and federa
authority and expanded the sphere of policymaking and legislating by the states and local 
governments. The states and local governments are free, for example, to regulate gun 
possession in school zones even if Congress is not. These decisions, in turn, have set o
debate concerning the proper scope of federalism and the Court’s role in enforcing the 
boundaries between the federal and state governments.  There are basically four areas 
within which these decisions and the attendant debate have operated: (1) the power of 
Congress to enact legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause of Article I, § 8; (2) the 
power of Congress to enact legislation pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendm
the immunity of the states from private suits under the Eleventh Amendment, and (4) t
 
14 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
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uably limited at the time 
of the f ,16 a series of Supreme Court decisions 
Rather than 
ourt 
wrote that “[c]ommerce undoubtedly is traffic, but it is something more: it is 
                                                
autonomy of the executive and legislative powers of the states from federal 
commandeering.  This chapter will address only the Commerce Clause and § 5 of 
Fourteenth
arity and our discussion of them will broad
s. 
A. Commerce Clause 
Article I, § 8 of the Constitution states: “The Congress shall have the power…[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with 
Indian tribes….”15 Though the meaning of “commerce” was arg
raming of the Constitution to trade
gradually but decisively expanded the definition of commerce.  
1. Gibbons v. Ogden 
 The most important early case addressing the scope of Congress’s power is 
Gibbons v. Ogden.17 Gibbons’ importance is on account of Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
rejection of narrow definitions of “commerce” or “among the several States.” 
a definition of “commerce” that was limited to the buying and selling of goods, the C
 
U. CHI. L. REV. 101 
(2001); T
l enterprise will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of 
eat.) 1 (1824). 
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
16 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 
HE FEDERALIST NO. 11 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961): 
An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an 
interchange of their respective productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home, 
but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in every part will be replenished 
and will acquire additional motion and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every 
part. Commercia
different States. 








                                                
intercourse.”18 Furthermore, the Court rejected a narrow construction of the phrase 
“among the states” in § 8 that would have rendered all conduct occurring within a single
state beyond the reach of the commerce power. Instead, the Court held that “[t]he word 
‘among’ means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is intermingled with 
them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary of line of each 
State, but may be introduced into the interior.”19 Finally, the Court rejected the argument 
that the reservation of powers to the states in the Tenth Amendment20 operated to lim
Congress’s commerce power. “If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of 
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects,” the Court 
reasoned, “the power over commerce…among the se
absolutely as it would be in a single governm
 2. The New Deal 
Following Gibbons, the scope of Congress’s commerce power was rarely 
challenged until the New Deal’s expansion of federal power over a range of economic 
activities. In a series of cases in the 1930s, the Supreme Court held that a number of 
federal statutes exceeded the limits of the commerce power. For example, a chal
the Coal Conservation Act of 1935 included an argument that federal labor law 
regulations did not fall within the commerce power. “Plainly,” the Court wrote in Carter 
v. Carter Coal Co., “the incidents leading up to and culminating in the mining of coal do 
 
18 Id. at 189. 
19 Id. at 193. 
20 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
21 Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 197. 
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e again when the Court revisited its Commerce Clause 
jurispru
                                                
not constitute such intercourse. The employment of men, the fixing of their wages, hours
of labor and working conditions, the bargaining in respect of these thi
te intercourse for the purposes of production, not of trade.”22 
So also in the famous “sick chickens” case, A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, the Court held that portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act were
unconstitutional.23 The president promulgated a “Live Poultry Code” under the Act, “a 
code of fair competition for the live poultry industry of the metropolitan area in and abou
the City of New York.”24 Among other provisions, the Code limited the workweek to 40
hours, established a minimum wage, and prohibited child labor. The defendant poultry
producers argued that the Code exceeded Congress’ commerce power, and the Court 
agreed. “In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate 
transactions upon the ground that they ‘affect’ interstate commerce, there is a necessary 
and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects,” the Court began.25
The sharp distinction between such direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce 
provided the basis for the Court’s view that the conduct of the poultry producers, wh
was limited to New York state, had a merely indirect effect on interstate commerce 
outside New York’s boundaries. Employing a reductio argument, the Court note
concern that will emerg
dence in 1995: 
 
22 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936). 
23 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
24 Id. at 523. 
25 Id. at 546. 
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consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them ‘indirect.’”28 
                                                
If the commerce clause were construed to reach all enterprises and transactions 
which could be said to have an indirect effect upon interstate commerce, the 
federal authority would em
a
the federal government.26 
For a few years following Schecter Poultry, the effort to draw a principled 
distinction between direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce marked the Cour
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. This robust limitation on the scope of the commerce
power proved to be short-lived, however. In a rapid succession of cases from 1937 to 
1942 and culminating in Wicka
ss’s commerce power.  
In Wickard, the Court heard a challenge to provisions of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (“AAA”) that set a production quota in an effort to maintain the p
wheat.27 The plaintiff—forever known to generations of law students as “Farmer 
Filburn”—alleged that he grew wheat only for his own consumption, but he nonetheless 
exceeded his production quota and was fined. The Court held that even if Filburn’s w
was never destined to enter interstate commerce, application of the AAA to him was 
constitutionally permissible: “Once an economic measure of the reach of the power 
granted to Congress in the Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of federal power 
cannot be decided simply by finding the activity in question to be ‘production,’ no
 
26 Id. 
27 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
28 Id. at 124. 
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  3. 1995 - Present 
In the wake of Wickard and over the course of almost sixty years, most 
constitutional scholars had come to believe that the power of Congress to regulate 
interstate commerce knew virtually no limits.  What limits that were thought to exist, 
most argued, were policed by Congress itself through the political process.29  Indeed, 
many significant pieces of legislation having little to do with interstate commerce as 
such, including much of the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s, were passed 
under Congress’s interstate commerce power. Because the Supreme Court had ruled in 
the wake of enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments that the Fourteenth 
Amendment permitted Congress to regulate state conduct but not to regulate directly 
private conduct,30 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 pursuant to its commerce 
power, not the power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States31 and Katzenbach v. McClung32 (the famous Ollie’s Barbecue case) 
the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act as a constitutionally permissible use of the 
commerce power. 
In both Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach v. McClung, the Court adopted a 
thoroughgoing deference to Congress’s findings regarding the effect of discrimination in 
public accommodations on interstate commerce. “The commerce power invoked here by 
 
29 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
30 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
31 379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
32 379 U.S. 294 (1964). 
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the Congress is a specific and plenary one authorized by the Constitution itself,” the 
Court explained in Heart of Atlanta Motel, and: 
The only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that 
racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, 
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and 
appropriate. If they are, appellant has no “right” to select its guests as it sees fit, 
free from governmental regulation.33 
 
Similarly and relying heavily on Gibbons and Wickard as precedents for regulating 
putatively “local” activity, the Court reasoned in Katzenbach that it “must conclude that 
[Congress] had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination in restaurants had a 
direct and adverse effect on the free flow of interstate commerce.”34 
This expansive view of Congress’ commerce power was dislodged when the 
Court invalidated the Gun Free School Zones Act in 1995 in Lopez.  The Act made it a 
federal crime to possess a gun on the grounds of a school or within 1000 feet of school 
grounds. Alfonso Lopez, the defendant, was convicted under the statute and sentenced to 
six months imprisonment. On appeal, Lopez argued that the Act was beyond the scope of 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. The Fifth Circuit agreed with Lopez, and the 
Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for a five justice majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued that, because illegal possession of a gun within a school zone is non-economic 
activity, Congress cannot regulate such possession absent some link to economic activity 
or interstate commerce.  The Fifth Circuit’s holding had relied on the inadequacy of the 
congressional findings of a link between gun possession in a school zone and interstate 
 
33 379 U.S. at 258-59. 
34 379 U.S. at 304. 
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commerce. The Supreme Court evaded the question of the adequacy of the congressional 
findings and instead held that the prohibition on gun possession in school zones was not 
substantially related to interstate commerce. 
Chief Justice Rehquist’s opinion summarized the Court’s prior Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence as recognizing three types of permissible regulation under the commerce 
power. First, Congress may “regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,” 
with the regulation of public accommodations under the civil rights statutes as a 
particularly important example.35 The second category of permissible federal regulation 
is over the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” such as regulation of highways
railroads, and airlines.36 Finally—and most importantly—Congress may “regulate those 
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,” which is the most 
expansive potential use of the commerce power and harkens back to the New Deal cases 
that culminated in Wickard.37 Because the Gun Free School Zones Act did not fit into any 
of those categories, it exceeded Congress’s power. Furthermore, criminal law has, the 
Court argued, traditionally been the province of the states, and allowing Congress to 
regulate freely in this area would give the national government a broad police power. 
In concurring opinions, Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, and Thomas provided a 
wider framework for the Court’s opinion. Justices Kennedy and O’Connor jointly 
emphasized the values of federalism. “Of the various structural elements in the 
 
35 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
36 Id. at 558. 
37 Id. at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). 
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Constitution, separation of powers, checks and balances, judicial review, and federalism,” 
they write, “only concerning the last does there seem to be much uncertainty respecting 
the existence, and the content, of standards that allow the Judiciary to play a significant 
role in maintaining the design contemplated by the Framers.”38 Justices Kennedy and 
O’Connor concluded by arguing that the statute in Lopez “forecloses the States from 
experimenting and exercising their own judgment in an area to which States lay claim by 
right of history and expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of 
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term.”39 Without expressly invoking 
subsidiarity by name, Justices Kennedy and O’Connor nonetheless signaled that the 
Court should properly play a role in policing the limits on national power and should take 
into account concerns that are, I would argue, related to subsidiarity. 
Justice Thomas took the stronger position that the Commerce Clause doctrine 
inherited from Wickard should be discarded and the original meaning of “commerce” 
should be restored in the Court’s jurisprudence. He flatly rejected the “substantial effects” 
prong of the commerce power. “I am,” he wrote, “aware of no cases prior to the New 
Deal that characterized the power flowing from the Commerce Clause as sweepingly as 
does our substantial effects test. My review of the case law indicates that the substantial 
effects test is but an innovation of the 20th century.”40 In particular, the “aggregation” of 
 
38 Id. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
39 Id. at 583. 
40 Id. at 596 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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effects on commerce upon which Wickard arguably relies, is, in Justice Thomas’ view, 
unprincipled and subject to abuse.41 
The Court’s willingness to engage in judicial enforcement of the Commerce 
Clause continued in 2000 with United States v. Morrison, which considered a 
constitutional challenge to portions of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). 
Among other provisions, VAWA created a private right of action by victims of gender-
motivated violence against their attackers, which was motivated by a concern that state 
criminal prosecutions for sexual assault were inadequate and should be supplemented by 
the prospect of private civil litigation. An alleged victim of a sexual assault, Christy 
Brzonkala, filed suit against several football players at Virginia Tech. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing again for the same five justices as in Lopez 
(himself and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas), argued that Congress’s 
creation of a private right of action in VAWA exceeded Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause. The Chief Justice’s opinion recited again the three permissible forms 
of commerce power regulation and noted that VAWA, if a legitimate exercise of 
congressional power, had to fall into the third category of regulating an activity with a 
 
41 Id. at 600: 
The substantial effects test suffers from this flaw, in part, because of its “aggregation principle.” 
Under so-called “class of activities” statutes, Congress can regulate whole categories of activities 
that are not themselves either “interstate” or “commerce.” 
…. 
The aggregation principle is clever, but has no stopping point. Suppose all would agree that gun 
possession within 1,000 feet of a school does not substantially affect commerce, but that 
possession of weapons generally (knives, brass knuckles, nunchakus, etc.) does. Under our 
substantial effects doctrine, even though Congress cannot single out gun possession, it can prohibit 
weapon possession generally. But one always can draw the circle broadly enough to cover an 
activity that, when taken in isolation, would not have substantial effects on commerce. 
 69 
                                                
substantial effect on interstate commerce. As in Lopez, the non-economic, essentially 
criminal nature of the regulation was its downfall. Notwithstanding congressional 
findings that domestic violence and sexual crimes have an effect on interstate commerce 
(but taking a much less deferential view toward the congressional findings than the Court 
had in the earlier Civil Rights Act cases such as Heart of Atlanta Motel), the Court wrote: 
Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, 
economic activity. While we need not adopt a categorical rule against aggregating 
the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in 
our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of 
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature.42 
 
By simply aggregating the effects of inherently local crimes, the Court reasoned, there 
would be no limit to the commerce power: “We accordingly reject the argument that 
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that 
conduct’s aggregated effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a 
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.”43 
Read together, Lopez and Morrison suggest that the Court’s review of dubious 
congressional exercises of the commerce power will pose two questions: (1) is the 
regulated activity economic or non-economic?, and (2) is this an area of law traditionally 
reserved to the states? Federal criminal statutes (or, as in Morrison, a federal statute that 
touched on an area of state criminal law) are especially susceptible to the challenge that 
they exceed Congress’s enumerated powers to the extent that whole areas of criminal law 
 
42 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000). 
43 Id. at 617-18. Applying the holding of Boerne v. Flores, discussed below, the Court also rejected 
the argument that VAWA was a permissible exercise of Congress’s power under § 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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(most homicide and crimes, for example) are left to the states. Indeed, Justices Kennedy 
and O’Connor, in their concurrence in Lopez, noted that many states had already enacted 
prohibitions against gun possession in school zones, thereby rendering federal action 
superfluous. 
Interestingly, the Department of Justice, under both Democratic and Republican 
administrations, has disfavored a broad, categorical subject matter limitation on federal 
crimes. There is, then, a sort of subsidiarity limit on federal criminal law in Lopez and 
Morrison to address only problems of national concern (e.g., drug trafficking and 
possession), areas in which state jurisdiction is inadequate or compromised (e.g., 
interstate crimes such as child pornography trafficking or crimes involving political 
corruption), or matters of particular federal expertise. Furthermore, jurisdictionally 
overlapping federal criminal legislation is cured by reliance on federal prosecutorial 
discretion, which might also sometimes reflect a subsidiarity norm. When deciding 
whether to bring a charge, so the argument goes, the Department of Justice and the local 
United States Attorney will be guided in part by federalism concerns and a desire to strike 
a proper federal-state balance. 
But in many cases there is unlikely to be an analogous state criminal prosecution 
to which federal prosecutors could defer. This issue arises most often in drug cases, but 
there is little evidence that federal prosecutors defer in other contexts. Once the 
subsidiarity limits on federal crime legislation have been ignored by Congress, 
prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to vindicate the federalism interest in leaving 
regulation of crime up to the states (unless the United States Attorney simply refuses to 
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enforce the statute at all, which may not be an attractive option). Federal intervention is 
also frequently justified on the politically popular grounds that federal penalties are often 
(significantly) higher than state penalties, but it is hard to see why this is, properly 
speaking, a federal interest. The other concerns (state inadequacy, special federal 
expertise) are pertinent to subsidiarity, but—apart from political appeal—it is hard to see 
why higher federal penalties constitute a reason for federal criminal intervention. 
Finally, in Gonzales v. Raich,44 the Court considered a claim by users of medical 
marijuana that the federal prohibition on possession of marijuana under the Controlled 
Substances Act (CSA) exceeded Congress’s commerce power. By ballot initiative, 
California had legalized possession of marijuana for legitimate medical purposes, but the 
CSA contains no such exemption. Those who grow and possess marijuana for medicinal 
purposes, then, were exempt from state prosecution under California law but were still 
subject to federal prosecution under the CSA. A different alignment of justices (Justices 
Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) than the five who had struck 
down the federal statutes in Lopez and Morrison upheld the provisions of the CSA that 
the plaintiffs were challenging. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens relied on Wickard v. 
Filburn and held that even marijuana grown locally and used for medicinal purposes has, 
in the aggregate, an effect on interstate commerce, thereby bringing the story of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence full circle from Farmer Filburn’s cultivation of wheat 
for home consumption. Interestingly, Justice Scalia (who had not written separately in 
 
44 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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either Lopez or in Morrison to explain his views of the limits of the commerce power) 
concurred with the result in Raich but argued that the case turned on the interpretation of 
the “Necessary and Proper” Clause. The “substantial effects” category of permissible 
regulation of commerce, he argued, is grounded not in the Commerce Clause itself but 
rather in the power of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause to make effective 
its regulation of interstate commerce.45  
This tour of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence suggestively 
reflects aspects of the principle of subsidiarity. The argument in the Lopez concurrence by 
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, for example, on judicial recognition of areas of law that 
are properly reserved to the states (criminal law, for example, or education) comports 
with subsidiarity’s view that different levels of authority have different competencies and 
that the higher level of authority should not, absent good reason, usurp the lower level’s 
authority. But such a “devolutionary” account of subsidiarity is, as argued in Chapter 
One, incomplete. Wickard and, more recently, Raich stand for the proposition that a crude 
devolutionary principle should not prevent the higher authority (here, the federal 
government) from enacting statutes that are, as Justice Scalia argued in his concurrence in 
 
45 Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted): 
Congress’s regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate 
commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from 
the Necessary and Proper Clause….[T]he category of “activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce” is incomplete because the authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the 
regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws governing intrastate activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Where necessary to make a regulation of interstate 
commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities that do not themselves 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
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Raich, “necessary and proper” to achieve the constitutionally legitimate aims of the 
commerce power. 
 B. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
Just as the past fifteen years have witnessed a revival and then, in Raich, demise 
of a more robust limitation on the commerce power, so also the Court has by fits and 
starts suggested that it is willing to set appropriate limits on Congress’s power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o 
State shall...deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”46 
Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress is empowered to “enforce, by 
appropriate legislation” the equal protection and due process guarantees of that 
amendment.47  The Fourteenth Amendment is thereby “a positive grant of legislative 
power” to Congress.48 As the Supreme Court noted in Ex Parte Virginia, “Whatever 
legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the [Reconstruction] 
amendments have in view...is brought within the domain of congressional power.”49 But 
the Court was clear in City of Boerne v. Flores that “Congress’ discretion [under § 5] is 
not unlimited...and the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to 
determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution.”50 In the words 
 
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
47 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
48 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
49 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879). 
50 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).   
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of Oregon v. Mitchell, “As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not 
unlimited.”51 
The scope of “appropriate” legislation under § 5 has generally been held to share 
the broad authority granted Congress to legislate pursuant to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in Article I,52 just as Justice Scalia emphasized in his concurrence in Raich that 
the Commerce Clause must be read in combination with the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. The thorny question posed by § 5 jurisprudence is whether determination of what 
legislation is “appropriate” should be left entirely to Congress.53 On one view, Congress 
has an expansive power under § 5 to forge remedies addressing constitutional violations 
of equal protection.  As the Court noted in Fullilove v. Klutznick, “It is fundamental that 
in no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more comprehensive 
remedial power than Congress, expressly charged by the Constitution with the 
competence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees.”54  Indeed, some cases 
suggest that congressional authority extends even to the prohibition of conduct that is 
 
51 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970). 
52 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650 (“By including § 5 the draftsmen [of the Fourteenth Amendment] 
sought to grant to Congress... the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause....”); 
see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (interpreting the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to embrace “all means which are appropriate”). 
53 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determine whether and 
what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and its conclusions are 
entitled to much deference.” (quoting Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651)). 
54 448 U.S. 448, 483 (1980). 
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“not itself unconstitutional” if necessary to remedy or deter constitutional violations,55 
and the adoption of prophylactic rules to deter infringements of equal protection.56  
The Civil Rights Act of 1875, like the later Civil Rights Act of 1964, sought to 
prohibit racial discrimination in a variety of places of public accommodation—hotels, 
theaters, and railroads, for example. At issue in the Civil Rights Cases in 1883 was 
whether Congress could regulate private conduct under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
or whether the § 5 power was limited to state action. The Court ruled that the 1875 Act 
was an impermissible regulation of private conduct. Because the Fourteenth Amendment 
“is prohibitory…upon the states[,] invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter 
of the amendment.”57 Section 5, then, permits Congress to create remedies for private 
parties against state action that violates equal protection or due process, but it does not 
allow Congress itself to act directly on private conduct. 
By the terms of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the jurisprudence of the 
Court regarding the extent of congressional power to remedy violations of § 1, then, 
Congress is limited in its ability to legislate under § 5 by the so-called “state action 
doctrine.” In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 did 
“not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by the States” but 
“step[ped] into the domains of local jurisprudence...without referring in any manner to 
 
55 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
56 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion). 
57 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883). 
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any supposed action of the State or its authorities.”58 Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 invalidated in United States v. Harris was, in the Court’s words, “directed 
exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the laws of the 
State, or their administration by her officers.”59 
On this more limited reading of the § 5 power, the plain meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and a “time-honored principle” indicate that the equal protection 
guarantee of § 1 is enforceable only against the states.60  As argued by the Court in 
Shelley v. Kraemer, “the principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law 
that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such 
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States.  That Amendment erects no shield 
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”61 More recently, 
the Court has affirmed the state action limitation in such cases as Georgia v. McCollum 
(“Racial discrimination, although repugnant in all contexts, violates the Constitution only 
when it is attributable to state action.”)62 and in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. (“Because 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment is directed at the States, it may be violated only by conduct 
that may be fairly characterized as ‘state action.”).63 
The limitation of § 1 to state action applies also to attempts by Congress under § 5 
to enforce the provisions of § 1.  A review in City of Boerne v. Flores of the legislative 
 
58 Id. at 11, 14. 
59 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883). 
60 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000).   
61 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). 
62 505 U.S. 42, 50 (1992). 
63 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). 
 77 
ivate 
                                                
history of the Fourteenth Amendment argued that § 5 was intended to confer on Congress 
a “remedial” power “to make the substantive constitutional prohibitions [of § 1] against 
the States effective.”64 As explained in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion affirmed in Morrison, 
just as “Section 1 confer[s] rights only against the States…Congress’ Section 5 power to 
enforce Section 1 is correspondingly limited to remedial action against States and state 
actors.”65   
Congress may, however, reach the conduct of private persons when it does so to 
remedy discrimination by the States, a view for which United States v. Guest remains the 
leading case. In Guest, the Court held that Congress possesses authority under § 5 “to 
enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth 
Amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under the color of state 
law are implicated in the conspiracy.”66 In District of Columbia v. Carter, the Court 
wrote that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment itself ‘erects no shield against merely pr
conduct’...[but that] is not to say...that Congress may not proscribe purely private conduct 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”67 
An even more robust argument for federal authority submits that the scope of 
Congress’ § 5 power should not be unduly cabined by the state action limit of § 1 and 
that, once Congress has perceived an equal protection violation by the States, the range of 
 
64 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 522 (1997).   
65 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 865 (4th Cir. 1999), aff’d sub. 
nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
66 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966). 
67 409 U.S. 418, 424 n.8 (1973). 
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possible remedies is not limited to states or state actors.68 But, and as mentioned above, 
the Court was confronted with an analogous question in United States v. Harris and the 
Civil Rights Cases and affirmed the holdings of both cases as recently as Morrison in 
2000.  In all three cases (Harris, the Civil Rights Cases, and Morrison), the Court held 
that federal legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 could not target private individuals, even 
where such legislation was intended to remedy state violations of equal protection.  The 
private remedies of both the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 (invalidated in Harris) and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 (invalidated in the Civil Rights Cases) were thought to be 
justified because, as characterized by the Court, “[t]here were state laws on the books 
bespeaking equality of treatment, but in the administration of these laws there was 
discrimination.”69 The state action limits imposed on the permissible scope of § 5 
remedies “are necessary to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the 
Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and the National 
Government.”70 As with the commerce power, this concern is particularly acute where 
the federal government seeks to act in an area of law generally reserved to the states on 
the view that “the power of Congress [under § 5]...does not extend to the passage of laws 
for the suppression of crime within the States.”
 
68 See Evan H. Caminker, Private Remedies for Public Wrongs under Section 5, 33 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1351, 1359-64 (2000).   
69 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625 (2000); see also CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st 
Sess. App. 153 (1871) (“The chief complaint is...that, even where the laws are just and equal on their face, 
yet by a systematic maladministration of them...a portion of the people are denied equal protection under 
them.”), quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625.  
70 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.  
71 Harris, 106 U.S. at 638. 
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But even in legitimate exercises of Congress’ power to craft remedies for equal 
protection violations, Congress is limited in its ability to define the extent of equal 
protection. As summarized by Boerne, “The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 
are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s restrictions on the States.”72 Though it is initially up to 
Congress to “determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees 
of the Fourteenth Amendment,”73 the distinction “between measures that remedy or 
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the 
governing law...exists and must be observed.”74 
Recent decisions of the Court have further insisted that remedial § 5 legislation 
must have a “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”75 This insistence on the tailoring of means 
or limitation of scope that the Court signaled in Boerne are intended to “ensure Congress’ 
means are proportionate to ends legitimate under § 5.”76 “[T]ermination dates,” 
“geographic restrictions,” and “intrusions into the States’ traditional prerogatives and 
general authority” are among the factors suggested in Boerne for assessing congruence 
and proportionality.77 In a different context, Justice Kennedy, the author of the Court’s 
 
72 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. at 507, 519 (1997).   
73 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
74 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20. 
75 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999); 
see also Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 (“[T]here must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to 
be achieved.”) 
76 521 U.S. at 533.   
77 Id. at 534. 
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opinion in Boerne, warned of the need to protect the federal balance in the area of 
criminal law: “[E]ssential considerations of federalism are at stake here.  The federal 
balance is a fragile one, and a false step...risks making a whole catalog of ordinary state 
crimes a concurrent violation of a congressional statute.”78 The provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act struck down in Morrison, for example, failed in part 
because they “applie[d] uniformly throughout the Nation,”79 whereas another § 5 remedy
(portions of the Voting Rights Act) was upheld in Morgan when Congress directed the 
remedy only to those states found to be engaged in racial disc
II. Freedom of Association and Parental Liberty 
 Though not part of the usual set of doctrines that bear on federalism, freedom of 
association and parental liberty are perhaps the closest analogues in American 
constitutional law to the principle of subsidiarity. The federalism decisions summarized 
in Section II of this chapter address the limits on federal and state power, but, as noted 
below in the conclusion of this chapter, it is difficult to move from the language of 
subsidiarity in the papal encyclical tradition to the federalism doctrines surrounding the 
Commerce Clause and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While federalism may be the 
way in which many observers see a reflection of the principle of subsidiarity in American 
constitutional law, a better analogue to subsidiarity can be found in the constitutional 
 
78 Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 287 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
79 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000). 




                                                
doctrines of freedom of association and parental liberty, which bear a close resemblance 
to the papal encyclical tradition’s account of families and civil associations. 
A. Freedom of Association 
 The three leading recent cases on the freedom of association—Roberts v. United 
States Jaycees,81 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of 
Boston,82 and Boy Scouts v. Dale83—concern groups that sought to invoke association
rights against the state’s claim that the group was engaged in unlawful discriminatio
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Jaycees brought a challenge to a Minnesota statute 
that prohibited racial and gender discrimination.84 The Jaycees limited their regular 
membership to men between 18 and 35, but the Minneapolis and St. Paul chapters had 
begun to admit women. When the national organization of the Jaycees threatened the 
local chapters with revocation of their charters, members of the local chapters filed 
charges with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights, and the national organization 
brought suit against the state of Minnesota seeking an injunction against enforcement of 
the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 
 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan began by delineating the scope of the 
freedom of association. One aspect of the right to association, he argued, “conclude[s] 
that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be 
secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in 
 
81 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
82 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
83 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
84 Roberts, 468 U.S. 609. 
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safeguarding…individual freedom.”85 As such, the freedom of association “receives 
protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.”86 A second aspect of the 
freedom of association, writes Justice Brennan, is for “the purpose of engaging in those 
activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress 
of grievances, and the exercise of religion.”87 In this sense, freedom of association is “an 
indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.”88 Justice Brennan goes on 
to denote these as, respectively, the “intrinsic and instrumental features of constitutionally 
protected association.”89 
 Note that for the Roberts Court, the freedom of association is derivative of 
individual freedom. Groups, as such, do not enjoy associational rights except and insofar 
as the state’s interference with a group jeopardizes some exercise of individual liberty. 
The Court suggests that it is (merely) because “[a]n individual’s freedom to speak, to 
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be 
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to 
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed” that the freedom of 
association is recognized.90 Although “[t]here can be no clearer example of an intrusion 
into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the 
 
85 Id. at 617-18. 




90 Id. at 622 (emphasis added). 
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group to accept members it does not desire,”91 the Court nonetheless concluded that 
enforcement of the Minnesota anti-discrimination statute against the Jaycees was 
constitutionally permissible. The Court argued that the state has a compelling interest in 
“eradicating discrimination against its female citizens,” which justifies enforcement 
against the Jaycees.92 Furthermore, the Court claimed there was no imposition on the 
expression of the Jaycees.93 
 The most important recent cases addressing the freedom of association have 
posed largely the same issue posed in Roberts, namely the attempted enforcement of anti-
discrimination statutes against organizations that seek to exclude certain members or 
those bearing a particular message. The protection afforded freedom of association has, 
though, arguably expanded considerably since Roberts. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, 
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, the Court considered a suit brought by GLIB, an 
Irish-American gay and lesbian group, that sought to march in a St. Patrick’s Day parade 
in South Boston sponsored by the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, an 
organization not notable for its progressive views on sexual matters. GLIB brought 
constitutional claims and a claim under the Massachusetts public accommodations 
statute, which prohibited discrimination based on, among other grounds, sexual 
orientation. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a lower court’s holding 
 
91 Id. at 623. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 627. 
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that the parade was a public accommodation and that there was no expressive purpose in 
the parade.94 
 The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter 
began with first principles and noted that “[i]f there were no reason for a group of people 
to march from here to there except to reach a destination, they could make the trip 
without expressing any message beyond the fact of the march itself.”95 But parades such 
as the South Boston St. Patrick’s Day parade are a form of expression, argued Justice 
Souter, for “we use the word ‘parade’ to indicate marchers who are making some sort of 
collective point.”96 And even though the South Boston parade organizers liberally 
permitted groups to participate in the parade, “a private speaker does not forfeit 
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to edit 
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”97 
Because “every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private 
organizers’” the Court argued, “the state courts’ application of the statute produced an 
order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade.”98 
 Hurley, then, marked a subtle shift in the Court’s freedom of association 
jurisprudence away from framing the associational right in terms derivative of individual 
rights and toward according rights to groups as such. Indeed, the Court’s discussion of 
 
94 Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293 
(Mass. 1994). 
95 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 568 
(1995). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 569-70. 
98 Id. at 572-73. 
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what is denoted by a “parade” signals the collective aspect of the activity. Like Margaret 
Gilbert’s discussion of sharing an intention to, for example, go for a walk and the “plural 
subject” created by a “pool of wills,”99 the activity considered by the Hurley Court was 
deemed inherently collective. The purpose of gathering for a parade, rather than just 
walking from point to another, is to engage in collective expression. The forced inclusion 
of a message with which the group disagrees risks altering the message of the group and 
does not risk abridging merely the free speech rights of the individual members. 
 The gesture in Hurley toward a thicker conception of associational rights became 
more pronounced in Boy Scouts v. Dale. James Dale was an assistant scoutmaster in New 
Jersey. While in college, Dale became active in gay and lesbian causes and was co-
president of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance at Rutgers University. In response, the local Boy 
Scouts’ council revoked Dale’s adult membership in the Boy Scouts. Dale filed suit under 
a New Jersey public accommodation statute that, like the statutes in both Roberts and 
Hurley, prohibited discrimination on a number of grounds, including (under the New 
Jersey statute) sexual orientation. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Boy 
Scouts were a public accommodation within the meaning of the statute and that the 
organization’s “large size, nonselectivity, inclusive rather than exclusive purpose, and 
practice of inviting or allowing nonmembers to attend meeting, establish that the 
organization is not sufficiently personal or private to warrant constitutional protection 
 
99 Margaret Gilbert, Walking Together; a Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon, 15 MIDWEST STUD.IN 
PHIL. 1, 7 (1990). For a qualified appreciation for and elaboration on Gilbert’s work on shared intention, see 
J. David Velleman, How to Share an Intention, in THE POSSIBILITY OF PRACTICAL REASON 200 (2000). 
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under the freedom of intimate association.”100 The New Jersey Supreme Court further 
held that forcibly reinstating Dale “does not compel the Boy Scouts to express any 
message.”101 
 The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice Rehnquist began by referring to 
Roberts and noting that “[t]he forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group 
infringes the group’s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person 
affects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or private 
viewpoints.”102 But the most remarkable aspect of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion is 
his insistence that the Court should broadly interpret what constitutes an “expressive 
association” and should defer to the organization in determining the purpose of 
expression and what would impair the group’s ability to express itself. The Boy Scout’s 
stated goals of inculcating values in its members the Scouts are “indisputabl[y]” engaged 
in expressive activity. 
 As for any effort to review the content of the Scout’s message on sexual matters 
or the consistency with which the Scouts have spoken on such topics, the Court 
contended that “our cases reject this sort of inquiry; it is not the role of the courts to reject 
a group’s expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them 
internally inconsistent.”103 And just as the Court held that it must defer to an 
organization’s claims about “the nature of its expression” so it “must also give deference 
 
100 Dale v. Boy Scouts, 734 A.2d 1196, 1221 (N.J. 1999) (internal quotation omitted). 
101 Id. at 1229. 
102 Boy Scouts v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000). 
103 Id. at 651. 
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to an association’s view of what would impair its expression.”104 In an effort to bring 
together the unanimous holding of the Court in Hurley with his argument for the Boy 
Scouts’ associational rights in Dale, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded: 
Here, we have found that the Boy Scouts believes that homosexual conduct is 
inconsistent with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not 
“promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” As the presence 
of GLIB in Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day parade would have interfered with the 
parade organizers’ choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence 
of Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy 
Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs.105 
 
 As to the question of whether forced inclusion of Dale would then compromise 
the Boy Scouts’ message, the Court sharply disagreed with the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s view that such a step would not significantly affect the Scouts’ ability to 
disseminate their message. The Court held that a group does not have to gather for the 
purpose of expression in order nonetheless to receive First Amendment protection.106 
Furthermore, internal disagreement or a failure to place a message at the center of the 
organization’s purpose—both of which were arguably true of the Boy Scouts—does not 
undermine the protection for expressive association: “The fact that the organization does 
not trumpet its views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks, does 
not mean that its views receive no First Amendment protection.”107 
 The important difference of framing the right to association as a group right rather 
than an aggregated individual right is spelled out by John Garvey in What Are Freedoms 
 
104 Id. at 653. 
105 Id. at 654. 
106 Id. at 655. 
107 Id. at 656. 
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For?108 The Roberts Court roughly reflects what Garvey terms the “individualist” view: 
“[G]roup action has value because it is an aggregate of valued individual 
actions….People form groups in order to advance their own interests more 
effectively.”109 The alternative to such individualism and as suggested by Hurley 
emphasizes the potential for genuine group action. Surveying examples drawn from 
family life and team sports,
What distinguishes these cases from the individualist view is that in each of them 
members see in the group a good more important that their own self-interest. In 
each case the good is interpersonal, a kind that can only be enjoyed by a group: 
victory for the team, love, peace, grace. Love, for example, is a relation between 
persons. It cannot be divided (like a baked Alaska) into separate shares and 
handed around for individual enjoyment.110 
 
 The insistence upon the possibility of “group personality” is also found in an 
earlier tradition as reflected in F.W. Maitland’s essay “Moral Personality and Legal 
Personality.”111 “If the law allows men to form permanently organised groups,” Maitland 
writes, “those groups will be for common opinion right-and-duty-bearing units.”112 As 
summarized by Russell Hittinger, “[i]n the case of a real group-person, common action is 
an intrinsic aspect of the common end or purpose….Achievement of a mutually agreeable 
result is not enough….[F]or each of these groups, their respective corporate unity is one 
 
108 JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996). 
109 Id. at 133. 
110 Id. at 137. 
111 F.W. Maitland, Moral Personality and Legal Personality, in STATE, TRUST, AND CORPORATION 
62 (David Runciman & Magnus Ryan eds., 2003). 
112 Id. at 68. 
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of reasons for action—unity is one of the goods being aimed at.”113 By underscoring the 
importance of genuinely group personality and group activity, the case law surrounding 
freedom of association and commentators such as Garvey, Maitland, and Hittinger 
provide an elaboration of Pius XI’s central insight in Quadragesimo Anno regarding the 
nature of subsidiary function: “For every social activity ought of its very nature to furnish 
help to the members of the body social, and never destroy and absorb them.”114 
B. Parental Liberty 
 A second set of constitutional doctrines concerns the due process right of parents 
to direct the upbringing of their children. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court considered a 
challenge to a Nebraska statute that prohibited instruction in languages other than English 
before the eighth grade in any school in the state.115 The plaintiff was a teacher who had 
taught German to a ten-year-old child.116 The Supreme Court of Nebraska upheld the 
statute and noted its “salutary purpose:” “The legislature had seen the baneful effects of 
permitting foreigners, who had taken residence in this country, to rear and educate their 
children in the language of their native land.”117 But in a remarkably short opinion for the 
United States Supreme Court, Justice McReynolds wrote that the scope of the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included not merely freedom from bodily 
 
113 Russell Hittinger, Society, Subsidiarity, and Authority in Catholic Social Thought, in 
CIVILIZING AUTHORITY: SOCIETY, STATE, AND CHURCH 119, 122 (Patrick McKinley Brennan ed., 2007). 
114 POPE PIUS XI, QUADRAGESIMO ANNO ¶ 79 (1931). 
115 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
116 For background to Meyer and the nativist sentiment that was at work in the Nebraska statute, 
see WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION AND THE COURTS, 1917-1927 
(1994); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and The Child As 
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992); and William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska 
in Historical Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125 (1988). 
117 262 U.S. at 397-98. 
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restraint “but also the right of the individual…to establish a home and bring up children, 
to worship God according to the dictates of his conscience, and generally to enjoy those 
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men.”118 The rights of the plaintiff teacher and the parents of the child being 
instructed in a foreign language are, the Court concluded, “within the liberty of the 
Amendment.”119 
 Shortly thereafter, the Court held in Pierce v. Society of Sisters120 that an Oregon 
statute requiring all children to attend public schools was a similar violation of the 
parental due process liberty right. “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all 
governments in this Union repose,” the Court explained, “excludes any general power of 
the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public 
school teachers only.”121 With words that echo in the papal encyclical tradition’s 
discussion of subsidiarity and the family, the Court further argued that “[t]he child is not 
the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, 
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for his additional 
obligations.”122 
 Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder123 the Court considered a challenge to a Wisconsin 
compulsory school attendance statute. The Old Order Amish wished to send their 
 
118 Id. at 399. 
119 Id. at 400. 
120 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
121 Id. at 535. 
122 Id. 
123 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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children to school only until the eighth grade, but the state statute required attendance 
until age 16. The Court sided with the Amish parents in a holding roughly based on both 
the parental liberty right and the right of religious free exercise, though the Yoder Court 
was famously unclear about precisely what constitutional doctrine was at work. As 
Steven Smith observes: 
After presenting the Sherbert doctrine in half-hearted and less than lucid 
fashion—doctrinalists may note that the Court doesn’t even get the phrasing right 
and so never even recites the magic words “compelling interest”—the Court 
seems almost to forget about the doctrinal framework and instead meanders 
through assorted topics such as the old-fashioned virtues of working the soil, 
Jeffersonian educational ideals, and the role of medieval monasteries in 
preserving classical culture.124 
 
But all the same, the Court held that “a State’s interest in universal education, however 
highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on 
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the 
religious upbringing of their children.”125 
 The parental liberty right rooted in Meyer and Pierce and reflected in some 
aspects of Yoder has, of course, been subject to considerable criticism. James Dwyer 
provocatively argues that 
[P]arental rights are inconsistent with the general rule against granting individuals 
rights to control the lives of others. In the past, such other-determining rights have 
been granted only where the subjugated individual was regarded as “property” or 
as subsumed under the identity of the right-holder. Today, however, the law 
 
124 See Steven Smith, Wisconsin v. Yoder and the Unprincipled Approach to Religious Freedom, 
25 CAP. U. L. REV. 805, 806 (1996). 
125 406 U.S. at 214. 
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recognizes that children are not chattel, but persons, who themselves hold rights 
under our Constitution. Thus, parental rights of control may be no more just than 
was the centuries-old institution of slavery or the longstanding legal sanction of 
marital rape. We should seriously consider, then, what interests parents’ child-
rearing rights do serve, and on that basis determine whether it is rational and just 
to perpetuate these rights.126 
 
A more sympathetic perspective offered by Stephen Gilles still worries that parental 
liberty rights “are both ill defined and vulnerable to unduly deferential judicial review of 
state educational regulation.”127 I agree with Richard Garnett that the principle of 
subsidiarity offers a framework and justification for parental liberty that the small body of 
case law on the topic has not developed adequately. “Perhaps Pierce and the cluster of 
values and maxims for which it is thought to stand are best defended,” Garnett suggests, 
“not in terms of parents’ individual ‘rights’ against government, and certainly not in terms 
of ownership and property, but instead in terms of subsidiarity.” He concludes: 
Maybe we should think of the family, as it appears in Pierce and in contemporary 
debates about civic education, parental authority, and religious freedom, as the 
original “mediating institution.” On this view, the State properly refrains from 
second-guessing families on matters of education and the transmission of 
religious tradition not only out of respect for the religious freedom and parental 
authority of the individuals situated within those families, but also out of wise 
regard for those families’ integrity and health, precisely because the integrity and 
freedom of these “vital cells” is important to the common good….At their best, 
families can provide, for their members, their neighbors, and society, a prophetic 
counter-weight to the State, just as, at its best, religious faith challenges and 
subverts the State’s claims to virtue and competence. This is precisely why statists 
understandably seek to atomize the family and to minimize religion’s influence 
 
126 James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents’ 
Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1426 (1994). 
127 Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 
938 (1996). 
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through persecution, suppression, or co-option, or perhaps through the milder 
methods of civic education.128 
 
III. Conclusion: Subsidiarity as “Functional Pluralism” 
 The foregoing discussion serves as the basis for the conclusion of this chapter that 
the appropriate way to frame the relation between the principle of subsidiarity and 
contemporary American constitutional law is nothing as abstract or useless as “small is 
beautiful” or a principle of devolution. Instead, I suggest that subsidiarity provides a 
theoretical basis for “institutional” theories of rights advocated recently by legal scholars. 
As developed variously by Roderick Hills and John McGinnis, such institutional theories 
supplant anticoercion or other liberal accounts of rights that fail to account for significant 
aspects of constitutional jurisprudence. 
 As summarized by Hills, “[a]nticoercion theories of constitutional rights maintain 
that the interest being protected by rights is simply the individual’s best interest in being 
free from ‘coercive’ pressure imposed by institutions for collective self-governance.”129 
With some qualification, examples of such anticoercion accounts are Ronald Dworkin’s 
and John Rawls’s.130 Hills argues, though, that such anticoercion theories cannot justify 
 
 
128 Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to 
Children, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 113, 144-46 (2000). 
129 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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130 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 134-40 (1993) and RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). See also Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 309 (2000). As Hills shows, it is easier to ascribe the anticoercion label to Dworkin than to Rawls: 
If political participation merely secures some sort of entitlement to basic social goods consistent 
with the Difference Principle, then it might constitute a version of anticoercion theory, as the 
interest is a jurisdictionally indifferent and remedially simple private good--an entitlement to some 
share of social goods plus an interest in being left alone. In theory, such entitlements could be 
satisfied in a benevolent bureaucratic despotism with lots of public hearings, a merit-based civil 
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ascribing rights to institutions. Along the way, Hills performs a valuable task by calling 
into serious doubt the easy distinction between public and private and between 
constitutional structure (federalism, separation of powers) and constitutional rights. More 
importantly and in ways that Hills mentions only briefly in his article, institutions act as 
“private governments” because they legitimately possess authority. For his part, Hills 
justifies the importance of institutions by arguing for their essentially instrumental value. 
In contrast to Justice Brennan’s views in Roberts that freedom of association is based on 
the rights of the individual members’ rights to free speech, Hills argues that “[m]any 
organizations may (because of their incentives, structure, etc.) be better suited for 
advancing First Amendment values than the federal, state, and local governments 
themselves. It is this special expertise (for lack of a better word) that entitles them to 
preempt other governments’ regulation, not the members’ desire, however sincere, to 
express themselves.”131 
 Similarly, in his article defending a Tocquevillian interpretation of the Rehnquist 
Court’s jurisprudence in a range of areas—federalism, freedom of association, the 
Establishment Clause, and the scope of the right to trial by jury—John McGinnis argues 
for the unifying theme of “social discovery” through associational rights. In contrast to 
 
service, and stringently enforced freedom for solitary free-lance journalists, soap-box orators, etc. 
The abstract requirement of equal political participation can be guaranteed just as easily by 
abolishing elective office equally as by giving everyone an equal right to vote for such offices. 
Given that Rawls leaves most specific institutional questions to later stages of his “four stages” of 
analysis, which he himself does not discuss, it is probably best to be agnostic about what precisely 
Rawls’s theory implies. 
Hills, supra note 129, at 159 n.36. 
131 Hills, supra note 129, at 218.  
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the Warren Court’s enthusiasm for centralized federal power balanced by areas of 
hypertrophied individual autonomy in areas such as privacy and criminal procedure, 
McGinnis argues that the Rehnquist Court has substituted an enthusiasm for 
decentralized associational and localized “social discovery.” Just as John Hart Ely’s 
Democracy and Distrust provided the intellectual ballast for the Warren Court, McGinnis 
hopes to provide a unifying framework for the Rehnquist Court’s decisions in a wide 
range of constitutional doctrines. 
 In doing so, McGinnis underscores the recent acknowledgment of the influence of 
the English political philosopher Michael Oakeshott on Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Rehnquist wrote an M.A. thesis at Stanford on competing theories of rights, which was 
only posthumously published in the Stanford Law Review132 and began an M.A. thesis on 
Oakeshott at Harvard. From Oakeshott, Rehnquist adopted a measure of skepticism 
toward politics that reflected deeper epistemological commitments by Oakeshott 
remotely derived from Oakeshott’s qualified appreciation for Hobbes.133 In turn and as 
argued by Doug Kmiec, this skepticism or anti-utopianism led Rehnquist to adopt a 
suspicion of national power that, soon upon his confirmation to the Supreme Court, stood 
in marked contrast to the Warren Court’s federalism jurisprudence and the Wickard high-
water mark of the New Deal Court.134 
 
132 William Hubbs Rehnquist, Contemporary Theories of Rights, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1997 (2006). 
133 See MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, HOBBES ON CIVIL ASSOCIATION (1975). 
134 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclam. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring); Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr. Rehnquist’s Theory of Moral Rights—Mostly Observed, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1827 (2006).  
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 For his part, McGinnis looks to Tocqueville and Hayek as the remote intellectual 
forces on the Rehnquist Court. Regardless of their source, however, the decisions 
surveyed by McGinnis that evince a commitment to social discovery are justified, 
according to McGinnis, by the instrumental ends served by such social discovery. So it is 
that, for McGinnis, associations “are independently valuable because they themselves 
generate potentially beneficial norms for society through their competition. The norms 
that survive this market-test have some claim to being beneficial.”135 Later in his article 
when defending the Court’s decision in Dale, McGinnis argues that: 
[T]he advantages of having a full range of civil associations lies in society’s 
engagement of a range and intensity of views on an issue pressed from different 
perspectives. An alternative constitutional world, which provides special 
solicitude only for the autonomy of groups with an express political agenda and 
neglects that of civil association, is one where contentious political advocacy 
alone supplements the norms encouraged by the government.136 
 
 In place of—or perhaps as an elaboration of—the theses advanced by Hills and 
McGinnis to defend the role of associations and the states and local governments in the 
American constitutional order, I propose that subsidiarity offers a more adequate and 
complete justification. On this view, subsidiarity is a principle reflecting what I term 
“functional pluralism” in the social order. By “functional,” I mean to denote that 
subsidiarity focuses upon the ends of political societies—families, towns, civic 
organizations—and thereby seeks to determine the goods they pursue and the means that 
are properly adapted to those ends. By “pluralistic,” I merely suggest that different ends 
 
135 John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of 
Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 505 (2002). 
136 Id. at 534. 
 97 
                                                
are pursued by different social forms. So, for example, the ends served by Villanova 
University are different than the ends served by the federal government, the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Boy Scouts, or the family. Note that this view of 
functional pluralism need not contradict the instrumentalist accounts variously offered by 
Hills and McGinnis. One can proceed from an agnosticism about the worthiness of ends 
served by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints or by the Rotary Club but still 
believe it may well be beneficial (understood instrumentally) to the larger society if there 
are a multitude of such groups and if their associational rights are duly protected by 
constitutional doctrine. 
 One advantage accorded by subsidiarity as functional pluralism, though, is that 
one need not be committed to adopting such an agnosticism toward the ends pursued by 
different groups, thereby deflecting for now the charge that advocates of associational 
rights cannot offer principled grounds for distinguishing between the Episcopal Church 
and the Ku Klux Klan. Constitutional scholars have, for example, either wrung their 
hands over squaring the Court’s rulings in Roberts or Runyon v. McCrary137 with Dale or 
have argued simply that Dale was wrongly decided.138 Such confusion is sown by 
adopting an agnosticism toward the ends served by any form of expressive association, 
whether for the purposes of gathering for religious worship, camping, organizing a 
 
137 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (holding that § 1981 prohibition on racial discrimination was applicable to 
private, commercially operated, nonsectarian school). 
138 See David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities’ Racial 
Preferences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619 (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine 
Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 595 (2001); Jed Rubenfeld, The 
First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001). 
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parade, or engaging in racially motivated violence. But functional pluralism permits—
indeed requires—some such “peek behind the curtain” of the reasons for which the group 
is engaging in expressive association or has come together in the first place, even if not 
for purely expressive purposes. The remaining chapters of this dissertation are an 
exploration of when constitutional doctrine or public policy may engage in such inquiry 
into the ends an association pursues. 
 Hills captures an aspect of this point by his discussion of Joseph Raz’s argument 
for political authority in the Morality of Freedom and in Hills’ discussion of 
“jurisdictional limits” to associational rights. As summarized by Hills, “[i]n contrast to 
anticoercion theories, which are jurisdictionally indifferent, under Raz’s theory, 
authorities are limited by jurisdiction.”139 By “jurisdictionally indifferent,” Hills means 
that anticoercion accounts of rights “do not make the definition of impermissible 
‘coercion’ depend on the identity of the allegedly coercive jurisdiction.”140 An 
implication of such jurisdictional indifference, according to Hills, is that “rights are not 
entitlements to any particular institutions for collective self-governance.”141 By contrast, 
in the account of authority offered by Raz, “[a]n authority is entitled to deference only on 
those questions where deference to the authority’s views will improve the consistency of 
the decision with the appropriate social norm.”142 For our purposes, the key step in the 
 
139 Hills, supra note 129, at 196. 
140 Id. at 157. 
141 Id. 
142 Id.  
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argument by Hills and of importance for synthesizing his theory of institutional rights and 
the principle of subsidiarity is the need for reasoned justification for authority: 
Razian authority, in other words, is critically connected to the justifications for 
decisions rather than the acts or consequences that result from the decision. Since 
the institutional rights of private government that I defend are a species of Razian 
authority, they depend on reasons as well. Thus, private organizations have rights 
to make decisions if their justifications are the proper ones for the sphere in which 
those organizations have jurisdiction. This creates a certain symmetry between 
rights of private organizations and powers of government: Both are invalid if they 
are based on improper reasons. Such symmetry should hardly be surprising. 
Under my theory, the institutional rights of private organizations are, as a matter 
of principle, indistinguishable from the powers of the state. Both are simply 
instruments of self-government.143 
 
Though the justification for authority in the Catholic social tradition would emphasize the 
common good more than mere instrumentalism, the jurisidictional limits for which Hills 
argues are consonant with that tradition. As Johannes Messner argues in Social Ethics, 
“[b]ecause the subsidiary function principle protects the particular rights of the natural 
and the free associations against the state’s claim to omnicompetence, it is a fundamental 
principle of the pluralistic society.”144 
 This account of subsidiarity as functional pluralism and its role in American 
constitutional law prompts an important question, though: are the states and local 
governments appropriately considered such subsidiary institutions? The argument for a 
consonance between the associational and parental rights in such cases as Dale and 
Pierce and functional pluralism is easy to see. Indeed, the documents from the Catholic 
 
143 Id. 
144 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 213 (J.J. 
Doherty trans., 1949) (emphasis in original). 
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social tradition surveyed in Chapter One that initially formulated the principle of 
subsidiarity and then later elaborated upon it spoke of precisely such associations as 
reflecting subsidiarity—families (preeminently), unions, guilds, civic associations, and 
the like. The more difficult issue is how to square functional pluralism with the 
apparently random boundaries of geographically determined political units in a federal 
system. 
 I offer an initial response here to this concern and will leave for the later chapters 
an illustration of how subsidiarity might be worked out amid such governmental units. 
Even if the states and local governments are not “natural” forms of association in the 
sense in which families are or are not “voluntary” associations in the way that the Rotary 
Club is, they exist as a matter of positive constitutional (or sub-constitutional) law. 
Following the same account of functional pluralism and applying it to the states and local 
governments, then, we can describe the ends of such political units as those powers that 
are assigned them by positive law. Furthermore, for reasons famously articulated by 
Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action, there is a relation between the size of 
any group or organization and the provision of some collective good.145 The collective 
action problems associated with large groups are often overcome in smaller units.146 A 
more complete exploration of this theme will await the discussion of school finance at the 
state and local levels in Chapter Five. It is enough here to note that both positive law and 
 
145 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS (1965). See also JEREMY WALDRON, Can Communal Goods be Human Rights?, in LIBERAL 
RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 339, 344-54 (1993).  
146 See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD 
REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 34-36 (2008). 
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arguments regarding the scale of authority and the provision of collective goods offer a 
way to reconcile the jurisdictional pluralism of American government—federal, state, 
and local—with the functional pluralism of subsidiarity as articulated in this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER THREE: ASSISTED SUICIDE AND LIBERALISM 
 
Introduction: Federalism and Assisted Suicide 
Federalism and related institutional considerations have been in disfavor among 
political theorists for a generation. As Jacob Levy points out, “[T]he dominant mood in 
political philosophy since the early 1970s has been one of disdain for questions of 
institutional design” because “[i]n this post-1971 intellectual landscape [since the 
publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice], it has sometimes been suggested, or 
causally assumed, that liberalism is synonymous with moral universalism applied to 
politics.”1 
This chapter will seek to dispute that assumption by building on the last chapter 
and arguing for an institutionally pluralistic approach to contested moral questions. I will 
argue, with the aid of the principle of subsidiarity as developed in the last two chapters, 
that a broader conception of political liberalism—one protective of rights and democratic 
deliberation, such as one associates with the grand liberal tradition from Locke to 
Rawls—is better advanced on some questions through subsidiarity and federalism than 
through uniform national policymaking. This chapter seeks to play provocatively on the 
“political safeguards of federalism” debate inaugurated by Herbert Wechsler2 and Jesse 
 
 
1 Jacob T. Levy, Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
459, 463 (2007). See also Jonathan Chaplin, Subsidiarity as a Political Norm, in POLITICAL THEORY AND 
CHRISTIAN VISION 81, 81 (Jonathan Chaplin & Paul Marshall eds., 1994) (“A noteworth characteristic of 
recent political thought…is an emerging recognition of the inadequacy of a fundamental premise of the 
classical liberal tradition, namely that the central problems confronting political philosophy can be reduced 
to a singular relationship, that between the individual and the state.”). 
2 Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the 
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Choper3 over whether the national political process would adequately protect federalism 
by arguing that constitutionally enforced federalism provides a safeguard for basic 
concerns of political liberalism. 
The focus of this chapter is the ongoing debate over the legal status of physician-
assisted suicide and the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on a range of questions related 
to physician-assisted suicide. As we saw in the last chapter, the Court has, albeit 
inconsistently, been willing to enforce limits on federal power, as suggested by Lopez and 
Morrison (in the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence) and by Boerne (in its § 5 
jurisprudence). Correlatively, the power of the states is expanded by these decisions, at 
least insofar as the states retain, after Lopez, Morrison, and Boerne, the power to enact 
gun possession laws of a kind and religious freedom protection statutes, but Congress 
does not.  So also, federal legislation under the Controlled Substances Act to prohibit 
physician-assisted suicide, for example, is constitutionally ambiguous. As the Court 
argued in Raich, the CSA is indisputably a valid exercise of the interstate commerce 
power because the sale and trafficking of drugs is “economic” activity and because the 
prohibitions on drug trafficking contained in the CSA are necessary and proper to the 
carrying out of the commerce power. But as one author notes, a federal statute that would 
prohibit dispensing drugs to aid in a suicide is directed at intrastate drug regulation: 
“[W]hile drugs travel in interstate commerce, a terminally ill patient’s decision to ask a 
 
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). 
3 JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175-93 (1980) (“Numerous structural aspects of 
the national political system serve to assure that states’ rights will not be trampled, and the lesson of 
practice is that they have not been.”). 
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doctor for a prescription to end his life and a doctor’s decision to comply are medical 
rather than commercial decisions.”4 
One can imagine a similar constitutional uncertainty were such as statute 
defended on Fourteenth Amendment grounds.  What if Congress determined that equal 
protection (for the disabled, for example) required that physician-assisted suicide not be a 
legal option under the CSA?  Out of a concern that the disabled or elderly would be 
(over-) encouraged to avail themselves of physician-assisted suicide, Congress could 
claim that a ban on assisted suicide is an exercise of congressional power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. But, here again, the uncertainty in the 
§ 5 jurisprudence occasioned by Boerne and the congruence and proportionality limits to 
the § 5 power render such an exercise of federal power problematic. 
Finally, a looming uncertainty emerging from the last chapter and elaborated upon 
here is the place of federalism concerns in administrative law decisions. In a 2001 case, 
the Court ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers could not claim jurisdiction over a 
landfill site with migratory birds, despite the Clean Water Act’s grant of jurisdiction to the 
Corps of “navigable waters.”5 As we will see, the decisions in the Oregon physician-
assisted suicide case referred only in passing to the SWANCC Court’s view that 
administrative rulings that “alter[] the federal-state framework by permitting federal 
encroachment upon a traditional state power” will trigger a narrowing construction of the 
 
4 Joy Fallek, Note, The Pain Relief Promotion Act: Will It Spell Death to “Death with Dignity” or 
Is It Unconstitutional?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1739, 1787 (2000). 
5 Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County [SWANCC] v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001).  
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relevant statute (the Clean Water Act in SWANCC and the CSA in Gonzales v. Oregon).6  
A broad interpretation of the SWANCC rule might entail a wholesale reevaluation of the 
scope of Chevron deference to administrative agencies, as any administrative ruling that, 
in the Court’s view, “encroached upon a relevant state power” could be subject to judicial 
scrutiny and potentially invalidated so as not to raise constitutional objections to the 
underlying statute itself: “This requirement stems from our prudential desire not to 
needlessly reach constitutional issues and our assumption that Congress does not casually 
authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional 
authority.”7  Gonzales v. Oregon chose not to adopt such a broad rule, relying instead on 
a narrower statutory interpretation of the CSA. But the Court’s language in SWANCC
suggests that it may be prepared to place federalism worries at the center of 
administrative law cases as well. 
I. Assisted Suicide and Constitutional Rights 
In 1997, the Supreme Court rejected due process and equal protection challenges 
to state law prohibitions on physician-assisted suicide. In the first case, Glucksberg v. 
Washington, the Court considered a due process claim against Washington’s assisted 
suicide statute. A panel opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
written by Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. In the Ninth Circuit case, Compassion in Dying v. 
Washington,8 the appellate court reviewed a district court ruling that the plaintiff patients 
 
6 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1091 (D. Or. 2002) (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 
173 (citations omitted)). 
7 SWANCC, 531 U.S at 172-73. 
8 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
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and physicians were deprived of a due process liberty and were denied equal protection 
by the Washington statute. Rejecting the view that the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey somehow expanded the scope of due process liberty to 
include every decision affecting personal autonomy, Judge Noonan wrote that “[a]ny 
reader of judicial opinions knows that they often attempt to generality of expression and 
sententiousness of phrase that extend far beyond the problem addressed.”9 Because a 
right to physician-assisted suicide has never been recognized, “[u]nless the federal 
judiciary is to be a floating constitutional convention, a federal court should not invent a 
constitutional right unknown to the past and antithetical to the defense of human life that 
has been a chief responsibility of our constitutional government.”10 
Judge Noonan’s opinion is an especially helpful survey of the possible arguments 
offered on behalf of the state’s interest in prohibiting assisted suicide. First, the state has 
an “interest in not having physicians in the role of killers of their patients.”11 As argued 
more elaborately by Leon Kass, among others, legal permission for assisted suicide 
would transform the nature of the medical profession and present a marked 
transformation in the role of physicians in their relationships with patients.12 Second, the 
state has an interest in protecting patients from “psychological pressure to consent to their 
own deaths.”13 Financial pressures on families and despair over terminal conditions 
 
9 Id. at 590. 
10 Id. at 591. 
11 Id. at 592. 
12 Leon R. Kass, Neither for Love nor Money: Why Doctors Must Not Kill, 94 PUB. INTEREST 25 
(1989). 
13 49 F.3d at 592. 
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might lead to coercion that would make the choice for assisted suicide less than
autonomous.14 Third, the state is legitimately concerned with protecting the poor and 
minorities from exploitation and manipulation. Fourth, the disabled would be especially 
vulnerable to pressure to avail themselves of assisted suicide, which, in turn, gave rise in 
the 1990s to a concerted anti-euthanasia effort among the disability rights community. 
Fifth, the state is legitimately worried that there might be a slippery slope from permitting 
terminally ill patients to have the aid of a physician in committing suicide to the giving 
the same option to suffering (but not terminally ill) competent patients and finally to 
involuntary euthanasia. The literature on the long-running experiment with legalized 
euthanasia in the Netherlands raises doubt that limits on assisted suicide can be 
maintained.15 
An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Noonan’s opinion. Writing 
for the court, Judge Stephen Reinhardt began his analysis of the liberty interest by 
positing “the fact that we have previously failed to acknowledge the existence of a 
particular liberty interest or even that we have previously prohibited its exercise is no 
barrier to recognizing its existence.”16 Building on the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Cruzan v. Missouri, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that 
 
14 The role of “autonomy” in the physician-assisted suicide debate and in bioethics more generally 
is much contested. Two very fine treatments of the topic are ONORA O’NEILL, AUTONOMY AND TRUST IN 
BIOETHICS (2002) and CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND 
MEDICAL DECISIONS (1998). 
15 See NEIL M. GORSUCH, THE FUTURE OF ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA 102-15 (2006). 
16 Compassion in Dying v. State of Wash., 79 F.3d 790, 805 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) rev’d sub 
nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  
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terminally ill patients have a due process liberty interest in procuring the aid of a 
physician in ending their lives. 
The litigation against New York’s prohibition on assisted suicide began when Dr. 
Timothy Quill, who had written a controversial piece in the New England Journal of 
Medicine describing an assisted suicide, filed suit along with two other New York 
physicians.17 The Second Circuit did not follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead in concluding 
that there was a Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interest in physician-assisted 
suicide, but it did hold that the statutory prohibition against assisted suicide was a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that the longstanding right to 
refuse medical treatment that dates back to Judge Cardozo’s famous opinion in 
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital18 results in an unequal treatment of patients 
in end-of-life settings. A competent patient who seeks to refuse medical treatment or who 
seeks removal of life sustaining treatment is protected under New York law. The patient 
who cannot hasten his death in such a manner, though, and seeks instead to have the 
assistance of a physician in ending his life is not given such a right under New York law: 
[I]t seems clear that New York does not treat similarly circumstanced persons 
alike: those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems 
are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such systems; but 
those who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-




17 Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision Making, 324 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 691 (1991). 
18 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914). 
19 Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996) rev’d, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
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Underlying the court’s reasoning is an assault on the distinction between killing 
and letting die, which has been a familiar argument in the bioethical literature.20 The 
court seizes on the argument from the district court that there is a difference between 
“allowing nature to take its course,” on the one hand, and hastening death on the other. 
But “there is nothing ‘natural’ about causing death by means other than the original 
illness or its complications,” the court argues, and the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment “hastens…death by means that are not natural in any sense. It certainly cannot 
be said that the death that immediately ensues is the natural result of the progression of 
disease or condition from which the patient suffers.”21 
The Supreme Court rejected both the due process and the equal protection 
arguments.22 The Court noted that “[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an 
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-
assisted suicide.  Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic 
society.”23 This federalism rationale in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion for the 
outcome was brought to the fore in Justice O’Connor’s concurrence: 
There is no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper 
balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally competent individuals 
who would seek to end their suffering and the State’s interests in protecting those 
who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure….States are presently 
undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and 
other related issues….In such circumstances, “the…challenging task of crafting 
 
20 Much of the current debate derives from James Rachels’ 1975 article, Active and Passive 
Euthanasia, 292 NEW ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975). For a thorough treatment of the issue, see Daniel Patrick 
Sulmasy, Killing and Allowing to Die (1995) (Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University). 
21 Quill, 80 F.3d at 729. 
22 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
23 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 735. 
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appropriate procedures for safeguarding…liberty interests is entrusted to the 
States….”24 
 
On a controversial question of “morality policy,” then, the Court deferred to the federalist 
system of democratic deliberation in the several states.25 26 
We could generalize from the Court’s opinion in Glucksberg and Quill to a 
principle that the federal government (including the federal judiciary) should refrain from 
making law or policy on controversial questions that generate deep moral conflict. Even 
if this principle is intuitively appealing, however, it still stands in need of justification. 
Federalism for the sake of federalism will not do; what is needed is a political theoretical 
justification for preferring state-by-state adjudication of these controversial moral 
questions. I will argue that subsidiarity provides such a justification. 
After recounting the forms of federal opposition to the Oregon physician-assisted 
suicide statute, I will look at two ways in which one committed to the basic principles of 
political liberalism could decide the question of physician-assisted suicide.  One 
alternative—a uniform, national approach by way of constitutional rights—is provided by 
 
24 Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
25 I take the concept of “morality policy” from Christopher Z. Mooney, The Decline of Federalism 
and the Rise of Morality-Policy Conflict in the United States, 30 PUBLIUS 171 (2000). 
26 Obviously, the area of law most difficult to square with the Court’s opinion (and Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence) in Glucksberg is abortion.  In a brief passage, the Court sought to distinguish a 
claimed right to physician-assisted suicide from Roe and Casey: 
“[T]he Court’s opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in light of our prior 
cases, those personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply 
rooted in out history and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally 
ordered liberty, that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment….That many of the 
rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does 
not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal 
decisions are so protected, and Casey did not suggest otherwise.”   
Glucksberg, 523 U.S. at 726-27. 
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the authors of “The Philosophers’ Brief” and argues for a federal constitutional due 
process liberty right to physician-assisted suicide.  The second alternative favors state-by-
state determination of the issue but also from what might be described as a broadly 
“liberal” perspective but one consistent with aspects of subsidiarity.   
II. Assisted Suicide in Oregon: A Test Case for Federalism 
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which is primarily directed at drug 
trafficking, prohibits “dispens[ing] a controlled substance” unless authorized under the 
statute.  Physicians can obtain authorization (and register with the federal government) 
under the statute to dispense drugs “to the extent authorized by their registration and in 
conformity with the other provisions of this subchapter.”27  According both to case law 
interpreting the CSA and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regulations 
implementing the statute, one such limitation on physicians is that prescriptions must be 
in accord with “legitimate medical purposes”: “A prescription issued for a controlled 
substance must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner 
acting in the usual course of his professional practice.”28  The extent to which a federal 
determination (made by the Attorney General) of what constitutes a “legitimate medical 
 
27 21 U.S.C. § 822(b). 
28 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04(a).  See also United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 140-42 (1975):  
[T]he scheme of the [CSA], viewed against the background of the legislative history, 
reveals an intent to limit a registered physician’s dispensing authority to the course of his 
“professional practice.”…Implicit in the registration of a physician is the understanding 
that he is authorized only to act “as a physician.”…[R]egistration is limited to the 
dispensing and use of drugs “in the course of professional practice or research.” Other 
provisions throughout the Act reflect the intent of Congress to confine authorized medical 
practice within accepted limits. 
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purpose” can preempt a state’s determination was at the center of the dispute over federal 
intervention in Oregon. 
In November of 1994, Oregon voters passed by ballot initiative the Death with 
Dignity Act (DDA), thereby becoming the first state to legalize a form of physician-
assisted suicide.  After rejecting a second ballot proposal to repeal the Act in 1997, the 
law went into effect after those challenging the statute failed to convince the Ninth 
Circuit that the statute violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.29  The DDA provides, in relevant part, that “[a]n adult who is capable, is a 
resident of Oregon, and has been determined by the attending physician and consulting 
physician to be suffering from a terminal disease, and who has voluntarily expressed his 
or her wish to die, may make a written request for medication for the purpose of ending 
his or her life in a humane and dignified manner.”30 
Even before the 1997 ballot initiative and Ninth Circuit decision, however, 
Senator Orrin Hatch (Republican of Utah) and Congressman Henry Hyde (Republican of 
Illinois)—the then-chairmen of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, 
respectively—sent a letter to the DEA advocating the position that the DEA is authorized 
under the CSA to revoke the registration of physicians and pharmacists who prescribe 
death-causing medication under the Oregon statute: “In our view, assisting in a suicide by 
prescribing or filling a prescription for a controlled substance cannot be a ‘legitimate 
medical purpose’ under DEA regulations, especially when the practice is not reasonable 
 
29 Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 927 (1997). 
30 OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (1997). 
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and necessary to the diagnosis and treatment of disease and injury, legitimate health care, 
or compatible with the physician’s role as healer.”31 
On November 5, 1997, DEA Administrator Thomas Constantine agreed and 
concluded in his response to the Hatch/Hyde letter “that delivering, dispensing or 
prescribing a controlled substance with the intent of assisting a suicide would not be 
under any current definition a ‘legitimate medical purpose.’”32  The state of Oregon, 
acting through its deputy attorney general, asked the Department of Justice to reconsider 
the DEA opinion by Administrator Constantine.  On June 5, 1998, Attorney General Janet 
Reno reversed the decision of the DEA Administrator and determined that “[t]here is no 
evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to displace the states as the primary 
regulators of the medical profession, or to override a state’s determination as to what 
constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that 
practice.”33 
In an effort to clarify congressional intent, the Pain Relief Promotion Act (PRPA) 
was introduced in Congress in the summer of 1999.  If enacted, the PRPA would have 
amended the CSA to give the DEA authority to prohibit the use of controlled substances 
 
31 Letter from Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate & Henry J. 
Hyde, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, to The Honorable Thomas 
A. Constantine, Adm’r, Drug Enforcement Admin. of the U.S. (July 29, 1997).   
32 Letter from The Honorable Thomas A. Constantine, Adm’r, Drug Enforcement Admin. of the 
U.S., to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, (Nov. 5, 
1997), at 1-2. 
33 Letter from The Honorable Janet Reno, Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, 
Chairman of the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, (June 5, 1998), at 1. 
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for the purpose of hastening the death of a terminally ill patient.  Specifically, the bill 
provided: 
For purposes of this Act and any regulations to implement this Act, alleviating 
pain or discomfort in the usual course of professional practice is a legitimate 
medical purpose for the dispensing, distributing, or administering of a controlled 
substance that is consistent with public health and safety, even if he use of such a 
substance may increase the risk of death.  Nothing in this section authorizes 
intentionally dispensing, distributing, or administering a controlled substance for 
the purpose of causing death or assisting another person in causing death.34 
 
The PRPA passed the House but languished in the Senate.  As the end of the 106th 
Congress approached, Senator Ron Wyden (Democrat of Oregon) announced his 
intention to filibuster the PRPA if it reached the Senate floor.  Wyden, though claiming to 
be personally opposed to physician-assisted suicide and an opponent of the Oregon ballot 
measure, raised federalism concerns about the PRPA in his testimony to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee.35  “[W]hen it comes to determining legitimate medical purposes of 
these controlled substances, these drugs have always fallen under the supervision of the 
states,” Wyden said, “….These state approaches differ from state to state and exist solely 
under state, not federal authority, without disturbing the federal government’s 
jurisdiction.”36  Despite efforts by the chief sponsor of the PRPA in the Senate, Senator 
Don Nickles (Republican of Oklahoma), to attach the bill to an appropriation measure, 
Congress adjourned on December 15, 2000, without enacting the PRPA. 
 
34 Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999). 
35 Testimony of U.S. Senator Ron Wyden before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Regarding 
the Pain Relief Promotion Act, April 25, 2000.  
36 Id. 
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With control of the Senate shifting to the Democrats in the spring of 2001, 
opponents of Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide statute shifted strategy and moved from 
seeking a legislative nullification of the DDA to seeking an administrative reversal of 
Reno’s earlier interpretation of the CSA.  On June 27, 2001, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General Sheldon Bradshaw and Special Counsel Robert Delahunty in the Office of Legal 
Counsel submitted a legal memorandum to Attorney General John Ashcroft concluding 
that practices authorized by the Oregon DDA do not constitute a “legitimate medical 
purpose” and therefore violate the CSA.37  On November 6, 2001, Attorney General 
Ashcroft informed the Administrator of the DEA, Asa Hutchinson, that prescribing drugs 
intended to kill a terminally ill patient does not constitute a “legitimate medical purpose” 
under the Controlled Substances Act, and “prescribing, dispensing, or administering 
federally controlled substances to assist suicide may render [a physician’s] 
registration…inconsistent with the public interest and therefore subject to possible 
suspension or revocation under [the CSA].”38  Oregon filed suit in federal district court 
the next day challenging the Ashcroft directive and seeking a temporary restraining order.  
The TRO was issued on November 8, and a preliminary injunction followed in two 
weeks. 
 
37 Memorandum from Sheldon Bradshaw, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. & Robert J. Delahunty, 
Special Counsel, to the Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, D.C. (June 27, 2001). 
38 66 Fed. Reg. 56608 (Nov. 9, 2001).  
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On April 17, 2002, Judge Robert E. Jones granted Oregon’s motion for summary 
judgment.39  Interestingly, the decision by Judge Jones avoided confronting any major 
federalism questions, such as the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause 
or the reservation of powers to the states under the Tenth Amendment, though the Oregon 
did argue both points in its briefing to the court.  Instead, the court rested its decision 
entirely on administrative law and statutory interpretation issues, arguing that the 
statutory language, the legislative history, and the case law surrounding the CSA did not 
support the Attorney General’s view that he can provide his own interpretation of 
“legitimate medical purpose” over and against a state’s regulation of medical practice.  “I 
resolve this case as a matter of statutory interpretation,” wrote Judge Jones, “and my 
interpretation of the statutory text and meaning is that the CSA does not prohibit 
practitioners from prescribing and dispensing controlled substances in compliance with a 
carefully-worded state legislative act.”40 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the Attorney General’s 
directive exceeded the scope of his authority under the CSA, and the Supreme Court 
agreed. Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy began by noting that the case involved the 
underlying moral and political question of assisted suicide, “but its resolution requires an 
inquiry familiar to the courts: interpreting a federal statute to determine whether 
Executive action is authorized by, or otherwise consistent with, the enactment.”41 After 
 
39 Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Or. 2002). 
40 Id. at 1093. 
41 Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 249 (2006). 
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summarizing the history of the Interpretive Rule, the Court discussed the thorny 
administrative law issues in the case. Most importantly, the Court concluded that the CSA 
provided the Attorney General with “limited powers, to be exercised in specific ways.”42 
Furthermore, the regulatory aims of the CSA are, the Court argued, limited to 
combating illicit drug trafficking: “Congress regulates medical practice insofar as it bars 
doctors from using their prescription-writing powers as a means to engage in illicit drug 
dealing and trafficking as conventionally understood. Beyond this, however, the [CSA] 
manifests no intent to regulate the practice of medicine generally.”43 And while most of 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court steered clear of the substantive dispute over 
physician-assisted suicide, he did conclude on a federalism note: “Just as the conventions 
of expression indicate that Congress is unlikely to alter a statute’s obvious scope and 
division of authority through muffled hints, the background principles of our federal 
system also belie the notion that Congress would use such an obscure grant of authority 
to regulate areas traditionally supervised by the States’ police power.”44 
III. Political Liberalism and Assisted Suicide 
In all of the decisions recounted here (the Oregon ballot initiative, the various 
Supreme Court decisions, proposed federal legislation, and the Ashcroft directive), we 
could explore the levels of political accountability in each and ask whether that should be 
relevant to deciding the federalism and physician-assisted suicide question.  For example, 
 
42 Id. at 259. 
43 Id. at 270. 
44 Id. at 274. 
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should democratic deference to a ballot initiative prevail over federal administrative 
decisions?  Or are there republican reasons to worry about ballot initiatives but not, for 
instance, congressional legislation? But the primary question considered in this chapter is 
whether federalism should matter in the assisted suicide debate.  To that end, I will 
consider two attempts to use the resources of political theory to adjudicate the assisted 
suicide question.  One view—represented by “The Philosophers’ Brief”—argues for a 
federal constitutional right to assisted suicide.  An alternative view, based in subsidiarity 
and still “liberal” in the broadly theoretical sense, contends that the values of political 
liberalism are best served on this matter by federalism. 
A. “The Philosophers’ Brief” 
In the March 27, 1997, issue of the New York Review of Books, six prominent 
philosophers published an amicus brief they had filed with the U.S. Supreme Court as the 
Court considered the two federal appellate rulings on assisted suicide that became Vacco 
v. Quill and Washington v. Glucksberg. The brief, aptly titled “The Philosophers’ Brief,” 
argued for recognition by the Court of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide 
for terminally ill patients. Among the six authors were probably the most prominent 
liberal theorist of the twentieth century, John Rawls (whose work I will use later to argue 
for a federalist solution to physician-assisted suicide), and also the University Professor 
of Jurisprudence at Oxford, Ronald Dworkin. Though the Supreme Court did not adopt 
the reasoning or the conclusions of “The Philosophers’ Brief,” a contribution to a 
contested public policy question by such notable theorists provides an interesting glimpse 
of the interplay between moral philosophy, political theory, and legal debate. 
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Though the argument of the brief cannot be repeated here in its entirety, the three 
central contentions of the authors can be summarily stated. First, the authors asserted a 
constitutional principle that decisions regarding the termination of life are governed “on 
the basis of a religious or ethical conviction about the value or meaning of life itself,” 
and, furthermore, that the U.S. Constitution “forbids government to impose such 
convictions on its citizens.”45 There is a presumption of neutrality regarding moral 
questions, and the categories of “moral,” “ethical,” and “religious” are often collapsed in 
the brief under this principle of non-interference. 
This “liberty interest,” as the authors term it, is protected by two considerations, 
one drawn from the text of the Constitution and the other from two Supreme Court cases. 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the brief argues, guarantees the 
right of citizens to be “allowed to make [deeply personal] decisions for themselves, out of 
their own faith, conscience, and conviction.”46  The decision as to the manner of one’s 
own death is held to be a primary instance of such a decision, for, as the brief states in a 
peculiar turn of phrase, “Death is, for each of us, among the most significant events of 
life.”47 Additionally, the 1992 decision of the Supreme Court upholding the right of a 
woman to an abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, recognized a “sphere of autonomy” 
into which government may not intrude. As the Court wrote in its now-famous “mystery 
passage,” “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
 
45 Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, T.M. Scanlon, & Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, The Philosophers’ Brief, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 27, 1997, at 43. 
46 Id.. 
47 Id. at 44. 
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meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”48 What could lie closer to 
one’s concept of existence, the brief asks rhetorically, than one’s attitude toward death? 
Finally, in Cruzan v. Missouri,49 the 1990 case holding that a competent patient may 
refuse life-sustaining treatment such as artificial nutrition and hydration, the Court, 
according to the philosophers, laid the groundwork for a right to determine the time and 
manner of one’s death, including a right to physician-assisted suicide. If one has the right 
to refuse unwanted medical intervention and to seek death through an act of omission, 
then, the brief contends, one may also seek death through an act of commission, such as 
the ingestion of a lethal dose of medication. 
The use of the Cruzan case leads from a treatment of the brief’s assertion of a 
liberty interest to its attack on the traditional distinction between killing and letting die. 
“If it is permissible for a doctor deliberately to withdraw medical treatment in order to 
allow death to result from a natural process,” the authors write, “then it is equally 
permissible for him to help a patient hasten his own death more actively, if that is the 
patient’s express wish.”50 This dispute over the question of whether there is a moral 
distinction to be made between acts that allow a patient to die, such as removal of a 
respirator, and acts of killing a patient, such as the administration of lethal drugs, has, as 
noted above, raged since James Rachels’ famous article “Active and Passive Euthanasia” 
appeared in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1975, and the central place given to 
 
48 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992), cited in The Philosophers’ Brief, supra 
note 45, at 44. 
49 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
50 The Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 45, at 45. 
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obliterating the distinction by “The Philosophers’ Brief” demonstrates the ongoing 
importance of the question. 
Finally, the brief argues that the various versions of the “slippery slope” argument 
advanced by critics of physician-assisted suicide do not justify an absolute prohibition. 
These arguments usually take two forms. One argues that the extension of a right to 
physician-assisted suicide to terminally ill and competent patients will quickly lead to the 
extension of such a right to non-competent patients. Why, it is argued, should non-
competent patients, for example, those in a coma, be prevented from exercising the same 
right to a hastened and dignified death that competent patients enjoy? (This was, as 
mentioned earlier, basically the argument adopted by the Second Circuit in Vacco.) The 
second form of the argument points to the potential for various types of subtle or not so-
subtle coercion of the free choice of physician-assisted suicide among the most 
vulnerable members of the population: the elderly, the young, and the poor. Particularly 
in an environment of cost-containment through managed care arrangements, many share 
the fears of M. Cathleen Kaveny and John P. Langan writing in the New York Times: “If 
every person diagnosed with a terminal illness is seen as a potential candidate for assisted 
suicide, a fatal overdose prescribed by a doctor could well become the most powerful 
cost-control tool available to managed care.”51 
The brief responds by arguing that no evidence exists to justify such assertions by 
opponents of physician-assisted suicide. The data from the Netherlands, the only 
 
51 M. Cathleen Kaveny and John P. Langan, The Doctor’s Call, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1996, at A13. 
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jurisdiction among liberal democracies with extended experience of decriminalized 
assisted suicide, is, the authors contend, insufficient to override the liberty interests at 
stake. Furthermore, the states would be permitted to enact regulatory schemes to limit the 
practice of assisted suicide, thus preventing non-competent patients from falling victim to 
it or the coercion of the vulnerable. Because a constitutional right is at stake, the authors 
argue that the burden of proof lies on the government to demonstrate that the exercise of 
that right should be prohibited. Subtle coercion by doctors or family members is 
presumably also a danger in decisions to withdraw life-support, but, the brief argues, the 
right of competent patients to refuse such treatment is held to override such fears. 
The Court rejected each of the arguments presented in the brief. Regarding the 
distinction between physician-assisted suicide and the withdrawal of life-support, the 
Court writes that the distinction is “widely recognized and endorsed in the medical 
profession [citing the American Medical Association] and in our legal traditions, is both 
important and logical; it is certainly rational.”52 The Court accepted the reasoning of not 
only the AMA but also several bioethicists that the removal of life-support leads to the 
patient’s death due to the underlying condition, whereas a lethal dose of medication is the 
direct cause of a patient’s death. Though “The Philosophers’ Brief” ascribed the same 
intention to the patient in both cases (causing one’s death), a moral and material 
distinction can, the Court argued, be drawn between (1) the intention of relieving oneself 
from unwanted medical intervention that also has the effect of causing one’s death, and 
 
52 Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800-01 (1997). 
 123 
                                                
(2) the intention of ending one’s life directly and immediately. One is an acknowledgment 
of the human condition; the other is or is tantamount to murder/suicide. 
Though engaging the issue of protecting the vulnerable in far less detail than the 
distinction between killing and letting die, the Court also agreed that states have a 
legitimate interest in safeguarding the poor, the elderly, and the disabled from pressure to 
prematurely end their lives. Citing a New York State task force that studied the question, 
the Court agreed that “[l]egalizing assisted suicide would pose profound risks to many 
individuals who are ill and vulnerable...The risk of harm is greatest for the many 
individuals in our society whose autonomy and well-being are already compromised by 
poverty, lack of access to good medical care, advanced age, or membership in a 
stigmatized social group.”53 The Court also cited empirical research on the practice of 
euthanasia in the Netherlands showing that a high proportion of patients killed did not 
give consent as justification for Washington State’s fear that there is a “slippery slope” 
leading from voluntary to involuntary euthanasia. 
In concluding this part of my analysis, I would like to call attention to two critical 
questions or issues that emerge from this confrontation between “The Philosophers’ 
Brief” and the Supreme Court. First, what is the relationship between abstract 
philosophical reflection and an “applied” political or legal question such as physician-
assisted suicide? “The Philosophers’ Brief” sought to argue for a constitutional right that 
had never been recognized but lay dormant, the brief argued, within the constitutional 
 
53 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) (citation omitted). 
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text. The Supreme Court sharply disagreed, and Chief Justice Rehnquist made clear in his 
opinion that the historical prohibition on physician-assisted suicide in the states was a 
determinative factor in the Court’s reasoning, as was the research on Dutch practice. The 
resolution of the cases by the Court may provide a helpful though inexact guide to the 
prudential use of concrete, historical, and empirical data in such cases. 
Second, the underlying conception of the human person or anthropology of “The 
Philosophers’ Brief” could be the subject for considerable debate. Of course, one of the 
central contentions of the brief is that it has no such conception of the person but is 
merely seeking to assert a constitutional principle that the government may not take a 
position on such metaphysical or anthropological verities. Nevertheless, as authors such 
as Michael Sandel have argued, liberalism does adopt, however implicitly, an 
anthropological view.54 In the instance of “The Philosophers’ Brief,” its authors clearly 
hold such notions as autonomy and freedom to be constitutive of human well-being. 
People have a considerable capacity to be “competent, rational, informed, stable, and 
uncoerced” in the face of momentous decisions.55 As the debate on physician-assisted 
suicide and other similar issues continues, courts and scholars could be more attentive to 
the ways in which a communitarian insistence upon the historical and cultural 
embeddedness of decision making challenges the presumption of liberal autonomy. In the 
meantime, the Court’s decisions in the physician-assisted suicide cases make clear that 
 
54 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). 
55 The Philosophers’ Brief, supra note 45, at 47. 
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the Court will not read the Fourteenth Amendment so broadly as to encompass the liberal 
conception of rights found in “The Philosophers’ Brief.”56 
B. Federalism as a Safeguard of Political Liberalism 
My view, ultimately grounded in a commitment to the concerns of subsidiarity 
voiced in Chapter One, is that a vibrant federalism is not just a faithful reading of the 
constitutional text, structure, and original intent of the Framers and thereby a necessary 
element of our constitutional republic—though it is all these things. I also want to argue 
that a strong federalist system protects certain values of any liberal society, including and 
especially on such controversial moral issues as physician-assisted suicide. Borrowing 
again from Roderick Hills’ work, I will argue that a federal system (and state-by-state 
resolution of these controversial moral matters) allows for a better pluralistic matching of 
preferences and policies across the country and brings about what Hills terms a 
“Westphalian” solution on these issues. 
The literature on federalism is famously lacking in robust theoretical defenses of 
federalism. A notable exception is Michael McConnell’s review of Raoul Berger’s 
Federalism: The Founder’s Design, in which McConnell calls attention to three distinct 
advantages of decentralized decision making in a federal system. The first of these 
advantages is “responsiveness  to diverse interests and preferences,” by which McConnell 
means the familiar argument that in a decentralized system “local laws can be adapted to 
 
56 See Yale Kamisar, Foreward: Can Gluckberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of 
Life and Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453 (2008) and Paul J. Weithman Of Assisted Suicide and 
‘The Philosophers’ Brief,’ 109 ETHICS 548 (1999). 
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local conditions and tastes, while a national government must take a uniform and hence 
less desirable approach.”57 McConnell’s example is to take two states of 100 people each. 
70% of the people in State A wish to outlaw smoking in public places but only 40% in 
State B wish to do so. A national solution to ban smoking will please 110 people and 
anger 90. A different decision in each state (reflecting the different majorities for each 
view in each state) will please 130 and anger 70.58 To this argument of McConnell’s, we 
might add interstate mobility and the classic argument of Albert Hirschman’s regarding 
voice and exit serving to permit the displeased minority in State A to move to State B and 
vice versa.59 A nationally-imposed solution cuts off the “exit” option within the federal 
system, and, arguably, makes “voice” more difficult (because, among other reasons, 
lobbying the federal government is harder). 
On the other hand, those who favor national solutions to such questions might 
argue that citizens of states that permit morally offensive practices impose an 
“ideological externality”60 on the rest of the Union (as most would say is true with regard 
 
57 Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 
1493 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DEIGN (1987)). 
58 Id. at 1494. 
59 ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
60I owe the term “ideological externality” to Rick Hills.  In the parlance of economics, an 
externality exists when there is external benefit or external damage affecting individuals not involved in the 
consumption or production of some good.  Residents of culturally conservative states (e.g., Oklahoma and 
Utah) are, if one accepts the notion of ideological externalities, thereby affected by conduct in culturally 
liberal states (e.g., Oregon and Vermont).  Of course, states also impose internal costs on citizens who 
disagree with the state’s political conservatism or liberalism—an “internality” (Oregonians opposed to 
assisted suicide or Vermonters opposed to same-sex civil unions, for example).  For a discussion of the 
concept of externalities and its relation to liberal theory, see Don Herzog, Externalities and Other 
Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895, 910-14 67 (2000) (arguing that “the economists’ invocations of 
externalities are invidiously opportunistic” because “the concept is secretly parasitic on the liberal harm 
principle”). 
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to race and is reflected in the Reconstruction Amendments).  So also, it might be argued 
based upon a thick concept of the common good and subsidiarity, no society should 
permit some of its citizens to participate in physician-assisted suicide, even if this 
eliminates the decentralized matching of preferences to policies. 
Another way to make the same point with regard to morality policy is to consider 
risk aversion and expected utility. Recall the usual formulation of risk aversion: a risk 
averse person will prefer a sure chance of losing a small amount to a small chance of 
losing a large amount. In the terms of morality policy and physician-assisted suicide, an 
opponent of physician-assisted suicide would prefer the certainty that some states will 
allow assisted suicide (e.g., Oregon and similarly culturally liberal states) to the chance 
(albeit much smaller) that a national policy favoring physician-assisted suicide will be 
implemented. Likewise, the proponent of legalized physician-assisted suicide will rest 
comfortably with the knowledge that some states will prohibit the practice, but states 
such as Oregon will allow it. He or she stands to lose much more if the federal 
government adopts a national policy (particularly since any national policy on the issue, 
post-Glucksberg and Quill, is likely to prohibit physician-assisted suicide, not to permit 
it). 
In the federalism context, then, the risk averse person will rationally prefer the 
sure departure from his or her values in some states (but only limited to those states) over 
the chance that the national government will impose a solution on some controverted 
question for everyone, which would be a very large loss. If we assume that one wants to 
see one’s preferences enacted into law, one should favor a system in which one allows for 
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some sure victories and losses but excludes the possibility of losing everything at once. 
Or as John Rawls explains in his famous thought experiment of the “original position,” 
“It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain 
conception of justice. Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows 
his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune 
in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”61 
The point of this argument, for Rawls, is to “strip away” (theoretically, at least) those 
preferences that lead to a biased outcome on questions of justice: “Since all are similarly 
situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his [or her] particular condition, 
the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain.”62 This quality of 
“fairness” in outcome I take to be a crucial element of Rawls’ theory specifically and 
liberal theory generally. In a much later book, Rawls explains, “This requirement is fair 
because in establishing the fair terms of social cooperation (in the case of the basic 
structure) the only relevant feature of persons is their possessing the moral powers (to a 
sufficient minimum degree) and having the normal capacities to be a cooperating member 
of society over a complete life.”63 
As applied to the context of federalism and physician-assisted suicide, one should 
imagine that—whatever one’s policy preferences on the issue—we are seeking to design 
a system to take account of these basic requirements of fairness.  Would one prefer, then, 
 
61 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971). 
62 Id. 
63 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 79 (1993). 
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a national solution (whether judicially imposed in the form of a constitutional right to 
physician-assisted suicide, legislatively through something like the PRPA, or 
administratively in the Ashcroft directive) or a state-by-state resolution of the question? 
For many of the same risk-averse reasons explained above, we might expect one to favor 
federalism. Because one does not know whether the national resolution of the problem 
will be for or against one’s view, the “safer” course is to leave the matter to the states. If 
left to the states, one at least has a chance to “win” sometimes even if “losing” other 
times, regardless of one’s substantive views. 
Beyond the potentially self-referencing reasons of risk aversion, however, we 
might also favor federalism on grounds of toleration.64 In a pluralistic society in which 
controversial moral questions such as assisted suicide (and we could add same-sex 
marriage or the death penalty) divide us—often evenly across the population—respect 
and toleration for the views of others combines with Rawls’ conceit of the original 
position to favor a patchwork of solutions instead of a single, national solution, even if a 
national solution with which one happens to agree. Within proper limits (especially those 
imposed by the Bill of Rights and by the Reconstruction Amendments’ protections 
regarding race and basic liberties), federalism, then, is the genuinely liberal solution to 
controversial questions such as physician-assisted suicide. 
 
64 See id. at xxiv-xxviii (commenting on toleration and the origins of liberal political theory).  
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This is also the solution offered by Roderick Hills in his article “Federalism as 
Westphalian Liberalism,”65 which, from a liberal standpoint, offers a theory of federalism 
that is consonant with the principle of subsidiarity as functional pluralism, as discussed in 
the last chapter. Hills begins with an implicit theory of consent under which “[t]he 
constitutional legitimacy of a democracy rests on the fiction that each citizen consents to 
the overall decisions of his elected representatives” (769). He then describes and rejects 
two forms of liberalism—dubbed “Madisonian” and “Millian”— as inadequate for 
resolving deep moral disagreement. Madisonian liberalism “allocate[s]…power in a 
highly centralized manner, to the national legislature of a large republic” (771). Such a 
centralization of authority ensures that any resolution of a contested moral question will 
be based on a broad consensus of public opinion on the matter, as the national lawmaking 
process will “refine away partial resolutions of issues of deep disagreement.” As Hills 
observes, such a “vision of the national legislature as transcending parochial local 
prejudice or greed has a powerful pull on the judicial imagination” (772). But such 
Madisonian solutions are increasingly seen now as obsolete and ineffective. Madison’s 
confidence in the Federalist Papers that factions would rub against each other in the 
national legislative process and thereby lead to the best outcome fails to account for the 
possibility—indeed, likelihood in contemporary political experience—of gridlock and 
extortion. “[M]utual vetoes of each faction hardly ensures that the legislative dross will 
be siphoned off, leaving only pure ore,” Hills concludes, “Rather, the national legislature 
 
65 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism as Westphalian Liberalism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 769 (2006). 
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may simply grind to a halt as the national agenda is consumed with simple culture war 
salvos—Terri Schiavo, flag burning, same-sex marriage, abortion, etc.—shrill enough to 
be heard by an inattentive citizenry above the din of its favorite soap opera or sporting 
event” (773). 
By contrast, Millian liberalism allocates power over contested moral matters to 
individuals and “limiting the state to the role of defining the jurisdiction of each 
individual independent of his idea of the good” (774). But Hills points out that such an 
account of liberalism depends on a contested understanding of what constitutes a “harm,” 
which merely delays but does not resolve the disagreement: “Mill’s system of liberalism 
creates a system of private governance but no rules for defining the jurisdictions that do 
the governing” (779). Unless private entitlements and harms can be defined in such a way 
as to evade disagreement—and, experience shows, they cannot—then there will still be 
disagreement about the initial allocation of rights and responsibilities. “It is this failure of 
Mill and his epigoni to define private entitlements in a way that can overcome deep 
disagreement that creates the necessity for some process that respects each person’s view 
on the intractable questions of entitlement” (780), Hills argues. Following Jeremy 
Waldron’s terminology of the “right of rights,” Hills submits that the right to have a say 
in resolution of the definition of what constitutes a right “entitl[es] the individual to a 
share of the collective power to define individual rights” (780). 
We can now draw out the implications of Madisonian and Millian liberalism for 
the physician-assisted suicide debate. The Ashcroft Directive and the proposed Pain 
Relief Promotion Act were efforts to enact a national resolution of the assisted suicide 
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question, but they suffer from the defect of such Madisonian solutions noted above, 
namely that they do not reflect the tempering of factions but are instead the premature 
imposition of a national solution over and against the deep opposition of some. So also, a 
Millian individualized resolution of physician-assisted suicide would beg the question of 
what constitutes an entitlement or harm in the physician-assisted suicide debate. If we 
assume for the sake of argument that Judge Noonan’s opinion in the Ninth Circuit panel 
decision is plausible in its presentation of legitimate state interests and Judge Reinhardt 
offers a plausible argument for individual liberty and autonomy on the same question, 
then we still stand in need of some prior account of what constitutes a good reason for 
legislative action. As Hills argues, “[t]he difficulty with the Millian solution is that we 
remain deeply divided on the proper scope of the private sphere, and these disagreements 
are frequently impossible to resolve on the basis of any shared consensus about private 
liberty” (786-87). 
The advantage of “Westphalian liberalism” is that it avoids both disagreement 
over the public-private distinction of Millian liberalism and preserves the jurisdictional 
pluralism that Madisonian liberalism sacrifices. Hills argues that the famous Peace of 
Westphalia is liberal in two senses that are relevant here: “by using territorial jurisdictions 
to define power over religious disputes, the Peace substituted geography for theology” 
and “the Peace provided a solution to the difficulty of drawing a distinction between the 
public and the private” (781). Most importantly for purposes of showing the significance 
of subsidiarity for such questions, subsidiarity, like Hills’ Westphalian liberalism, “better 
avoids the gratuitous suppression of reasonable views through the preservation of 
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jurisdictional diversity” (788). A gratuitous suppression of disagreement occurs when it is 
“unnecessary to ensure adequate provision of some collective good” (790). On a version 
of this Westphalian principle that precisely tracks the vocabulary of subsidiarity, Hills 
argues that “one could insist on a stronger principle of subsidiarity under which all 
policies would be devolved to the smallest unit of government capable of providing the 
good to the largest possible majority of all persons affected by the good” (792). This, in 
turn, “assures the losing faction that their loss was not gratuitous, meaning that their loss 
was the minimal sacrifice required by any system of collective self-government, because 
any collective decision would result in at least the same number of equally disappointed 
persons” (792). 
Hills’ account, then, converges with the theory of subsidiarity as functional 
pluralism advanced in the last chapter and helps us see the importance of a 
jurisdictionally differentiated approach to contested moral questions such as assisted 
suicide. It also points to a provocative convergence of subsidiarity and liberalism, albeit 
understood in a highly qualified sense that is not reducible to Millian individualism. A 
more complete account would need to consider the various social goods that different 
jurisdictions should be charged with providing, what jurisdictional limits can 
meaningfully be imposed, and what constitutes a social good in the first place. 
But yet another virtue of this pluralistic approach is that it permits debates about 
goods to be conducted on a scale that, at least potentially, makes such debate 
productive—at the level of the household, the community, or the sub-national political 
unit. Arguments about the goods at stake in the physician-assisted suicide debate, such as 
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caring for the terminally ill, the danger of coerced decisions by patients, individual 
autonomy, and the threat to the medical profession posed by permitting assisted suicide, 
are most likely to be conducted rationally and respectfully when they are not made either 
at the national level or by merely delegating the decisions on such questions to 
individuals. As Hills concludes, “The political processes of federalism, in other words, do 
not protect liberty as some object distinct from those processes themselves. Those 
subnational processes are themselves conducive of liberty, where ‘liberty’ stands for the 
equal right of all affected by a definition of ‘rights’ to have a say in rights’ definition” 
(797).
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CHAPTER FOUR: SUBSIDIARITY AND FDA PREEMPTION 
 
Introduction 
As the foregoing chapters have argued, the principle of subsidiarity offers an 
analytic framework for addressing a range of contested political question from a 
standpoint informed by the common good and what I have termed functional pluralism. 
We should not imagine, though, that subsidiarity is only relevant to questions close to the 
heart of Catholic moral theology, such as the debate over physician-assisted suicide 
discussed in the last chapter. Indeed, if Catholic social thought provides a way of thinking 
about politics as such, then we should expect that the functional pluralism of subsidiarity 
can be brought to bear on a range of policy questions. If subsidiarity is not, as the 
provocative quotation from Justice Scalia in Chapter One suggests, a merely formal 
principle that provides no meaningful guidance, then we can hope that it can be applied to 
even mundane and intricate policy debates. In this chapter, we will consider the debate 
over FDA preemption, which, like the debate over physician-assisted suicide, is in large 
part a dispute over whether national- or state-levels of authority should shape a particular 
policy question. 
“Tort reform” conjures images of pitched legislative battles at the federal and state 
level over limiting medical malpractice claims,1 restricting class action suits,2 
 
 
1 See Help, Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2005, H.R. 5, 
109th Cong. (2005) (proposed federal legislation setting a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in 
medical malpractice suits); see also FLA. STAT. § 766.118 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-13-1 (2006); MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 11-1-60 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.035 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (West 
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immunizing gun manufacturers from liability,3 capping damages in products liability 
suits,4 or imposing legislative resolutions for mass torts such as asbestos litigation.5 A 
quieter but equally important tort reform debate, however, has been conducted for several 
years in the once obscure area of federal preemption of state tort law claims. This chapter 
will summarize the background to the preemption debate and discuss in detail a recent 
and highly controversial such effort at tort reform by preemption, the assertion by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2006 that FDA labeling rules preempt state law 
tort claims alleging inadequacies in drug labeling. 
At the nexus of constitutional law and administrative law, preemption is the 
seemingly straightforward constitutional doctrine based in the Supremacy Clause that a 
“state law that conflicts with federal law is ‘without effect.’”6 Preemption is traditionally 
divided among “express,” “conflict,” and “field” preemption: 
Congress’ intent may be explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly 
contained in its structure and purpose. In the absence of an express congressional 
command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, 
or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable 
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.7 
 
 
2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-1708.1F (2005); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.301 (Vernon 
2006); W. VA. CODE § 55-7B-8 (2006) (recent state medical malpractice reform statutes). 
2 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1332, 1335, 1453, 1603, 1711-1715, 2071, 2074 (2007)). 
3 Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109- 92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (to be 
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921, 922, 924)). 
4 Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 956, 104th Cong.(1995). 
5 Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong. (2006). 
6 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 
U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).  
7 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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In the face of a products liability suit filed in state court, a successful federal 
preemption defense raised by a defendant manufacturer is a powerful tool requiring 
dismissal of the claim. More broadly, preemption defenses are a federalized version of a 
regulatory compliance defense under which accord with a relevant safety standard would 
serve to defeat a claim of design defect or failure to warn8—the Holy Grail of the 
products liability defense bar since the advent of strict liability for products liability 
claims in the mid-twentieth century.9 
Though the preemption debate had simmered for many years in such contexts as 
federal nuclear safety statutes10 and tobacco litigation,11 the FDA’s release in January 
2006 of a revision to its physician labeling rule for prescription drugs and an 
accompanying preamble asserting that the rule preempts state common law causes of 
action ushered in a firestorm of litigation and controversy. Some states already have 
enacted statutes that provide measures of protection against liability for pharmaceutical 
defendants demonstrating compliance with FDA requirements.12 A 2007 Texas state court 
 
8 See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000); Alan 
Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2 AM. L. 
& ECON. REV. 1 (2000). 
9 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
10 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 
238 (1984). 
11 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504. See also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538 (2008) 
(holding that misrepresentation claim was not preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 
Act). 
12 See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 82.007 (Vernon 2003); see also Mich. Comp. Laws § 
600.2946(5) (2007); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:58C-4 (2001); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-05(3) (1991); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.80(C) (West 2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.927 (2003); Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-2 
(2002). 
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decision in the Vioxx litigation against Merck highlights the effect of such statutes.13 
Preemption at the federal level by the FDA would, of course, be a much more powerful 
defense in pharmaceutical products liability litigation than relying on a patchwork of state 
products liability statutes. The FDA’s action, then, represented a newer, more aggressive 
approach to federal preemption that some termed “silent tort reform.”14 
There are essentially five questions at the heart of the FDA preemption (or 
preemption by any other agency) debate: 
1. Where Congress has not expressly preempted the states (or where the 
statute is ambiguous) how broadly may courts invoke principles of conflict 
preemption to find state tort claims preempted? 
Beginning with Geier v. American Honda Motor Company (discussed below), the 
Supreme Court has addressed preemption cases involving statutes that did not expressly 
preempt state common law claims, but the Court has moved toward a broader doctrine of 
conflict preemption in such cases. Because the FDA preemption cases premised on 
failures to warn do not pose an example of express preemption, the availability of conflict 
preemption in such cases has become the central question. 
2. Do state tort claims pose a conflict with federal regulation? 
 
13 See Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., Inc., Nos. 2005-59499, 2005-58543, 2007 WL 1181991 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Apr. 19, 2007) (Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Granting 
Expedited Appeal) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Texas statute and holding that “fraud-on-the-
FDA” provision in state statute is preempted). 
14 Stephen Labaton, “Silent Tort Reform” Is Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 
2006, at C5. 
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A recurring question in the preemption debate is whether permitting judges and 
juries to second-guess federal administrative safety determinations undermines the 
federal safety regime. Justice Blackmun’s partial concurrence and dissent in Cipollone v. 
Liggett Group is the most forceful statement of the view that tort law serves different 
purposes than administrative regulation (notably, providing compensation to injured 
plaintiffs) and that defendant manufacturers should simply view common law judgments 
for damages as the cost of doing business. Whether that view or Justice Breyer’s assertion 
in Geier that common law liability poses efficiency and administrative obstacles prevails 
will partly shape the future of preemption jurisprudence. 
3. How should traditional considerations of federalism affect the preemption 
debate? 
Invocations of state sovereignty and deference to the traditional role of the states 
in tort law dominate the preemption case law. One side, as expressed by Erwin 
Chemerinsky, argues that “[c]onservatives are hypocrites when it comes to federalism” 
because judicial and political conservatives favor federalism in many contexts but not 
when it helps corporations evade state tort liability.15 Others argue that preemption serves 
the goals of a national market and that constitutional federalism is consistent with a 
national regulatory approach.16 This disagreement over the role of the states and the 
federal government is reflected in lobbying and public relations efforts over preemption 
 
15 Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. 
REV. 69, 69 (2005). 
16 See Schwartz, supra note 8. See also Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort 
Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. (2006). 
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by, on one side, the business lobby (such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufacturers)17 and on the other, state and consumer-interest 
groups (such as the National Conference of State Legislatures).18 More generally, the 
preemption debate has often focused narrowly on details of statutory interpretation and 
eschewed constitutional structural questions, leading Richard Epstein and Michael Greve 
to argue in their introduction to a set of essays on preemption that “[w]hat the preemption 
debate needs…is an examination that reflects the delicate interplay between broad 
institutional considerations and regulatory detail.”19 
4. Should one’s view of the FDA’s approval process affect preemption 
analysis? 
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Medtronic v. Lohr presciently raised the 
issues that were sharply posed in the wake of Merck’s highly publicized withdrawal of 
Vioxx, namely whether the FDA is capable of effectively approving new products and 
monitoring their safety. Such a concern is based in the perception that the “FDA is an 
underfunded agency charged with regulating products that collectively constitute nearly 
25% of the U.S. gross domestic product.”20 If concerns about FDA effectiveness 
continue, how, if at all, should they shape courts’ willingness to find FDA preemption of 
 
17 U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Federal Preemption, 
http://www.uschamber.com/nclc/caselist/issues/preemption.htm.  
18 National Conference of State Legislatures, Preemption Monitor, 
http://www.ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/PreemptionMonitor_Index.htm. 
19 Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Introduction: Preemption in Context, in FEDERAL 
PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 1, 2 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 
2007). 
20 Bruce M. Psaty & R. Alta Charo, FDA Responds to Institute of Medicine Drug Safety 
Recommendations—In Part, 297 JAMA 1917, 1917 (2007). 
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state common law claims? Is the FDA sufficiently funded to perform its administrative 
duties adequately? Should the analysis depend on whether the agency examined a safety 
issue and reached a determination (or how adequate the review process was), as 
illustrated in the anti-depressant suicide cases discussed below? 
5. Are agency determinations with respect to preemption entitled to 
administrative deference? 
Justice Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Geier clearly signaled the Court’s 
willingness to treat the preemptive determinations of agencies with deference, even 
where the agency has, arguably, changed its position over time. The legacy for 
preemption in both the FDA and related contexts will depend on whether courts defer 
toward agency views on preemption for the reasons articulated in Geier (summarized 
below) or, instead, worry that political considerations have undermined agency expertise 
and judgment, making agency views unworthy of deference. 
This chapter will survey the background and implications of the FDA rule. Part I 
will summarize the FDA’s labeling regime and the content of the new physician labeling 
rule. Part II will discuss the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence in health and 
related products liability fields. Part III will briefly survey the litigation in response to the 
labeling rule leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine. In Part IV, I will 
suggest why federal preemption may (perhaps unexpectedly) be justified for subsidiarity-
based reasons. 
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I. FDA Approval and Labeling Process 
The 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) governs approval and labeling 
of new prescription drugs.21 The FDCA provides the FDA with general regulatory 
oversight of the safety and efficacy of prescription drugs, including the labeling 
requirements for prescription drugs. A new drug application (NDA) filed with the FDA 
by a prospective seller of a drug must contain “specimens of the labeling proposed to be 
used for such drug.”22 The FDA is further charged with ensuring that prescription drugs 
are not misbranded and that a label accompanying a prescription drug communicates 
adequate warnings.23 An adequate label includes “indications, effects, dosages, routes, 
methods, and frequency and duration of administration, and any relevant hazards, 
contraindications, side effects, and precautions under which practitioners licensed by law 
to administer the drug can use the drug safely and for the purposes for which it is 
intended….”24 
Through a set of regulations promulgated under the FDCA’s statutory authority, 
the FDA has governed the labeling of pharmaceutical products with extensive regulatory 
provisions since 1979.25 In response to growing physician concern about over-warning of 
minimal risks, the FDA began in the 1990s to consider an overhaul of its labeling 
 
21 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938). 
22 Id. § 355(b)(1). 
23 Id. §§ 331, 352. 
24 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c)(1) (1975). 
25 Id. §§ 201.56-201.57. 
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requirements, issuing a proposed rule in late 2000.26 After an extensive comment period, 
the FDA published the final rule in January 2006.27 Many changes contained in the 
proposed rule were incorporated into the final rule, including use of a “highlights” section 
for introductory and important prescribing information. Most controversial, however, was 
the FDA’s assertion in a preamble to the rule that “under existing preemption principles, 
FDA approval of labeling under the [FDCA]…preempts conflicting or contrary State 
law.”28 
In the years running up to the rule, the FDA had taken the position in amicus 
briefs filed by the Department of Justice that FDA labeling approval preempted state 
common law claims, particularly in cases involving alleged failure to warn of the suicide 
risks of anti-depressant drugs.29 The FDA claimed that its position on the interpretive rule 
with respect to preemption “represents the government’s long standing views on 
preemption, with a particular emphasis on how that doctrine applies to State laws that 
 
26 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; 
Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels; Proposed Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 81081, 81083 (Dec. 22, 
2000) (“Physicians believe that labeling overly stresses the occurrence of extremely rare events. They also 
asserted that although they can generally find the information they need, the usefulness of labeling could be 
improved by highlighting and providing an abstract of the most important information.”). 
27 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biological 
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3968 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pts. 201, 314, and 601). 
28 Id. at 3934. 
29 See Brief for Amicus Curiae The United States of America, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 
F.Supp.2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (No. 05-CV-05500-MMB), 2006 WL 1724170; Amicus Brief for the United 
States, Kallas v. Pfizer, Inc., Civ. No. 2: 04-cv-0998, 34, 37-38 (D. Utah, filed Sep. 15, 2005); Amicus Brief 
for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal 
of the District Court’s Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-
Appellant, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498), 2002 WL 
32303084.   
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would require labeling that conflicts with or is contrary to FDA-approved labeling.”30 
Highlighting the “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dilemma of pharmaceutical 
manufacturers forced to comply with the FDA labeling requirements but also facing the 
prospect of state law damages claims, the FDA concluded: 
The agency believes that State law conflicts with and stands as an obstacle to 
achievement of the full objectives and purposes of Federal law if it purports to 
preclude a firm from including in labeling or advertising a statement that is 
included in prescription drug labeling. By complying with the State law in such a 
case and removing the statement from labeling, the firm would be omitting a 
statement required…as a condition on the exemption from the requirement of 
adequate directions for use, and the omission would misbrand the drug under [the 
FDCA]. The drug might also be misbranded on the ground that the omission is 
material…and makes the labeling or advertising misleading….31 
 
 More specifically, the FDA’s preamble to the physician labeling rule asserts that 
“at least” six types of claims are preempted:32  
• First, the rule preempts liability for failures either to include information in the 
highlights section of the label or “otherwise emphasize any information the 
substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling.” This assertion responded to 
an industry concern that creation of the highlights section and decisions about 
what information is worthy of including as a highlight would create new forms of 
liability. 
• Second, the rule preempts direct-to-consumer advertising claims where the 
plaintiff alleges that “a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to 
 
30 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biological 
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. 
31 Id. at 3935. 
32 Id. at 3935-36.  
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include in an advertisement any information the substance of which appears 
anywhere in the labeling,” when the sponsor has complied with FDA draft 
guidance.33 
• Third, and perhaps most importantly, the rule preempts claims alleging a breach 
of “an obligation to warn by failing to include contraindications or warnings that 
are not supported by evidence that meets the standards set forth in this rule.” 
• Fourth and fifth, the rule preempts failure to warn claims in which the plaintiff 
alleges that a manufacturer failed “to include a statement in labeling or in 
advertising” either where the FDA had determined that the substance of the 
warning did not need to be included on the label, or where the FDA had 
prohibited inclusion on the label.  
• Finally, statements that the FDA had approved for inclusion on the label cannot be 
the basis for a failure to warn claim.  
In the wake of the 2006 rule, defendants in pharmaceutical products liability suits 
raised the defense of FDA preemption with the imprimatur of the agency in the form of 
an interpretive rule, a much more influential basis for the defense than the FDA amicus 
briefs of previous years. Whether the rule did, in fact, preempt state tort claims, though, 
depended on application of the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence, to which we 
now turn. 
 
33 Following Wyeth v. Levine, the question of preemption of claims based on alleged misstatements 
made in direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising will likely be the next major front in the FDA preemption 
battle. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Drug Advertising Claims: Preemption’s New Frontier, 41 LOY. L.A. L. 






                                                
II. The Supreme Court and Preemption, 1992– 
Commentators routinely characterize the Supreme Court’s preemption case law as 
a “muddle,”34 turning on lawyerly discussions of statutory construction, agency 
deference, and federalism. The Court’s preemption jurisprudence traces back to such 
cases as San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,35 involving the National Labor 
Relations Act, and Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation, in which the Court held that a 
claim for punitive damages was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act.36 In recent 
years, the pace of preemption decisions has quickened considerably, particularly cases in 
which defendants argue that federal law preempts state common law claims.37 A 
complete treatment of the Court’s preemption cases is beyond the scope of this chapte
but the relevant issues for the arguments over FDA preemption can be gleaned from four
cases decided since 1992: (1) Cipollone v. Liggett Group, (2) Medtronic  v. Lohr, (3) 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, and (4) Buckman Company  v. Plaintiffs
Legal Comm
A. Cipollone: The Advent of Broader Preemption 
Notwithstanding a confusing four-justice plurality opinion to which two 
additional opinions concur and dissent in part, the Court’s decision in Cipollone is rightly 
seen as “a watershed decision in which a divided Court signaled a broader approach to 
 
34 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000). 
35 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).  
36 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). 
37 Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 1030 
n.9 (2002) (“A search by the author of preemption cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1940 
disclosed approximately 150 decided between 1940 and 1980 and an additional 150 in the twenty years 
between 1980 and 2000, roughly double the amount of the previous forty years.”). 
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preemption and a willingness to set aside state common law in the name of federal 
objectives.”38 Indeed, although Justice Stevens’ himself was to become more reluctant in 
later cases to find federal preemption, his plurality opinion in Cipollone is a roadmap for 
resolving such cases in favor of defendants seeking preemption. 
In Cipollone, the surviving son of a woman who died of lung cancer brought state 
law claims for failure to warn, breach of warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
conspiracy to conceal material facts. The Third Circuit39 held that the claims were 
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, a federal 
statute enacted following the Surgeon General’s famous report on the dangers of cigarette 
smoking.40  
A cardinal rule of all preemption cases is starting with congressional intent.41 In 
Cipollone, the Court began by tracing the legislative history behind enactment of the 
federal warning requirement on cigarettes. A successor statute to the 1965 Act, the Public 
Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,42 required a warning label on all cigarette 
packages stating “Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.” With respect to 
preemption of state law, the 1969 Act stated “[n]o requirement or prohibition based on 
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or 
 
38 Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 
1393 (2006). 
39 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) rev’d, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). 
40 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340).  
41 English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990) (“Pre-emption fundamentally is a question 
of congressional intent.”). 
42 Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (current 
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340). 
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promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the 
provisions of this Act.”43  
Thus, to resolve defendant’s preemption argument, the Cipollone court analyzed 
the defendant’s assertion that plaintiff’s claims constituted requirements or prohibitions 
within the meaning of the federal statute: “The phrase ‘[n]o requirement or prohibition’ 
sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive enactments and common 
law….”44 Relying on Prosser’s Law of Torts and a primarily regulatory conception of tort 
law, the Court argued that “common-law damages of the sort raised by [plaintiff] are 
premised on the existence of a legal duty, and it is difficult to say that such actions do not 
impose ‘requirements or prohibitions.’”45 
 The Court also held that common law claims are “imposed under State law” 
within the meaning of the statute, at least insofar as “whether the legal duty that is the 
predicate of the common-law damages action constitutes a ‘requirement or prohibition’ 
based on smoking and health.”46 With regard to state law failure to warn claims, the 
Court concluded that “claims . . . requir[ing] a showing that respondents’ post-1969 
advertising or promotions should have included additional, or more clearly stated, 
warnings . . . are pre-empted.”47 Because the remaining claims for breach of warranty, 
fraudulent misrepresentation, and conspiracy to conceal material facts did not implicate 
 
43 15 U.S.C. § 1334. 
44 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992) (alteration in original).  
45 Id. at 522. 
46 Id. at 523. 
47 Id. at 524. 
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the concern about uniform national standards, however, they were not preempted by the 
federal statute.48 
 Dissenting from the Court’s holding with respect to preemption of common law 
claims, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, found the Court’s 
conclusion “little short of baffling.”49 Most importantly, Justice Blackmun disputed the 
Court’s assertion that common law claims “exert a regulatory effect on manufacturers 
analogous to that of positive enactments.”50 Arguing that manufacturers do not, in fact, 
face a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” dilemma when choosing between 
regulatory compliance and liability for common law claims, Justice Blackmun asserted 
that “no particular course of action (e.g., the adoption of a new warning label) is 
required.”51 A manufacturer can “decide to accept damages awards as a cost of doing 
business and not alter its behavior in any way . . . [o]r, by contrast, it may choose to avoid 
future awards by dispensing warning through a variety of alternative mechanisms . . . .”52 
Finally, Justice Blackmun suggested that tort law and regulation serve “separate 
 
48 Id. at 526, 529-30. In dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Justice Thomas) argued based on 
principles of statutory interpretation that the federal statute preempted all of the plaintiff’s claims: 
Under the Supremacy Clause, our job is to interpret Congress’s decrees of pre-emption 
neither narrowly nor broadly, but in accordance with their apparent meaning. If we did the job in 
the present case, we wound find, under the 1965 Act, pre-emption of petitioner’s failure-to-warn 
claims; and under the 1969 Act, we would find pre-emption of petitioner’s claims complete . . . . 
The test for pre-emption in this setting should be one of practical compulsion, i.e., 
whether the law practically compels the manufacturers to engage in behavior that Congress has 
barred the States from prescribing directly. 
Id. at 544-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   
49 Id. at 534 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 




                                                
function[s],” thereby calling into question the Court’s argument that common law claims 
can pose requirements or prohibitions within the meaning of the statute.53 
B. Lohr: The Limits of FDA Preemption  
Four years after Cipollone, the Court faced a preemption claim regarding the 1976 
Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the FDCA, which regulate the “safety and 
effectiveness of medical devices intended for human use.”54 If Cipollone and Geier 
represent the high-water mark of preemption in the recent Supreme Court case law, Lohr 
is the most favorable case for plaintiffs seeking to rebut a preemption defense. As 
discussed below, however, Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Lohr’s otherwise anti-
preemption holding sowed the seeds of the anti-preemption holding’s own destruction. 
The plaintiff in Lohr alleged that her pacemaker failed due to a product defect.55 
As in Cipollone, the Court interpreted the conflicting requirement provision of a federal 
statute: 
No State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with 
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement (1) which is different 
from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under this chapter to the 
device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any 
other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this 
chapter.56 
 
Justice Stevens again wrote for the Court but arrived at a different conclusion on 
the preemption issue, largely because his opinion in Lohr took a different view from 
 
53 Id. at 537-39. 
54 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976). 
55 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1996).  
56 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1938). 
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Cipollone of the conflicting requirement language in the MDA (as opposed to the 
cigarette-related statutes in Cipollone): 
[W]hen Congress enacted § 360k [of the MDA], it was primarily concerned with 
the problem of specific, conflicting state statutes and regulations rather than the 
general duties enforced by common-law actions…In each instance, the word is 
linked with language suggesting that its focus is device-specific enactments of 
positive law by legislative or administrative bodies, not the application of general 
rules of common law by judges and juries.57 
 
More particularly, the Court argued that the MDA preempts state law that imposes 
requirements, according to the statute, “with respect to” medical devices. “[T]he general 
state common-law requirements in this suit were not,” according to the Court, 
“specifically developed ‘with respect to’ medical devices….These state requirements 
therefore escape pre-emption, not because the source of the duty is a judge-made 
common-law rule, but rather because their generality leaves them outside the category of 
requirements that [the MDA] envisioned to be ‘with respect to’ specific devices such as 
pacemakers.”58 
Additionally, in the background of Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court in Lohr 
is a policy concern that the FDA’s approval process for the pacemaker was not 
sufficiently protective of patient safety. Amid a detailed recitation of the FDA medical 
device approval process, the Court drew a distinction between the “rigorous” premarket 
approval process that new devices undergo and the cursory review accorded to devices 
 
57 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 489. 
58 Id. at 501-02. 
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that are “substantially equivalent” to pre-existing devices.59 On account of the FDA’s 
limited ability to conduct full-scale pre-market review of many devices, “the § 510(k) 
premarket notification process became the means by which most new medical 
devices…were approved for the market.”60 These policy considerations—the capacity of 
the FDA to conduct thorough review of medical devices and pharmaceutical products—
are, of course, broadly relevant to the prescription drug approval process and were 
sharply posed in the wake of Merck’s 2004 withdrawal of Vioxx.61 
In a concurrence that provided a fifth vote for the judgment in the case, Justice 
Breyer wrote that the plurality opinion was wrong to foreclose the possibility that the 
MDA could preempt a state tort claim. “One can,” Justice Breyer argues, “reasonably 
read the word ‘requirement’ as including the legal requirements that grow out of the 
application, in particular circumstances, of a State’s tort law.”62 In support, Justice Breyer 
relied on the Court’s (and Justice Stevens’) own words in Cipollone holding that “similar 
language ‘easily’ encompassed tort actions because ‘[state] regulation can be as 
effectively asserted through an award of damages as through some form of preventative 
relief.’”63 Attacking the plurality’s asserted distinction between a conflicting state 
regulation and a conflicting state court judgment, Justice Breyer argued that “[t]o 
distinguish between them for preemption purposes would grant greater power…to a 
 
59 Id. at 476-79.  
60 Id. at 479. 
61 Merck and Vioxx: Putting Safety First?: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Finance, 108th 
Cong. (2004). 
62 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 504. 
63 Id. (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (1992)). 
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single state jury than to state officials acting through state administrative of legislative 
lawmaking processes.”64 
Justice Breyer agreed with the plurality, however, that the MDA’s statutory 
language was ambiguous and that, in turn, the Court should look to the determination of 
the relevant agency with respect to preemption: “[I]n the absence of a clear congressional 
command as to preemption, courts may infer that the relevant administrative agency 
possesses a degree of leeway to determine which rules, regulations, or other 
administrative actions will have pre-emptive effect.”65 Because the FDA itself had, with 
respect to medical device regulation, issued a narrowing preemption regulation, Justice 
Breyer concurred with the Court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claim in Lohr was not 
preempted and that the FDA’s determination was entitled to deference. But in a passage 
that would have lasting effect for the Court’s preemption jurisprudence and is significant 
to our discussion of the 2006 FDA labeling rule, Justice Breyer noted that an agency can 
communicate preemptive intentions “through statements in ‘regulations, preambles, 
interpretive statements, and responses to comments,’ as well as through the exercise of its 
explicitly designated power to exempt state requirements from pre-emption.”66 
In a vigorous dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, argued that the MDA preempted the common law 
claims. Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice Breyer that common law claims “impose 
 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 505. 
66 Id. at 506 (citation omitted) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 
U.S. 707, 721 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
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‘requirements’ and are therefore preempted where such requirements would differ from 
those imposed by the FDCA.”67 Justice O’Connor would not, however, have deferred to 
the FDA’s own views regarding preemption: “It is not certain that an agency regulation 
determining the preemptive effect of any federal statute is entitled to deference….Where 
the language of the statute is clear, resort to the agency’s interpretation is improper.”68 
In retrospect, Lohr stands for at least two propositions, one “pro-preemption” and 
one “anti-preemption.” Most squarely, of course, the decision holds that the MDA does 
not preempt state common law claims with respect to medical devices that undergo the 
premarket notification process.69 But Justice Breyer’s concurrence signaled the potential 
for finding preemption in related contexts and provided the basis for favoring preemption 
in later cases through his argument about the effect of state tort litigation on federal 
agency safety rules. The countervailing policy considerations of FDA safety oversight (in 
Justice Stevens’ opinion for the Court) and of concerns about judicial second-guessing of 
agency safety determinations (in Justice Breyer’s concurrence) were clearly framed in 
Lohr. Similarly, the dispute between Justice Breyer’s concurrence and Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent with respect to deference to agency preemption determinations arises 
in subsequent cases and runs throughout litigation over the 2006 labeling rule. 
 
67 Id. at 509. 
68 Id. at 512. 
69 In 2008, the Court decided a question left unresolved by Lohr, namely whether claims against 
manufacturers of devices that undergo the pre-market approval process are preempted under the MDA. The 
Court concluded that such claims were preempted under the MDA. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 999 (2008). 
 155 
                                                
C. Geier: The Triumph of Justice Breyer’s Preemption Jurisprudence  
It took only four years for Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Lohr to become the 
basis for his opinion for the Court in Geier,70 arguably the most important products 
liability preemption decision of the past twenty-five years.71 At issue in Geier was 
whether a Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) regarding airbags issued by 
the Department of Transportation would preempt a tort suit brought in the District of 
Columbia in which the plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer should have installed an 
airbag in her vehicle.  
 Turning first to Honda’s argument that the underlying federal statute in Geier (the 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966) expressly preempted the 
plaintiff’s claims, the Court noted that the statute contained a “saving” clause that 
preserved common law claims. Specifically, the clause stated that compliance with a 
federal safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability under common 
law.”72 But the Court quickly moved to analyze conflict preemption and noted that “the 
saving clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles.”73 
 Formulating a preference for preemption that has occasionally guided the Court, 
Justice Breyer argued that permitting state courts to entertain common law claims would 
 
70 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). 
71 See Davis, supra note 37, at 1012 (“Geier represents a seismic shift in the Court’s preemption 
doctrine.”). 
72 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k). 
73 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (emphasis in original). See also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 
280, 288 (1995) (“The fact that an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute “implies”—i.e., 
supports a reasonable inference—that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters does not mean that 
the express clause entirely forecloses any possibility of implied pre-emption.”). 
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necessarily interfere with achieving federal objectives. According to Justice Breyer, such 
an approach would “avoid the conflict, uncertainty, cost, and occasional risk to safety 
itself that too many different safety-standard cooks might otherwise create.”74 Conflict 
preemption is applicable in such cases, the Court contended, because “the rules of law 
that judges and juries create or apply in such [state common law] suits may themselves 
similarly create uncertainty and even conflict, say, when different juries in different States 
reach different decisions on similar facts.”75 Adopting a view of common law claims that 
sharply contrasts with the view of Justice Blackmun in Cipollone, the Court in Geier 
asserted that “[i]nsofar as [plaintiff’s] argument would permit common-law actions that 
‘actually conflict’ with federal regulations, it would take from those who would enforce 
federal law the very ability to achieve the law’s congressionally mandated objectives that 
the Constitution, through the operation of ordinary pre-emption principles, seeks to 
protect.”76 
 On the issue of deference to an agency’s own determination with respect to the 
preemptive effect of federal statutory or regulatory requirements, the Court accorded 
significant weight to the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of the FMVSS as 
expressed by the views of the Solicitor General in Geier. As summarized by the Court: 
The agency is likely to have a thorough understanding of its own regulation and 
its objectives and is uniquely qualified to comprehend the likely impact of state 
requirements. And DOT has explained [the FMVSS’s] objectives, and the 
 
74 Geier, 529 U.S. at 871. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 872. 
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interference that ‘no airbag’ suits pose thereto, consistently over time. In these 
circumstances, the agency’s own views should make a difference.77 
 
In taking such a forceful position on deference to an agency’s views about preemption, 
the Court did not address whether it was employing the same deferential standard the 
Court applies in other administrative law settings pursuant to Chevron U.S.A.  v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council.78 As discussed below, the topic arises frequently in post-
Geier preemption litigation. 
Joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, Justice Stevens dissented in 
Geier. Agreeing with the Court that the federal statute did not expressly preempt the state 
common law claims, Justice Stevens proceeded to argue that neither did the federal 
statute impliedly preempt the claims under principles of conflict preemption. With respect 
to the central issue in the conflict preemption analysis—whether the state requirement 
would frustrate or undermine the federal safety interest—Justice Stevens argued that the 
safety standard imposed “minimum, rather than fixed or maximum, requirements.”79 
Exposure to tort liability would, in fact, help achieve the federal safety goal, according to 
Justice Stevens: “The possibility that exposure to potential tort liability might accelerate 
the rate of increase [of airbag installation] would actually further the only goal explicitly 
 
77 Id. at 883 (internal quotation and citations omitted). 
78 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 
737 (2004) (arguing that Chevron deference should not apply to agency interpretation of preemptive effect 
of statutes).  
79 Geier, 529 U.S. at 903. See also William W. Buzbee, Federal Floors, Ceilings, and the Benefits 
of Federalism’s Institutional Diversity, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF 
FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 98 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
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mentioned in the standard itself: reducing the number of deaths and severity of injuries of 
vehicle occupants.”80 
Finally, Justice Stevens raised a policy argument grounded in federalism and the 
presumption against preemption, particularly “when the pre-emptive effect of an 
administrative regulation is at issue”:81 
The signal virtues of this presumption are its placement of the power of pre-
emption squarely in the hands of Congress, which is far more suited than the 
Judiciary to strike the appropriate state/federal balance (particularly in areas of 
traditional state regulation), and its requirement that Congress speak clearly when 
exercising that power. In this way, the structural safeguards inherent in the normal 
operation of the legislative process operate to defend state interests from undue 
infringement.82 
 
This so-called presumption against preemption dates to the Court’s 1947 decision in Rice 
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation (a field preemption case) in which the Court stated that 
“in a field which the States have traditionally occupied . . . [the Court] start[s] with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the 
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”83 Following 
Geier, many commentators have followed Justice Stevens’ lead and claimed that the 
Court has eliminated the presumption against preemption.84 In defense of the Court’s 
 
 
80 Id. at 903-04. 
81 Id. at 908. 
82 Id. at 907. See also Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559, 1585 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he fact that that [Tenth] Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights should nevertheless 
remind the Court that its ruling affects the allocation of powers among sovereigns. Indeed, the reasons for 
adopting that Amendment are precisely those that undergird the well-established presumption against 
preemption.”). 
83 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).  
84 See Calvin Massey, Joltin’ Joe Has Left and Gone Away: The Vanishing Presumption Against 
Preemption, 66 ALB. L. REV. 759 (2003); Susan Raeker-Jordan, A Study in Judicial Sleight of Hand: Did 
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Eradicate the Presumption Against Preemption?, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 1 
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disregard of the presumption against preemption in Geier, however, one could argue that 
the presumption is primarily a rule of statutory interpretation in express preemption cases 
(and so was rightly prominent in Cipollone and Lohr) but has generally not been invoked 
by the Court in conflict preemption cases.85 
In Geier, the fault lines on preemption cases were drawn for the foreseeable 
future. Justice Stevens’ insistence on a broad presumption against preemption and 
reluctance to find preemption based solely on administrative action has found expression 
in a variety of subsequent cases.86 But Justice Breyer’s majority opinion for the Court 
signals all of the major themes in the debate over preemption, each of which is the 
subject to considerable dispute:  
1. deference to an administrative agency’s own determinations about the 
preemptive effect of its statutes or regulations,  
2. the conflict between state common law claims and the aims of federal 
uniform safety regulation, and  
 
(2002); but see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National 
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007): 
The rumors of the death of the Rice presumption against preemption may be exaggerated. Against 
Geier, one can set three more recent decisions that refused to preempt state law, one of which 
recited Rice’s clear statement rule as a justification for its holding. If the Court were so inclined, 
there is little doubt that the ambiguity in its preemption precedents would leave it ample room to 
convert Rice into a more powerful default rule disfavoring preemption by ambiguous federal laws. 
82 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 62 (citing Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); Bates v. Dow Agrosciences 
L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431 (2005); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51 (2002)) (internal footnotes 
omitted). 
85 I am grateful to Jim Beck for this insight. See Drug and Device Law Blog, 
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2006/11/presumption-against-preemption.html (Nov. 28, 2006). 
86 See Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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3. the expansive scope of implied conflict preemption even where express 
preemption is not available as a matter of statutory interpretation. 
D. Buckman: Preemption of “Fraud on the FDA” Claims 
Continuing the limited line of cases finding preemption, the Court concluded 
unanimously in 2001 that the MDA preempted a “fraud on the FDA” claim. In Buckman, 
the Court considered a claim that a bone screw manufacturer made fraudulent statements 
to the FDA during the medical device approval process. The suit was brought under 
Pennsylvania tort law “claiming that [the manufacturer]…made fraudulent 
representations to the FDA as to the intended use of the bone screws and that, as a result, 
the devices were improperly given market clearance and were subsequently used to the 
plaintiffs’ detriment.”87 
The Court’s disposition of the preemption issue is terse but adds to the cumulative 
weight of case law favoring preemption. Because the manufacturer’s dealings with the 
FDA were “dictated” by the MDA and “in contrast to situations implicating ‘federalism 
concerns,’” the Court concluded that “no presumption against pre-emption obtains in this 
case.”88 The FDA is charged with enforcing fraud against it and has a “variety of 
enforcement options that allow it to make a measured response to suspected fraud upon 
the Administration.”89 Permitting state common law claims premised on fraud on an 
administrative agency would, in the Court’s view, “inevitably conflict with the FDA’s 
 
87 Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001).  
88 Id. at 347-48. 
89 Id. at 349. 
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responsibility to police fraud consistently with the Administration’s judgment and 
objectives.”90 
By some lights, Buckman is a narrow case—the Court merely held that where “the 
fraud claims exist solely by virtue of the FDCA disclosure requirements,” the claim was 
preempted.91 Even Justice Stevens, writing separately but concurring in the judgment, 
agreed that where the FDA does not agree with the fraud allegations and has not removed 
a product from the market, the plaintiff cannot prove “an essential link in the chain of 
causation that . . . but for [defendant’s] fraud, the allegedly defective orthopedic bone 
screws would not have reached the market.”92 But Buckman also evinces a heightened 
“concern for the potential balkanization of federal regulatory authority” and the 
importance of integration of safety standards within a national market.93 Furthermore, the 
holding with respect to fraud on the FDA claims is significant in its own right and has led 
to the dismissal of claims in several cases,94 including some in which the reasoning of 
Buckman was extended to other, non-FDA related administrative contexts.95 
III. FDA Labeling Rule Litigation 
With the Court’s recent preemption jurisprudence as background, we can turn to 
the 2006 FDA rule. Not surprisingly, the preemption decisions were at first inconsistent, 
 
90 Id. at 350. 
91 Id. at 353. 
92 Id. at 353; but see id. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“If the FDA determines both that fraud 
has occurred and that such fraud requires the removal of a product from the market, state damages remedies 
would not encroach upon, but rather would supplement and facilitate, the federal enforcement scheme.”). 
93 Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 38, at 1397-98. 
94 See, e.g., Kobar ex rel. Kobar v. Novartis Corp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Ariz. 2005). 
95 Nathan Kimmel, Inc. v. DowElanco, 275 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending Buckman to 
EPA); Morgan v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 704 (E.D. Tenn. 2001) (extending Buckman to 
Department of Energy). 
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leading some to invoke the manufacturers’ dilemma amid the legal uncertainty between 
regulatory compliance and liability exposure.96 Two sets of cases illustrate the differing 
approaches courts adopted toward the FDA preemption defense in the wake of the 2006 
rule. In Colacicco v. Apotex97 and Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline,98 courts dismissed claims 
as preempted by the FDA labeling requirement. But in McNellis v. Pfizer,99 Jackson 
Pfizer,100 and Levine v. Wyeth,101 courts rejected such a defense. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the lower court in Wyeth v. Levine and found preemption inapplicable. 
This section will survey the litigation leading up to Levine before turning to a defense of 
preemption on subsidiarity-based grounds in the next section.  
A. Cases Upholding FDA Preemption 
In Colacicco, a federal district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled 
that the FDCA preempted a state law failure to warn claim. At issue in Colacicco was the 
alleged failure to warn of the increased suicide risk for users of anti-depressant drugs. 
The court’s argument began with deference to the FDA’s own views regarding 
preemption of plaintiff’s claims as expressed both in a series of amicus briefs and in the 
preamble to the 2006 rule.102 The court then quoted extensively from the briefs and the 
 
 
96 See Linda Pissott Reig & John T. Chester, Courts’ Misapplication of FDA Preemption Policy 
Creates Quandary for Drug Producers, 14 ANDREWS MED. DEVICES LITIG. REP. 9 (2007) (“Cases such as 
McNellis, Jackson, and Rush [v. Wyeth] impose the impossible on drug companies.”). 
97 Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 
98 Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, Inc., No. Civ.-A 06-111 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2007). 
99 McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006). 
100 Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964 (D. Neb. 2006).  
101 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006). 
102 Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525:  
The FDA’s view is critical to this Court’s analysis because Supreme Court precedent dictates that 
an agency’s interpretation of the statute and regulations it administers is entitled to deference…. In 
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preamble to the 2006 rule in support of its conclusion that the state law failure to warn 
claims were preempted. 
Though Colacicco held that the plaintiff’s claims were preempted, the court did 
raise an issue that has vexed defendants in related litigation. Whether the FDA has 
consistently adopted a position favoring preemption is, according to the court in 
Colacicco, relevant to determining the scope of deference to the agency, though the court 
did not explain why consistency of position should affect the preemption deference 
question. Indeed Chevron itself, which famously held that courts should defer to an 
agency’s reasonable administrative interpretion, expressly leaves open the possibility of 
agencies changing position while still entitled to administrative deference: “[T]hat the 
agency has from time to time changed its interpretation . . . does not . . . lead us to 
conclude that no deference should be accorded . . . . An initial agency interpretation is not 
instantly carved in stone.”103 Later cases have, however, listed consistency as among the 
factors in determining the level of deference courts should accord an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations.104 The policy—or, frankly, political—effect of 
raising inconsistency in an agency’s position as a reason for not according deference is, 
of course, to suggest that preemption decisions are influenced by political pressure and 
 
recent years, each time the Supreme Court has confronted the question of whether the FDCA 
preempts state law, it has deferred to the FDA’s preemption position. 
103 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984). 
104 See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences L.L.C., 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (stating that EPA’s position 
supporting preemption was “particularly dubious given that just five years ago the United States advocated 
the interpretation that we adopt today”); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001) (“The fair 
measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been understood to vary with 
circumstances, and courts have looked to (1) the degree of the agency’s care, (2) its consistency, formality 
and relative expertness….”); Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993) (“[T]he 
consistency of an agency’s position is a factor in assessing the weight that position is due.”). 
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agency accountability to outside interest groups that have reasons for favoring or 
disfavoring preemption. 
Another federal district judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled in 
Sykes that the FDCA preempted a failure to warn claim regarding a childhood vaccine.105 
Beginning with a detailed presentation of the FDA labeling approval process and 
concluding with the 2006 labeling rule, the court concluded that “the failure to warn 
claims seek to hold defendants liable for failing to include labeling that was not 
scientifically supported and would have been false and misleading under federal law.”106 
The Sykes court did, however, entertain at length the plaintiff’s argument that “the FDA’s 
position on the preemption of state law failure to warn claims has not been the model of 
consistency.”107 Nonetheless, the court concluded, whatever the inconsistencies in the 
FDA’s position, such inconsistencies either were legally irrelevant or Colacicco was 
correct in observing that the previous amicus briefs and other indicia of FDA’s position 
were not as inconsistent as the plaintiff contended. 
B. Cases Rejecting FDA Preemption 
Preemption defenses in state failure to warn cases in the wake of the 2006 rule 
were not uniformly successful, as shown by Jackson, McNellis, and Levine. Jackson and 
McNellis, like Colacicco, raised failure to warn claims for the labeling of anti-depressant 
drugs following suicides. In Jackson, a federal district court in Nebraska, writing shortly 
 
105 Sykes v. Glaxo-SmithKline, No. Civ.-A 06-111 (E.D. Pa. March 28, 2007). (The court also held 
that the Vaccine Act preempted plaintiffs’ design defect claims.).  
106 Id. at *23. 
107 Id. at *21.  
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after the 2006 rule was released, held that “the recent notice issued by the FDA claiming 
preemption is not persuasive” and that Eighth Circuit case law viewed FDA regulations 
as “minimum standards.”108 The court also argued in a footnote that the FDA’s failure to 
comply with the requirement to consult with the states before releasing the 2006 rule 
reduced the weight the court would accord to the rule.109 
 In McNellis, a New Jersey federal court concluded that, even after the 2006 rule, 
“the FDA’s approved warnings will continue to reflect merely ‘minimum standards,” and 
that the preemption preamble was inconsistent with the underlying regulations and the 
2006 rule itself.110 McNellis was also the strongest statement of the view that the FDA’s 
allegedly inconsistent view with respect to preemption should lead to a lower level of 
deference, if any, to the 2006 rule. “Here,” the court argued, “the FDA’s interpretation of 
 
108 Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966, 968 (D. Neb. 2006) (citing Hill v. Searle 
Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1068 (8th Cir.1989)). 
109 Id. at 968 n.3. The consultation requirement is imposed by Executive Order 13132, which 
requires an agency before issuing a rule with preemptive effect to “provide all affected State and local 
officials notice and an opportunity for appropriate participation in the proceedings.” See Exec. Order No. 
13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (Aug. 4, 1999). The court in Jackson disregarded or rejected FDA’s claims in 
the preamble that it had complied with the requirements of the executive order: 
FDA sought input from all stakeholders on new requirements for the content and format 
of prescription drug labeling through publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register. 
Although the proposed rule did not propose to preempt state law, it did solicit comment on product 
liability issues. FDA received no comments on the proposed rule from State and local 
governmental entities. 
Officials at FDA consulted with a number of organizations representing the interests of 
state and local governments and officials about the interaction between FDA regulation of 
prescription drug labeling (including this rule) and state law. 
In conclusion, the agency believes that it has complied with all of the applicable 
requirements under Executive Order 13132 and has determined that this final rule is consistent 
with the Executive order. 
71 Fed. Reg. at 3969. Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion in Jackson, Executive Order 13132 states that 
it is “not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law.” 64 Fed. Reg. 
at 43259. 
110 McNellis v. Pfizer, Civ. No. 05-1286, Section II.A(2)(b)(1) (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (“[T]he 
Preamble is squarely contradicted by the plain language of the regulations themselves . . . . The Preamble’s 
words are in irreconcilable tension with the Final Rule itself.”). 
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regulations in 2006 (as expressed in the Preamble to the Final Rule) is in stark contrast to 
the FDA’s position regarding the same regulations outlined in the FDA’s 2000 Proposed 
Rules.”111 The court concluded that “[t]he Preamble [to the 2006 rule], without more, 
does not signal to this Court Congressional intent to obviate state law.”112 The McNellis 
court also criticized Colacicco on the issue of agency deference, alleging that Colacicco 
“overstate[d] the deference due to an agency’s interpretation.”113 
 All of these arguments were brought to a head when the Supreme Court agreed to 
hear Wyeth’s appeal from the Vermont Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine. In 
Levine, the plaintiff’s arm was amputated following complications caused by improper 
administration of Phenergan, an anti-nausea drug. The defendant manufacturer raised a 
preemption defense, which the Vermont state courts rejected. Addressing the preemption 
defense generally, the Vermont Supreme Court cited McNellis approvingly for the 
proposition that FDA labeling requirements set a minimal standard that manufacturers are 
encouraged to exceed. “There is thus no conflict between federal labeling requirements 
and state failure-to-warn claims,” the court concluded, because the FDCA “allows, and 
arguably encourages, manufacturers to add and strengthen warnings that, despite FDA 
approval, are insufficient to protect consumers. State tort claims simply give these 
manufacturers a concrete incentive to take this action as quickly as possible.”114 As to the 
2006 preamble, the Vermont court held that the FDA’s position was entitled to “no 
 
111 Id. at Section II.A (1). 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  
114 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 186 (Vt. 2006). 
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deference” and that the court’s conclusions regarding conflict preemption were 
undisturbed by the new preamble and rule.115 
 In the most anticipated preemption case for many years, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Vermont Supreme Court. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens argued that 
“the [2006] preamble is at odds with what evidence we have of Congress’ purposes, and 
it reverses the FDA’s own longstanding position without providing a reasoned 
explanation, including any discussion of how state law has interfered with the FDA’s 
regulation of drug labeling during decades of coexistence.”116 FDA’s changed position on 
state tort law preemption, the lack of consultation with the states, and the Court’s 
interpretation of the FDCA all argued in favor of preemption, according to the majority. 
In concurrence, Justice Breyer (the author, recall, of Geier) sought to salvage the 
possibility of state tort law sometimes interfering with federal objectives.117 Justice 
Thomas concurred only in the judgment and offered a structural-federalist view of 
preemption that sidesteps altogether the Court’s “purposes and objectives” approach to 
preemption, thereby filling out the textualist understanding of preemption that he and 
Justice Scalia had sketched in Cipollone. Just as “[a]pplying ‘purposes and objectives’ 
pre-emption in Geier… allowed this Court to vacate a judgment issued by another 
sovereign based on nothing more than assumptions and goals that were untethered from 
the constitutionally enacted federal law authorizing the federal regulatory standard that 
 
115 Id. 
116 Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249, slip. op. at 21 (U.S. March 4, 2009). 
117 Id., slip. op. at 1 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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was before the Court,”118 Justice Thomas argued, so also the Court’s conclusion in Levine 
should be grounded in nothing more than the statutory text of the FDCA and 
considerations of dual sovereignty and federalism. 
IV. Subsidiarity and Preemption 
Even before Levine, though, the academic commentary in response to the FDA’s 
preemption rule had been almost uniformly hostile. The scholarly response—even where 
moderately supportive of preemption— has fallen roughly into three categories: concerns 
about patient safety, arguments for the limits on agency authority, and discussions of 
federalism and institutional design. 
The set of concerns over patient safety share a view of tort law as primarily 
serving compensatory goals. Depriving plaintiffs of a tort remedy against pharmaceutical 
manufacturers undermines the objectives of tort law, the argument runs, and does not 
properly incentivize manufacturers to take precautions when introducing products to the 
market. As summarized by David Kessler and David Vladeck: 
Statutory gaps in the FDA’s authority to gather information, especially post-
approval, hamstring its ability to ensure the safety of the drugs on the market. The 
FDA Amendments Act may help close those gaps somewhat, but they remain 
substantial. Nothing in the Act gives the FDA comprehensive authority to obtain 
whatever records it deems necessary to do its work. And closing that gap would 
not guarantee that emerging safety information is made available to physicians 
and patients, who need it just as much as the FDA. Even with the additional 
resources provided for under the Act, the FDA faces resource constraints. It is still 
a small “David” facing dozens of “Goliaths.” That is not about to change. As the 
Senate’s chief sponsor of the Act warned, “the resources of the drug industry to 
collect and analyze postmarket safety data vastly exceed the resources of the 
FDA, and no matter what we do, they will always have vastly greater resources to 
 
118 Id., slip op. at 20 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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monitor the safety of their products than the FDA does.” Failure-to-warn litigation 
brings to light information that is not otherwise available to the FDA, doctors, 
other health care providers, or consumers. The benefits of this litigation should 
not be discarded lightly, and, as we have said, we see no benefit to the FDA or the 
public in finding failure-to-warn litigation preempted.119 
 
In a similar vein, Richard Nagareda took a more moderate approach to preemption and 
argues that preemption should run alongside heightened information disclosure 
requirements from industry, but he hedges his bets on the beneficial effects of tort 
litigation: 
The approach to preemption offered here proceeds squarely from the premise that 
information about the impact of tort litigation on the pharmaceutical industry will 
remain a fiercely contested empirical question for the foreseeable future. In such a 
world of scholarly impasse, institutional design should seek to wield preemption 
as a preference-revealing device vis-à-vis regulated industry. Rather than scholars 
settling the debate over the detrimental effects of tort litigation on regulated 
industry, proper design of a preemptive regulatory regime would position industry 
itself to settle the debate, in effect, through its own actions. If tort litigation is 
indeed such an arbitrary force, then industry should have little quarrel with the 
heightened information demands sketched here. An approach to preemption keyed 
to industry forthrightness would challenge Big Pharma to put its money where its 
mouth is – to demonstrate by its actions that it has nothing to hide as the predicate 
for agency action with the power to wield preemptive force.120 
 
What all of these commentators share is a broad commitment to the ideal of the tort 
system as an ex post deterrence to manufacturers that will ensure maximal safety 
outcomes. 
A second set of scholars proceeded from administrative law arguments about the 
limits of agency authority and agency capture concerns. As noted above, Nina Mendelson 
 
119 David A. Kessler and David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Failure to 
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 495 (2008). 
120 Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. 
TORT L. (2006). 
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argues that so-called Chevron deference should not apply to agency preemption 
determinations. Also, the discussion mentioned above over the effect of Executive Order 
No. 13132 and the importance of striking a federal-state balance in agency preemption 
decisions argues against an overly broad reading of preemption. 
Finally, a third set of commentators do not take as strong an anti-preemption view 
as those who highlight patient safety or the limits on agency authority but instead frame 
the question around federalism and institutional design. In his article “Against 
Preemption,” Roderick Hills argues that an anti-preemption presumption would improve 
the national legislative process.121 Catherine Sharkey eschews anything as broad as an 
anti-preemption presumption but argues that, as a functional matter, courts have looked to 
agency expertise when deciding preemption cases, and she offers a defense of what she 
terms an “agency reference model”: 
The theme of my proposed middle course approach—between the extremes of 
applying a strong-form presumption against preemption and granting mandatory 
Chevron deference to the FDA—is fairly easy to state. State-law failure-to-warn 
claims based upon a risk for which the FDA has made a specific determination, 
either prior to or after approval, should be preempted. Conversely, state-law 
failure-to-warn claims should not be preempted when the FDA has not made a 
specific determination about a particular risk at the time the cause of action arises. 
In other words, the mere fact that the FDA does not require a warning on a 
product label at the time of initial approval would not preempt failure-to-warn 
claims; but if the FDA takes some action and rejects a proposed warning, or 
reviews evidence and declines to require a change, then potential grounds for 
preemption exist. 122 
 
 
121 See Hills, supra note 84. 
122 Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 449, 513-14 (2008). 
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But using the Texas and Michigan statutes discussed at the outset of this chapter, 
we see that a handful of states have enacted products liability defense statutes that permit 
defendants to argue compliance with regulatory standards as a defense to such claims. Set 
against the background of long-arm jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules that allow states 
to impose externalities on other states by subjecting out-of-state defendants to damages, 
pharmaceutical litigation is an example of Thomas Merrill’s observation that “[o]ne 
person’s healthy regional diversity is another’s interstate externality.”123 The contrarian 
election of some states, though, is to strike a drug safety balance through regulatory 
compliance defense statutes. Such statutes reduce costs for prescription drugs to all 
consumers, not just those in states that have enacted such statutes, and the lower cost 
encourages the sale of drugs that the FDA has determined are safe but perhaps cannot be 
sold profitably on account of the litigation risk posed by the externality-imposing states. 
A state-by-state approach—that is, watching while states such as Texas and 
Michigan enact such statutes but while most states continue to permit tort claims to 
proceed notwithstanding regulatory compliance—will be ineffective, though, at reducing 
drug costs and litigation. State regulatory compliance defense statutes provide an ex ante 
benefit to all consumers, but plaintiffs in those states bear an ex post cost relative to 
plaintiffs in other states without such regulatory compliance defense statutes. Residents 
of (as it happens, most) states have incentives to accrue litigation benefits to themselves 
 
123 Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and 
Default Rules, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 166, 168 (Richard A. 
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007). 
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at the expense of out-of-state plaintiffs, but everyone would be better off if the states 
could agree on a preemption rule.  
Virtually every participant in the preemption debate assumes a basic federal-state 
tension that subsidiarity dissolves. All assume that federal preemption undermines 
legitimate state interests in vindicating state tort claims. Even moderate defenders of 
preemption, such as Sharkey, justify preemption on the grounds that it is a necessary 
structural resolution to products liability litigation amid a national market. But as Gary 
Schwartz has argued, “[t]he value associated with federalism in allowing experimentation 
at the state level seems undercut by the practical inability of manufacturers distributing 
products at the national level to respond to whatever experiments state courts might 
undertake.”124 
As I argued in the conclusion to Chapter One, subsidiarity as functional pluralism 
signals that different political societies (including the states) are properly concerned with 
different ends. In the preemption debate, the states are apparently best served by an anti-
preemption rule that leaves state tort claims in place. But the foregoing argument 
suggests that the states’ genuine interests can sometimes be accomplished by a 
preemption rule that overcomes the collective action problem in pharmaceutical 
regulation. Aided by the principle of subsidiarity, with an emphasis not on efficiency or 
national supremacy but instead on functional pluralism, we might see that preemption can 
be understood as a way of helping the states achieve state objectives.
 
124 Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort Law, 38 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 917, 950 (1996) 
 CHAPTER FIVE: SUBSIDIARITY AND SCHOOL FINANCE 
 
Introduction 
Roughly fifty years after Brown v. Board of Education1 and thirty years after 
Serrano v. Priest2 and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,3 an 
apprehension lurks at the intersection of discussions of race, public education, and school 
finance.  The apprehension is that concerns of equality – racial and economic integration, 
equal educational opportunity – and concerns of efficiency must be traded off against 
each other.  The task of this chapter, aided by recent work by economists and empirical 
research on the relationship of school finance and equality and informed by the principle 
of subsidiarity, is to argue that the supposed trade-off between efficiency and equity 
distorts and misconstrues the school finance debate. 
 The United States spends over $400 billion per year to fund public K-12 
education, the largest area of public expenditure.4  In 2002-03, local governments 
provided 43% of the revenue for schools, with some states relying more on local 
government funding (e.g., Pennsylvania at 55%) and some states relying less on local 
government funding (e.g., Minnesota at 20%).5  Such revenue normally derives from 
local property taxes.  The states contribute an average of 49% of the funding for public 
education.  The federal government provides the remaining average 8% of funding, 
                                                 
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
3 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
4 NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, RANKINGS & ESTIMATES: RANKINGS OF THE STATES 2003 
AND ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS 2004 (2004). 
5 Hawaii is the sole state with a unitary school district and so has virtually no local government 
funding for education. 
173 
 mostly through the provision of Title I funds for special needs education and in the wake 
of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. 
 On one side of the discussion, a body of literature argues that vast disparities of 
funding exist between wealthy and poor districts, with race frequently serving as a 
marker for these categories.  Blame for these disparities is laid at the doorstep of localism 
(understood both as a political principle and as a public finance mechanism), and 
centralization of funding is viewed as the necessary prescription to insure equal 
opportunity.  The alternative, according to this argument, is to allow purportedly arbitrary 
disparities in wealth (more specifically, disparities in the property tax bases of localized 
school districts) to determine the availability of public educational resources.  A 
competing body of literature proceeds by showing the economic benefits of localized 
financing.  According to these authors, it is largely by linking the benefits of paying 
property taxes to the quality of local public schools that voters support funding public 
education in the first place.  Alternative methods of financing education, whether state 
income taxes or other taxes, fail to capture these benefits and result in inefficiency, voter 
apathy, and a decline in the quality of public education. 
 The tension, then, between the sentiments expressed in Jonathan Kozol’s widely 
read and influential book Savage Inequalities and concerns of economic efficiency and 
political participation lies at the heart of this chapter.6  Where Kozol appeals to the 
reader’s sense of justice and a desire for racial and socioeconomic integration, other 
authors point to the political and economic benefits of resisting Kozol’s argument for 
                                                 
6 JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1991). 
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 school finance equalization.  As William Fischel writes at the beginning of his book on 
local government and public finance, the incentive to do well can be squared with the 
incentive to do good: “[M]ercenary concern with property values, especially that of 
homeowners, motivates citizens to organize and make personal sacrifices for such things 
as public schools.”7 That suggestion elicits the central question of this chapter: can the 
insights of authors such as Fischel regarding the importance of local financing of public 
education be reconciled with the demands of racial justice, equality, and integration?  My 
argument is that these demands can be reconciled, and, perhaps more importantly, that the 
data on school finance reform efforts thus far reveals that, to put it bluntly, local control is 
the worst form of school financing except for the alternatives. The purposes of 
subsidiarity, which, as we have seen, sometimes counsel in favor of responsibility being 
placed at the local level and sometimes at the national level, are best served in the school 
finance debate by local control. 
 In the background to this entire discussion, of course, is fifty years’ worth of 
judicial intervention and public policy in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education.  Fifty years after Brown, the United States is still embroiled 
in a debate over the relationship between public education and race.  Though the series of 
desegregation cases of which Brown is the original and most prominent example is now 
largely at an end – as school districts across the country are declared by federal district 
courts to be “unified” and released from the requirements of busing decrees to integrate 
                                                 
7 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 18 (2001) [hereinafter FISCHEL, THE 
HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS]. 
175 
 students – it would be a mistake to suppose that debates over race and public education 
will fade away.  By the lights of many observers, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Milliken v. Bradley effectively ended aggressive efforts to implement Brown by 
foreclosing the ability of federal district courts to order inter-district remedies.8  “[T]he 
continuing problems of public school desegregation in our country are not due, directly, 
to the failings of Brown,” writes Douglas Reed, “but to the success of Milliken.”9 
The current debate occurring at the intersection of race and public education, 
however, is largely not about busing or other desegregating remedies for prior de jure 
racial segregation.  Instead, the debate of the past several years and likely of the future 
will be over the alleged discrepancies between the levels of funding afforded inner city – 
often largely minority – school districts and their wealthier counterparts.  Despite this 
rather obvious link between school financing and race, however, James Ryan is right to 
observe that “[v]ery little scholarly attention has been devoted to the relationship between 
school finance and desegregation or to the role that race plays in school finance 
reform.”10  For Ryan, school finance reform should be viewed alongside desegregation 
efforts in the courts, though the argument in his two articles on race and school finance is 
driven by a fear that school finance reform will prove to be a “poor substitute” for 
                                                 
8 See 418 U.S. 717 (1975). 
9 DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL 
OPPORTUNITY 38 (2001). See also Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701 (2007) (holding unconstitutional districts’ use of racial classification in assignment of spaces 
in oversubscribed high schools). 
10 James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 254 (1999) [hereinafter Ryan, 
Schools, Race, and Money].  See also James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 432 (1999) (“[T]he influence of race in school finance litigation and reform is virtually 
unexamined.”) [hereinafter Ryan, The Influence of Race]. 
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 genuine desegregation.  His conclusion is “not only that school finance reform has done 
little to improve the academic performance of students in predominantly minority 
districts, but also that it may be a costly distraction from the more productive policy of 
racial and socioeconomic integration.”11 
To focus this inquiry, I have chosen a particular and recurrent issue in school 
finance and one that obviously relates to the principle of subsidiarity, namely the proper 
role of localism in the school finance debate.  Beginning with the California Supreme 
Court’s decision in Serrano v. Priest in 1971, results in school finance reform litigation 
have often turned on whether local control over the financing and administration of 
public schools constitutes a sufficiently important government interest.  If so, then the 
equal protection worries caused by inequitable financing schemes are generally 
overridden by the state’s interest in maintaining local control over education.  Such an 
argument was rejected in Serrano and in several subsequent cases in other states, but 
other state courts (notably the Wisconsin Supreme Court) have acknowledged local 
control as an important state interest and left allegedly inequitable financing schemes in 
place.  In virtually every case, however, the courts – both state and federal – have been 
unclear as to precisely why localism is necessary or important to public education.  This 
chapter will treat the place of localism in the dispute over school finance reform through 
the lens of efficiency versus equity concerns with particular attention to the fears that 
localism serves to foster racial or class-based segregation in public education.  I hope to 
add legal meat–by looking at several cases addressing localism in school finance reform 
                                                 
11 Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 10, at 256. 
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 and at conceptions of “localism” in the academic literature–to the econometric bones of 
Caroline Minter Hoxby’s conclusion that “equating local finance with efficiency and 
centralized finance with equity is incorrect and greatly exaggerates the real efficiency-
equity tradeoff…. Local finance actually resolves much of the efficiency-equity problem, 
cutting it down to a manageable size.”12 
 The paper will proceed in three parts.  Part I will survey the treatment of localism 
and locally controlled school finance by courts deciding school finance reform cases.  
This section will seek to be both a descriptive account of what weight localist concerns 
have been accorded by courts and, normatively, what such courts have understood as 
“localism” and local control over school finance.  Part II will consider the racial and class 
segregation problems thought to beset localism and locally based school finance.  Part III, 
using the recent work of William Fischel and Caroline Minter Hoxby, will argue that 
objections to localism in the school finance reform jurisprudence and academic 
commentary are overstated but that subsidiarity provides a firmer footing for localism 
(and also acknowledges localism’s shortcomings) than mere concerns of economic 
efficiency.  
I. Localism in School Finance Reform Litigation  
Descriptively, courts weighing the value of localism in school finance reform 
litigation have rendered decisions falling into two general categories.  Broadly speaking, 
localism can be employed (a) to forbid centralizing school finance at the state level or 
                                                 
12 Caroline Minter Hoxby, Are Efficiency and Equity in School Finance Substitutes or 
Complements?, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 51, 51-52 (1996). 
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 similar types of reform (if localism is accorded high value), or (b) to require school 
finance reform through the centralization of financing to remedy inter-district funding 
inequities (if localism is thought to be merely discretionary or perhaps even pernicious).  
To take one of the preeminent examples of the former, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in 
Buse v. Smith13 and Kukor v. Grover,14 held local control over education to be an interest 
of such significance that the state’s financing scheme, though inequitable, was 
constitutionally permissible.  (Indeed, the court ruled in Buse that localism served to 
render one component of a proposed equalization scheme – so-called “negative aid” –
constitutionally forbidden.) 
Other state courts, however, have fallen into a second category of balancing the 
state’s interest in maintaining local control over education against the inequities brought 
about by leaving levels of school funding up to local governments.  In Brigham v. State, 
for example, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled that local control was only a discretionary 
means of providing for the basic right to education and that the state could not “abdicate 
the basic responsibility for education by passing it on to local government, which are 
themselves creations of the state.”15 The court concluded that local financing was not a 
“constitutional imperative” sufficient to overcome the problem of inequitable access to 
educational opportunities in Vermont.16 
But as a normative matter, neither the courts (such as Wisconsin’s) that elevate 
local control to constitutional status, nor the courts (such as Vermont’s) that give local 
                                                 
13 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976). 
14 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). 
15 692 A.2d 384, 395 (Vt. 1997). 
16  See id.  
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 control only “legislative discretionary” status have sufficiently explained what they take 
to be the meaning and import of localism.  As Richard Briffault observes, “The courts’ 
use of the term ‘local control’ has obscured, more than it has enlightened, our 
understanding of the appropriate role of local factors and local decisionmaking in public 
education.”17  Is the value accorded localism a policy choice by these courts, and, if so, 
on what grounds is such a choice made?  What role do considerations of efficiency play 
in these decisions?  If, as will be argued in Part III, there is substantial reason to believe 
that severing the link between local control and school finance ultimately harms public 
education, should courts take notice of such possible consequences in addressing equal 
protection challenges?  After summarizing the relevant case law in this part of the 
chapter, I will conclude by addressing these normative questions by outlining competing 
models of localism in school finance cases. 
As of 2002, nineteen states had ruled that the equal protection or adequate 
education guarantees of their state constitutions required that the state legislature reform 
the financing of public education, usually by rendering the system of financing more 
centralized and less reliant on local government taxation: Alabama,18 Arizona,19 
Arkansas,20 California,21 Connecticut,22 Idaho,23 Kentucky,24 Massachusetts,25 
                                                 
17 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773, 
773 (1992) [hereinafter Briffault, The Role of Local Control]. 
18 See Ex Parte James, 713 So. 2d 869 (Ala. 1997). 
19 See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994). 
20 See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist., 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983). 
21 See Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). 
22 See Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977). 
23 See Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993). 
24 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). 
25 See McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993). 
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32 Vermont,33 Washington,34 West Virginia,35 and Wyoming.36  Twenty four state 
supreme courts have ruled against school finance reform plaintiffs and generally 
permitted locally-based systems of school finance to remain in place: Alaska,37 
Arizona,38 Colorado,39 Florida,40 Georgia,41 Idaho,42 Illinois,43 Maine,44 Maryland,45 
Michigan,46 Minnesota,47 New York,48 North Carolina,49 North Dakota,50 Ohio
Oklahoma,52 Oregon,53 Pennsylvania,54 Rhode Island,55 South Carolina,56 Virgin
 
26 See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989), amended, 784 P.2d 
412 (Mont. 1990). 
27 See Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993). 
28 See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), 
supplemental opinion, 306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973). 
29 See Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). 
30 See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997). 
31 See Tennessee Small Sch. Systems v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993). 
32 See Edgewood Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). 
33 See Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). 
34 See Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978). 
35 See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979). 
36 See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995). 
37 See Matanuska-Susitna Borough Sch. Dist. v. Alaska, 931 P.2d 391 (Alaska1997). 
38 See Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973). 
39 See Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). 
40 See Coalition for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1996). 
41 See McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981). 
42 See Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975). 
43 See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.W.2d 1178 (Ill. 1996). 
44 See  Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 1 v. Comm’r, 659 A.2d 854 (Me.1995). 
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 Washington,58 and Wisconsin.59  The summary of state decisions here takes account of 
instances in which there have been two or more decisions regarding school finance 
reform.  The Ohio Supreme Court, for example, has rendered decisions on both sides of 
the issue.  Also, this list of states and accompanying cases in the footnotes selects either 
the first or the most significant state case on school finance reform; in some states – the 
Abbott litigation in New Jersey, for example – litigation challenging the school finance 






education (including finance) led to decisions against school finance reform plaintiffs.60  
                                                                                                                                                
. 
For our purposes, a limited issue and a limited set of examples drawn from the 
case law on school finance reform will suffice to illustrate the debate over the place of
localism in these cases.  On the question of whether local control over school finance
should be a factor in deciding school finance reform cases and, if so, to what extent 
localism should matter, we can gain a sense of the range of decisions from four exampl
In two cases – the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling in Kukor v. Grover and the U.S. 






57 See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138 (Va. 19
58 See Northshore Sch. Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178 (Wash. 1974). 
59 See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). 
60 Because most school finance reform litigation occurs in the state courts, San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), might appear to be an odd choice to serve as a 
representative example of the role of localism in school finance. I choose to use Rodriguez as an arch
for a certain type of judicial deference to localism and justify using it – even though a federal case – for two 
reasons. First, subsequent state supreme court decisions, such as Buse and Kukor in Wisconsin, cite 
Rodriguez’s analysis of the importance of local control, notwithstanding its lack of precedential authority, 
strictly speaking, for their own state constitutional analysis. Because Rodriguez was one of the first schoo
finance reform cases of any sort (federal or state) to be decided, its analysis of the issues in such litigation – 
including local control – has been important for subsequent courts. Second, much of the reason for state 
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 In Vermont and Wyoming, by contrast, the state supreme courts held that localism was 
merely a factor amid other overriding concerns (Vermont) or that localism was 
constitutionally proscribed (Wyoming).  Consideration of these four cases will provide us 
with a two-by-two matrix of positions as to the assessment of localism and its 
constitutional (both state and federal) weight in school finance reform litigation. 
A. Local Control as Constitutionally Required: Wisconsin  
 The Wisconsin litigation that culminated in the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Kukor v. Grover61 challenged the state’s system of school finance based on both the 
education and equal protection provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution.  According to 
the state Constitution, “The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of 
district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable,”62 and “[a]ll people are 
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights.”63  The plaintiffs in 
Kukor alleged that the Wisconsin school finance system failed “to compensate for the 
‘educational overburden’ resulting from a high concentration of poverty students…in 
poverty districts” and “municipal overburden” (denoting the “high costs of education in 
metropolitan districts”), and also resulted in “disparities in per-pupil expenditures among 
                                                                                                                                                 
supreme court adjudication of school finance reform litigation is, of course, Rodriguez’s reluctance to make 
en though the issue has (post-
Rodrigue tate, rather than federal, constitutional matter.  
rt. X, § 3 (emphasis added). 
the issue a matter of federal constitutional equal protection. Justice Powell’s analysis of school finance 
issues, then, is important for its effect on all later school finance litigation, ev
z) been primarily a s
61 436 N.W.2d 568. 
62 WIS. CONST. a
63 Id. art. I, § 1. 
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he state, and to raise funds 
therefo
                                                
s…demonstrative of the deficiency in the operation of the current school finan
system.”64 
A prior decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Buse v. Smith,65 la
groundwork for the court’s Kukor ruling.  In Buse, the court held that the so-called 
“negative aid” provisions of the state’s school district financing statutes were 
unconstitutional.  Under the negative aid scheme, certain (mostly wealthy) districts in the
state were required to pay a portion of their property tax revenues to a state fund.  
state government, in turn, redistributed the revenue from the state fund to under-funded 
districts.66  Five school districts and their residents brought a class action suit for 
declaratory judgment against the negative aid financing.  The court relied on provisions 
of the Wisconsin Constitution that, according to the court’s interpretation, required tha
local districts be vested with considerable authority over public education.67  The c
concluded that “the power possessed by local districts to determine what educational
subjects it will offer over and above those required by t
re, is not merely a delegated power.  Rather the state-local dichotomy in that 
limited regard is part and parcel of the constitution.”68 
When faced with a challenge from the other side (an equal protection challenge 
brought by poorer districts to the disparities in levels of funding across the state), the 
Wisconsin court fell back on its view in Buse that local control and local variation were 
 
64 Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 573. 
65 247 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1976). 
66 See id. at 143-47. 
67 See id. at 150. The Wisconsin Constitution requires that “each town and city raise tax for the 
support of common schools therein.” Id. (quoting WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3). 
68 Buse, 247 N.W.2d at 151. 
184 
 constitutionally required: “The principle of local control in Wisconsin, therefore, is not 
merely a theoretical notion, but rather is a constitutionally based and protected precept as










                                                
69  In assessing the
protection challenge, the court adopted the United States Supreme Court’s rational basis 
standard from Rodriguez for reviewing the plaintiffs’ challenge and found the state 
interest of local control over education sufficient.70  Applying the standard to Wisconsin
system of school finance, the court held, “[T]here is a rational basis justifying any 
disparities in per-pupil expenditures resulting from the operation of [the school finance 
system], the rational basis being the preservation of local control over education as 
mandated by…the Wisconsin Constitution.”71  In a footnote, the court stated that loca
control would still be sufficient to uphold the state system under strict scrutiny: “[E]ven if 
strict scrutiny were the appropriate standard to be applied, we would find the school 
finance system constitutional.… The requirement that local control of schools be retaine
is of constitutional magnitude and necessarily compelling.”72  Passing to the “narrow 
tailoring” prong of strict scrutiny, the majority al
ly drawn’ to promote local control while assuring the maximum uniformity in 
educational opportunity deemed practicable.”73 
Summarizing its two cases striking down negative aid redistribution of property
tax revenues from wealthy districts to poor districts (in Buse) and upholding th
 
69 Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 580-81. 
70 Id. at 580. For a more in-depth discussion of Rodriguez, see infra Part I.B. 
71 Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 582. 
72 Id. at 582 n.13 
73 Id.  
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 school finance system against an equal protection challenge (in Kukor), the Wisconsin 
court places all of the credit (or blame) for uneven levels of funding on local 
governmental decisions.  Such local variation in school funding, the court suggests, is a
constitutionally protected right of local government and local taxpayers.  Much as if it 
had recognized an associational right of local communities and thereby insulated th
from state constitutional liability, the court concluded that “[t]o the extent that dist
per-pupil expenditures may differ as a consequence of the operation of [the school 
finance system], this difference is a result of decisions made at the local level – a 






ion laws, the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopts something like an associational 
ool funding 
decisio
the path followed by the United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School 
                                                
74 Just as we saw in Chapter Two that the freedom of association 
cases sometimes protected voluntary associations from the operation of state anti-
discriminat
right for local governments to be free from state interference in their sch
ns. 
B. Local Control as Constitutionally Permitted: Rodriguez  
When deciding to uphold localism as a value to be safeguarded in school finance 
reform litigation, courts in states that include some provision for local control in the text 
of their constitutions might follow Wisconsin’s example.  More likely, however, a state’s 
constitution will be silent as to the value of localism (in education or any other context), 
and so the court must fashion a place for localism among other state interests.  Such was 
 
74 Id. at 580. 
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 District v. Rodriguez.75  Though the case involved an interpretation of the role of localism 
as it pertains to the federal constitutional equal protection guarantee, Rodriguez’s analy
of the value of localism is germane to the discussion of localism as a constitutionally 
cognizable value as such and 
sis 








                                                
finance reform cases. 
The litigation leading up to the Court’s decision in Rodriguez was based on a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge to Texas’ system of school finance.
Though school finance reform plaintiffs had already achieved an early and important 
victory in the California Supreme Court with Serrano v. Priest,76 a victory at the United 
States Supreme Court would have resulted in a Brown-style, national reworking of s
finance in every state.  Brown itself inspired confidence in the plaintiffs, for one of 
Brown’s more famous paragraphs, after asserting that “education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments,” concluded with the observation that 
“[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has u
e available to all on equal terms.”77 
In Rodriguez, however, the Court (per Justice Powell) held that the inequities 
Texas’ funding of public schools need only pass rational basis review: “A century of 
Supreme Court adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause affirmatively supports
application of the traditional standard of review, which requires only that the State’s 
 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
75 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
76 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
77 Brown v. Bd. of 
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 system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes.”78  
Localism filled the role of a “legitimate state purpose” for the Rodriguez Court: “We are 
asked to condemn [Texas’] judgment in conferring on political subdivisions the powe
tax local property to supply revenues for local interests.”
r to 
 
very child in the State, [the Texas system of school finance] permits and 






t alone a 
                                                
79  The Court refused to go this
far in expanding the scope of equal protection, holding that “[w]hile assuring a basic 
education for e
ges a large measure of participation in and control of each district’s schools a
local level.”80 
In its analysis of localism, the Court spoke not in the idiom of constitutional 
necessity (as the Wisconsin Supreme Court does in Buse and Kukor) but in the language 
of constitutional permission.  More properly, the Court held that delegation of control o
public education to local governments was a legitimate state interest.  Though not going 
as far as the Wisconsin Court when it claimed – albeit in a footnote and in dicta – that
local control was a compelling state interest (and thereby sufficient for strict scrutiny), the
importance of local control was enough to offset statewide inter-district inequities in 
funding according to Rodriguez.  As summarized by the Court, “While it is no doubt tr
that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues provides less freedom of 
choice with respect to expenditures for some districts than for others, the existence
‘some inequality’ in the manner in which the State’s rationale is achieved is no
 
U.S. at 40.  78 411 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 49. 
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 sufficient basis for striking down the entire system.”81  A yet stronger assertion of 
localism’s importance can be found in the Court’s suggestion that localism is 
“analog[ous] to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system” insofar as a division 
ral and state 
govern
’s 
osophical tag one 
attache
ate interest to 
overcom
to be ap
Whether we apply the ‘strict scrutiny’ test urged by plaintiffs, the ‘rational 
conclusion remains the same; in Vermont the right to an education is so integral to 
                                                
between state and local government, like a division between the fede
ments, “affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy 
competition for educational excellence.”82 
C. Local Control as Constitutionally Suspect: Vermont  
 In his book On Equal Terms, Douglas Reed cites the Vermont Supreme Court
decision in Brigham v. State as an example of “higher law” constitutionalism, by which 
Reed denotes a form of judicial policymaking claiming that “state constitutions are 
national constitutions in miniature, a higher law controlling the rough and tumble of 
legislative and executive lawmaking.”83  Regardless of the judicial phil
s to the Vermont court, the Brigham decision stands as an example of the position 
inverse to Rodriguez, i.e., local control as an insufficiently important st
e an equal protection challenge to inequitable school funding. 
The Vermont court was mostly unconcerned with the precise contours of the test 
plied to the plaintiffs’ challenge to the state’s funding system:  
standard’ advocated by the State, or some intermediate level of review, the 
our constitutional form of government, and its guarantees of political and civil 
 
1 (citations omitted). 81 Id. at 50-5
82 Id. at 50. 
83 REED, supra note 9, at 88. 
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 rights, that any statutory framework that infringes upon the equal enjoyment of 
84
 
that right bears a commensurate heavy burden of justification.   
 It is difficult to know how seriously to take both the court’s view that it makes no 
difference what level of constitutional scrutiny is being applied and, more importantly, 
Brigham’s claim that “any statutory framework” that results in inequitable educational 
opportunity will be unconstitutional.  Future cases will have to resolve whether, for 
example, a legislative decision to experiment with charter schools in some districts but 
not others will be inequitable and thereby struck down by the state supreme court. 
The basis for the Vermont court’s decision are the provisions of the Vermont 
Constitution governing education, from which the court extrapolates from the 
constitution’s silence to an argument about what is and is not required of the state 
legislature: “Although [the Education Clause of the Vermont Constitution] requires that a 
school be maintained in each town unless the Legislature permits otherwise, it is silent on 
the means of their support and funding.”   Though “[t]he Legislature has implemented 
the education clause by authorizing school districts to raise revenue through local 
property taxes,” the court observes, “neither this method, nor any other means of 
financing public education, is constitutionally mandated.  Public education is a 
constitutional obligation of the state; funding of education through locally-imposed 
property taxes is not.”  




84 Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 390 (Vt. 1997). 
85 Id. at 392. 
86 Id. 
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 In its defense, the State of Vermont asserted that local control was constitu
required (a successful argument in Buse and Kukor) or, in the alternative, that local 
control was sufficiently important to overcome the alleged inequities in the state school 
finance system.  Though lacking constitutional text to support its views, Vermont claime
that funding “must be derived from whatever sources are available locally,” and the 




 distinction between local control (which is 
unobjec trict 
inequit
“[i]ndiv ll be in the best position to decide whom to hire, 
how to
foster local control…. [I]nsofar as ‘local control’ means the ability to decide that 
have seen – as another court once wrote – that for poorer districts ‘such fiscal 
 
a 
that end, the legislature must find a constitutionally legitimate means.  The local control 
                                                
87  In response, the court drew a
tionable, in the court’s view) and local funding (which, if it results in inter-dis
ies, is constitutionally suspect).  As to local control, the court acknowledged that 
idual school districts may we
 structure their educational offerings, and how to resolve other issues of a local 
nature.”88  Nonetheless, the Court wrote: 
The State has not explained…why the current funding system is necessary to 
more money should be devoted to the education of children within a district, we 
freewill is a cruel illusion.’89 
In elaborating on the local control-local funding distinction, the court employed 
means-end analysis.  The state legislature, according to the court, is constitutionally 
charged with achieving the end of an equal education for all Vermont children; to achieve 
 
 
ce than their property wealth will allow, 
no matte crifice their voters are willing to make.”). 
87 Id. at 395. 
88 Id. at 396. 
89 Id. (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1260 (Cal. 1971)). See also id. (“[P]oorer districts
cannot realistically choose to spend more for educational excellen
r how much sa
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 defense of inter-district inequities, however, “confuses constitutional ends…with 
legislative means, that is, the methods it has employed to fulfill its obligation.”90 Local 
sources of revenue for public education are “longstanding and traditional compone





 not simply because it is local (a view closer to the 




                                                
91  Unsurprisingly, the court’s conclusion is that “the current system for 
funding public education in Vermont, with its substantial dependence on local property 
taxes and resultant wide disparities in revenues available to local school districts, 
deprives children of an equal educational opportunity in violation of the Vermont 
Constitution.”92  The constitutional requirement, then, is that inequitable funding be 
redressed by the Vermont legislature.  There is language in Brigham suggesting that loca
funding is constitutionally problematic
Wyoming Supreme Court, discussed below) but because it causes “wide
s.”  This requires negative aid schemes and other mechanisms for equaliz
funding across the state but stops short of the stronger claim that local control is itself a 
problem and constitutionally suspect. 
D. Local Control as Constitutionally Forbidden: Wyoming  
What Wyoming lacks in population it makes up for in the prolixity of its 
constitution93 and the complexity of the school finance system designed in the w
the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Washakie County School District No. One
 
nstitution runs to fifty pages and twenty-one articles, among the longest of any state. 
90 Id. at 395. 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 386. 
93 The state co
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 Herschler.94  In Washakie, the court held public education to be a fundamental right 
under the Wyoming Constitution and struck down the state’s school finance system
equal protection grounds: “[U]ntil equality of financing is achieved, there is no 
practicable method of achieving equality of quality.”
 on 
kie 
 that included a 
formula
tricts 
provisions of the plan, which was extraordinarily complex by any measure—as 
the cou  this 
 
                                                
95  In response to the Washa
decision, the Wyoming legislature enacted a new school finance system
 for recapturing revenues in local districts that exceeded a certain amount 
(“negative aid”) and redistributing funds to poorer districts in the state.  Local dis
were left free to raise funds through an optional mill levy, and the state “power 
equalized” the funding available to districts attempting to raise funds. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s opinion in the litigation challenging the post-
Washakie system of school finance ranks among the most elaborate and forceful 
rejections of local financing in any state supreme court decision on the issue of public 
education funding.  Relying on two provisions of the Wyoming Constitution, the court 
held in Campbell County School District v. State that the entire post-Washakie system 
(designed, recall, in response to an earlier state supreme court decision striking down 
local financing) was unconstitutional.96  Rather than rehearsing the court’s analysis of 
specific 
rt noted, “if lack of clarity alone were sufficient to strike these statutes down,
case would be less difficult”—we will concentrate here on the court’s dismissal of the
 
94 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980). 
95 Id. at 334. 
96 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995). 
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ll make such further provision by taxation or otherwise, as with the income 
arising icient 
 the presence and meaning of the word 
“legisla
Constit
reservations about local control (and a concomitant preference for centralized control) in 
the minds of the state constitutional framers:  
[A]t the time of the constitutional convention, educational issues were not limited 
m of establishing schools but included those problems inherent to 
local control….by the time of the constitutional convention, however, the 
            
97 
At issue in Campbell County was the interpretation of two provisions of the 
Wyoming Constitution, both found in the article of the constitution governing public 
education in Wyoming.  The first is a seemingly boilerplate requirement that “The 
legislature shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a complete and 
uniform system of public instruction.”98  The second provision at issue gives more deta
as to the constitutionally required means of financing public education in Wyoming: “T
legislature sha
 from the general school fund will create and maintain a thorough and eff
system of public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of the state.”99  
As we shall see, in interpreting these two sentences – both of which have analogues in 
many other state constitutions – much turns on
ture.” 
Reviewing the historical background to the ratification of the Wyoming 
ution, the supreme court offered an original understanding argument and placed 
to the proble
                                     
97 Id. at 1248 (quoting Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 809-810 (Ariz. 1994)). 
98 WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 1. (2004). 
99 Id. § 9.  
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 shortcomings and inadequacies of local control were obvious.  The framers 




a m state legislature.”   Relying also on its prior decision in Washakie, the 
court asserted that: 
[T]he plain meaning of our state constitution’s Education Article left no doubt the 
d 
the matter of providing a school system as a whole and financing it is a 
on 






100   
 
From this, the court concluded that the “framers intended the education article as
101andate to the 
legislature completely controlled the state’s school system in every respect, an
responsibility of the legislature.  In view of this determination that an educati
because of local control.102 
Unlike any of the foregoing decisions – Kukor, Rodriguez, or Brigham – the 
Wyoming court expressly adopted a strict scrutiny standard for reviewing the state’s 
education finance scheme: “[T]his court will review any legislative school financing 
reform with strict scrutiny to determine whether the evil of financial disparity, from 
whatever unjustifiable cause, has been exercised [sic] from the Wyoming education
system.”103  The court’s decision is confusing on this point, however, for it is not clear 
whether the state’s proffered defense of localism is constitutionally impermissible (a view
supported by the court’s original understanding argument drawn from the Wyomin
Constitution) or if localism fails to amount to a compelling state interest for purposes of 
 strict scrutiny.  To be sure, the state’s system – leaving significant funding 
discretion at the local level – would be found unconstitutional under either theory.  The 
                                                 
100 Campbell County Sch. Dist, 907 P.2d at 1271. 
101 Id. at 1259 (emphasis added). 
102 Id. at 1270 (citation omitted). 
103 Id. at 1266 (citation omitted). 
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 elaborate use of constitutional text and history, however, supports the view that any form
of localism for financing public education in Wyoming would be constitutionally 
prohibited, regardless of the state interest in fostering localism and local self-governance.
To appreciate the distance between Campbell 
 
 
County and, for example, the 
Wisons  
that “th
system l is not a constitutionally recognized 
interest
 seen 
local role to the discretion of the legislature.  The problems associated with local 
, 





                                                
in Supreme Court’s decision in Kukor, consider the Wyoming court’s bold claim
ere cannot be both state and local control in establishing a constitutional education 
…. Historical analysis reveals local contro
 and cannot be the basis for disparity in equal educational opportunity.”104  The 
force of such claims is mitigated by the court’s employment of the same distinction
in Brigham between local control and local finance: 
[T]he framers did not prohibit a local role but left the nature and scope of that 
control were known to the framers, and they addressed them by vesting authority
would establish the education system.105 
By so sharply limiting the scope of local authority over education, the Wyom
court poses issues that were not a problem for the other decisions discussed in thi
section.  Can, for example, local districts raise money through an optional mill levy under
Campbell County?  The court is guarded in its answer, holding both that the “system [of 
financing public education] must be a function of state wealth”106 and that districts can 
raise extra funds and experiment with new programs financed by those funds.  
Nonetheless, what the court gives with one hand it takes away with the other.  If by 
 
104 Id. at 1270. 
105 Id. at 1272 (emphasis in original). 
106 Id. at 1274. 
196 
 raising extra funds through local levies a district alters the meaning of a “proper 
education,” then all other districts in the state will be entitled to finance the same type 
program (and those without the financial means to do so will receive assistance from the
state, which may, in turn, recapture the extra funds raised in the district that instituted the
program in the first place).  As summarized by the court, “The definition of a proper 
education is not static and necessarily will change.  Should that change occur as a result 
of local innovation, all students are entitled to the benefit of that change as part of a cost-





s of this 
 in practice.  For now, we can only speculate whether a 
district ugh 
 the rest 
ct 
                                                
107  This is perhaps the most interesting (and, 
from a localist perspective, most disturbing) aspect of Campbell County.  One assume
we can look to Wyoming in the coming years to determine the metes and bound
requirement as implemented
 that offers, for example, Advanced Placement courses and finances them thro
extra tax levies will find itself forced to subsidize Advanced Placement courses in
of the state.  The danger of suppressing district innovation (or the political will to extra
new funding for such innovation in the first place) is apparent and marks the work of 
William Fischel and Caroline Minter Hoxby, to which we will turn in Part III. 
E. Conclusion 
We might summarize the approaches to local control in Brigham, Campbell 
County, Rodriguez, and Kukor by placing each case in a category defined by the 
intersection of two variables.  On one axis, the courts divide as to whether localism is 
sufficiently important to offset inequities in inter-district public school financing.  In 
 
107 Id.  
197 
 Wisconsin and in Rodriguez, the courts adopted a localist justification in ruling for the
state; in Vermont and Wyoming, the supreme courts of each state ruled on behalf of th
reform-minded plaintiffs and rejected the states’ localist defense.  On the other axis, the 
courts divide on the issue of whether the question of localism is one of constitutional 
dimensions or merely a “state interest” (though, as we have seen, the weight accorded 
such an interest varies depending on the test adopted by the court).  In Wisconsin and 
Wyoming, the courts shared the view that localism was a constitutional issue, though 
divided on whether that entailed equalization of funding; in Rodriguez and Vermont, 
 
e 
localism s not so much a constitutional matter as a prudential matter of state interest to 
ainst other concern drigue gitimate state 
t to p  bas n Brigham, by contrast, the 
ld that local control was insufficiently compelling to pass any level of 
judicial scrutiny, even if the court also stopped short of the full-fledged constitutional 
quirement of state control that marked the Wyoming decision in Campbell County. 
 wa
be weighed ag s.  For Ro z, local control was a le
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 II. “The Mockery of Local Control”  
With this survey of judicial approaches to localism in school finance reform 
litigation before us, we now turn to two briefer sections in which localism is decried (Pa
II) or extolled (Part III) by legal scholars and economists. 
As the courts have worked through the implications of localism in cases before 
them, much of the academic commentary on localism generally a
rt 





egation in order to understand fully the 
limits and dynamics of school finance reform.”110  Ryan argues that “the importance of 
           
on specifically has ranged from suspicious to hostile.  Richard Briffault’s 
assessment is typical: “Local control contributes to the economic and social stratificat
of contemporary metropolitan areas.  Furthermore, local control may contribute not 
simply to inequity in school funding, but to a broader inadequacy in the level of supp
for school funding.”108  In an even stronger vein, Michael Blanchard baldly asserts that 
“the esteemed benefits of local control over the means of education finance are illusory
Local control of education is premised on nineteenth century visions of community and 
local government that simply do not reflect modern society.”109 
Alongside this suspicion of localism for political theoretical or public finance 
reasons, a further critique of local control over education argues that localism fosters 
segregation along racial and class lines.  James Ryan notes that “one must understand the 
dynamics of race relations and school desegr
                                      
108 Briffault, The Role of Local Control, supra note 17, at 803. 
109 Michael D. Blanchard, The New Judicial Federalism: Deference Masquerading as Discours
and the Tyranny
e 
 of the Locality in State Judicial Review of Education Finance, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 231, 
278-79 (1998). 










                                                
ing local control of education” motivated the United States Supreme Court in 
Milliken v. Bradley, shifting the fight for racial equality to school finance reform efforts, 
albeit in a way that leaves racial issues hidden from view much of the time: “[A]fter
Milliken…the focus in desegregation cases…shifted away from integrative remedies.  
Replacing that focus was a concern for the quality of education offered in the racially 
isolated school districts…. In other words, the goal was not equality through integra
but adequacy through remedial funding.”111 
While Ryan may be correct that little attention has been paid to the racial aspects 
of school finance reform litigation, it is also true that localis
lt and Blanchard is a result of perceived flaws in local approaches to a wide 
variety of issues and not only education.  Exclusionary zoning and attendant racial or 
class-based segregation, for example, are thought to be a function of giving zoning p
to small units of local government.  Various proposals for regional or metropolitan 
governments are premised on the ill-effects of local control, including local control over 
education.  This section will examine the view that localism, as variously defined, fos
racial and socioeconomic segregation in public education. 
Briffault draws a distinction between localism as local control and localism as 
local fiscal responsibility, a move already encountered in our discussion of the Vermont 
and Wyoming supreme court decisions.112  More importantly, Briffault provides the
theoretical justification for a common view in the school finance literature, namely that 
 
111 Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, supra note 10, at 261. 
112 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 28 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part I]. 
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 local control is a fantasy for poor districts.  Briffault is essentially describing the familiar 
phenomenon of income effects and limits imposed on consumer choices.  Just as the 









critique maps onto the racial concerns of Ryan and others.  As a species of “economic 
                                                
in the minimum wage job who eschews Hawaiian vacations is not properly said
have “chosen” not to go to Hawaii, so the poorer districts unable to raise extra funds
public education (due to low property values) cannot be said to “choose” lower levels of 
education funding.  “[F]ormal legal and administrative authority does not by itself 
necessarily lead to real local power in practice….,” Briffault writes, “many localities lack
the resources for the effective exercise of their formal legal powers.  For these localiti
the state is not an enemy but, rather, a potential source of vital financial assistance.”113 
In Briffault’s view, this problem of income effects in education funding is not 
merely an economic issue.  A recurring theme of Briffault’s work, especially in his 
important set of articles on “Our Localism,” is the disjunction between normative claim
for greater local autonomy and the descriptive fact that local governments lack politica
power.114  “[F]or a substantial number of localities fiscal incapacity makes a mockery o
local control…. As the school finance cases illustrate, local autonomy in a setting of 
limited local fiscal capacity – remediable only through greater state financing at the risk
 control – is a central dilemma of our localism.”115  More pointedly, localism’s 
most pernicious side is not powerlessness but inequality, and it is here that Briffault’s 
 
criptive 
assertion r greater local autonomy.”). 
 
113 Id. at 38. 
114 See, e.g, Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 346, 346 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism: Part II]; Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra 
note 112, at 1 (“Two themes dominate the jurisprudence of American local government law: the des
 that American localities lack power and the normative call fo
115 Briffault, Our Localism: Part I, supra note 112, at 38-39.
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 localism,” local public school financing runs the danger of “accepting the preexis
distribution of wealth” and “prefer[ring] the interests of b
ting 
usinesses and investors over 
those o  
localiti
itics, is a matter of politics and 
d most 
effective parents from inner city communities that need them most, thereby 






Rather than a straightforward advocacy of continued school finance litigation, Reed 
                                                
f individuals and families, those of the affluent over those of the poor and those of
es with healthy tax bases over those of localities with limited fiscal capacity.”116 
The problem of localism finally, according to its cr
not merely economic efficiency or inefficiency.  In the terms made famous by Albert 
Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Briffault and others worry that “exit” will 
undermine “voice” in the financing of public education: 
[L]ocal financial responsibility may “skim off” the ablest, most active, an
leaving those communities not only with fewer economic resources, but bereft of 
institutions and to empower local participation.117 
In contrast to the vaguely Tocquevillian sense that local government (including local 
control over the funding of public services) is the surest refuge of democratic self-
governance and accountability, Briffault and others argue that localism undermines 
political participation and offers false ideals of autonomy to poor communiti
Lacking the sharp rhetoric or exclusive focus on local government law that mark
writers such as Briffault, Douglas Reed’s On Equal Terms is an examination of school 
finance reform as a constitutional matter.  Reed is circumspect about his views of school
finance reform, as illustrated by the proposals that mark the conclusion of the book. 
 
ontrol, supra note 17, at 805-06. 
116 Briffault, Our Localism: Part II, supra note 114, at 425. 
117 Briffault, The Role of Local C
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 proposes that a “public school attendance property tax credit” be created in 






  Reed 
which school finance reform litigation failed.  In all three states, to a varying degree, 
                                                
zones”).  His second proposed reform – linking magnet and charter school programs to 
“magnet” neighborhoods – is even more incrementalist.  The modest character of these
reforms and Reed’s acquiescence to the Court’s decision in Rodriguez118 leave him 
resigned to the fact that Brown’s aspiration for equal opportunity “has not been fully 
implemented.”119 
 Nonetheless, much of Reed’s book is taken up with offering empirical evidence 
for the benefits of school finance reform efforts that have already been implemented.
Aspects of his work, then, stand as an empirical verification for Briffault’s suspicion of 
localism.  For example, reviewing the levels of education funding in five states in which
a locally-based school finance system was replaced by more centralized funding 
(Connecticut, New Jersey, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas), Reed concludes that “siza
and enduring changes in the level of inequality among the relevant school districts” 
resulted.120  “[T]hese changes tell a story, in most instances, of persistent and meaningfu
decreases in inequality over time….” Reed writes, “[T]he lesson we should learn from 
court-initiated school finance equalization is that it generally achieves results.”121
also proffers evidence from three states – Illinois, North Carolina, and Oklahoma – in 
 
D, supra note 9, at 5-9. 118 REE
119 Id. at 182. 
120 Id. at 29. 
121 Id. 
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 13.  
nds that inequality in spending across school districts has increased.122  “W
that improvements in equality typically follow state supreme court decisions that order 
improvements in equality,” Reed concludes, “and that little change or worsening 
inequality follows from decisions upholding the existing school finance systems….”123 
Though a valuable contribution to the literature on school finance reform, 
particularly for its provision of significant empirical data (a persistent lacuna in the 
school finance literature),124 Reed’s book cannot be counted as a complete vindi
Briffault-style anti-localism.  As will be seen in Part III, there is a considerable body of 
data to the contrary, and Reed does not cite to the studies of Caroline Minter Hoxby that 
emerge with a quite different assessment of school finance reform’s results.125  One cou
also quibble with details of Reed’s studies.  For example, he cites no data from 
California, arguably the foremost case study in school finance reform.  Despite its
ongest-running experiment in school finance reform, California was not included 
in Reed’s selection of states to be surveyed apart from his observation that “[a]fter the 
Serrano decision and Proposition 13, California has, in the estimation of some analy
produced a funding system that is relatively equal but woefully underfunded.”126 
William Fischel, whose work will also be discussed in detail below, counters t
Serrano actually caused the anti-tax revolt that culminated in passage of Proposition
                                                 
122 Id. at 31-34 (“In all three cases [Oklahoma, North Carolina, and Illinois], equality was either 
worse or the same after the court decision.”). 
123 Id. at 34. 
124 But see Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity, Hollow Victories, and the Demise of 
School Finance Equity Theory: An Empirical Perspective and Alternative Explanation, 32 GA. L. REV. 543 
(1998). 
125 See infra Part III. 
126 See REED, supra note 9, at 196 n.21. 
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 To anticipate his argument here, Fischel – contrary to Reed’s view that Serrano and 
Proposition 13 happen to have combined to cause a state with equal but under-funded 
education – asserts that “voters tolerate property taxes only when the public services 
financed by them are capitalized in home values.  The spread of Serrano-like cases 
around the country has, I submit, contributed to a disaffection with local property 
taxation”127  On this view, pointing to the equality achieved by Serrano and similar 
decisions while bemoaning the lack of funding wrought by Proposition 13 misses the 
point.  It is, Fischel argues, precisely because Serrano equalized funding across the stat
that California voters lost their willingness to pay high property taxes.  Reed may have a 
rejoinder to Hoxby’s studies and Fischel’s argument about the link between Serrano an
Proposition 13, and, in fairness, his underlying argum
e 
d 
ent goes to the constitutional 
nd e 
onetheless, the failure to cite either 
 
ion 
                                                
dema s of equality in the financing of public education – an argument that need not ris
or fall based on the outcome of empirical study.  N
Hoxby or Fischel, particularly at those points in the argument where they have offered 
contradictory evidence, qualifies the empirical arguments of On Equal Terms and the
book’s defense of equal and centralized funding. 
III. Tiebout’s Revenge: The Importance of Local Control for Public Educat
A. Economic Efficiency and Localism 
 William Fischel’s book, The Homevoter Hypothesis, is a recent attempt to offer a 
defense of locally-based school finance over and against Serrano- (and Brigham- or 
 
127 FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 98-99.  See also William A. Fischel, 
How Serrano Caused Proposition 13, 12 J.L. & POL. 607 (1996). 
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 Campbell County-) inspired reform efforts to centralize the funding of education.  Fi
argues – contrary to set
schel 










environmental regulation, and exclusionary zoning.  As the title of his book suggests, 
V t and Wyoming supreme courts – that the quality of public education and the 
problems of racial and economic disparities in school financing are best addressed b
maintaining a strong link between local property taxes and public school expenditures.  
This section of the chapter will take up Fischel’s argument and related econometric 
studies that support it. 
 Two overarching questions will guide this section of the chapter.  First, does 
Fischel’s argument (and the variation on the Tiebout Hypothesis on which it rests) 
address the objection that local control fosters racial and class-based segregation in public
education?  To put the question another way, is Fischel’s argument driven by conce
the situation of high-valuation districts?  (Though the assumption that “high valuation”
districts are largely segregated, wealthy districts is attacked in Fischel’s book.)  If so, 
what of the plight of poor, urban, minority districts?  Second, how 
a egal doctrine and policymaking on school finance reform?  If, as was shown from 
the survey of school finance reform case law in Part I, preferences for and agains
localism are partially policy choices by courts, then should courts now reconsider the 
weight given local control in light of Fischel’s argument that the courts in many states 
have harmed public education by imposing equalizing measures? 
 Fischel’s argument for locally-based school financing shares the same premises 
the arguments in the book for local property taxes, local control over aspects of 
206 
 Fischel views homeowners (who vote and become “homevoters”) as the driving force in 
local government decision making: “The homevoter hypothesis holds that homeowne











poor live in “poor” school districts. In James Ryan’s aforementioned two articles on 
                                                
guided by their concern for the value of their homes to make political decisions that are 
more efficient than those that would be made at a higher level of government.”128  Th
decisions are efficient in the first place, so Fischel argues, because the value of local 
services (including public schools) becomes capitalized in the value of homes. 
 A corollary element of Fischel’s argument is the famous view advanced in Charles 
Tiebout’s “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”: “Policies that promote resident
mobility and increase the knowledge of the consumer-voter will improve the allocation
government expenditures.”129 Fischel adds a political component to Tiebout’s economic 
model “by inserting homeowners as the prime movers of the model.”130 Succinctly 
stated, the Tiebout model “stands for the proposition that local government provision
geographically isolated public goods is sup
more centralized units of government.”131  Once one sees that public education a
provided in geographically isolated and distinct school districts is an instance of such
good, then it is a short step to the conclusion that more (and locally funded) school 
districts in an area are preferable to fewer. 
One of the key assumptions attacked by Fischel is the easy assumption that the
 
128 See FISCHEL, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 4. 
129 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 423 (1956). 
130 See FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS, supra note 7, at 80. 
131 Id. at 58. 
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 school finance reform and race, for example, there is repeated use of the term “poor” with
little attention to this significant qualification. “The modest value of the homes in which 
[the poor] live is offset,” according to Fischel, “by the larger-than-average amount of 










If substantiated in further research, this argument appears to force the advocates of 
centralized, non-local funding to bear the effect of forcing all public schools in a state 
            
132 Insofar, then, as authors
such as Ryan or Kozol assume that the plight of inner-city, largely minority districts 
be helped by taking money from “wealthy” (usually suburban) districts, they neglect thi
point.  To be sure, Fischel also passes over some factors in his own argument.  He p
scant attention to the “municipal overburden” phenomenon commonly addressed in 
school finance reform litigation (the view that certain 
d s due to, for example, poorly maintained buildings or children with higher 
learning needs), which reinforces Ryan’s argument that “poor” districts really are poor, 
even if not property tax base-poor in Fischel’s terms. 
 Fischel’s strongest argument, largely unrebutted by school finance reform 
advocates, is that centralization of school finance decreases the quality of public sch
“Centralization of school funding – more state money, less reliance on property taxes –
appears to have statistically significant, large, negative effects on average SAT scores.”133  
                                     
132 Id. at 133. 
133 Id. at 141 (citing Thomas A. Husted and Lawrence W. Kenny, Evidence on the Impact of Stat





 toward mediocrity for the sake of equality.134 Commenting on the situation in Vermont in 
the wake of Brigham, Julie Underwood, dean of the School of Education at Miami 
Univer
gic 
hy districts only 







sity of Ohio, terms this the “Robin Hood” problem:  
There is no one right way to correct inequities in educational funding, no ma
formula…. But there is a wrong way.  Taking money from wealt
m
schools better.  Pulling a Robin Hood is a recipe for disaster.135 
Though considerations of race and class are virtually absent from Fischel’s 
argument, one might argue that Fischel’s failure to mention these factors illustrates the 
occupational hazard of economists to posit ideal types, separated from the thick contex
of actual decision making such as one encounters in state supreme court cases.  More 
plausible is the view that Fischel is merely providing an analytic framework for thinking 
about school finance and local government and that the charge of racism or class bias i
largely irrelevant to his thesis as such.  To pose a challenge to Fischel on race or class 
grounds is to commit a category mistake.  Normatively, Fischel’s argument makes 
virtually no claims about what local governments should do with their majoritarian
(other than his argument about what they already do in catering to the demands of 
homeowners) to increase racial or class integration.  His argument is, in that respect 
least, under-determined.  Even when it would be easy to mention the racial or class 
component of some phenomenon to which he is drawing our attention, Fischel inev
                                                 
134 But at least one author argues that the early results from a new experiment in centralized 
funding (Michigan) are generally positive.  See Heise, supra note 124, at 562-63 (“[I]nitial evidence 
suggests two positive themes.  First, in terms of per-pupil spending, no district is better off than it was 
before the reform legislation….Second, although per-pupil spending discrepancies endure, Michigan’s 
present school finance system makes it more difficult to exacerbate them.”). 
135 Elinor Burkett, Don’t Tread on My Tax Rate, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 26, 1998. 
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 fa the clarity of the capitalization model to any sociological or policy analysis 
beyond favoring localism over alternative approaches. 
 Caroline Minter Hoxby, who provides much of the econometric support for 
Fischel’s conclusions regarding school finance, does nod to the problems of local contro
in her discussion of the infelicitously termed phenomenon of “human capital spillovers,”
essentially denoting the fact of racial and economic segregation in the housing market. 
She offers a note of realism about the problem of racial and class-based segregation in 
Tiebout-model scheme of localized school finance:  “Households will do Tiebout-style 
sorting on the basis of their demand for spillovers….,” she writes, but (and here is her 
rejoinder to the race or class-based segregation objection), “It is essential to recogniz








xby concludes, “a desire to change human 
capital 
continue to be 
popular
though
[T]he combination of an instinct that not enough is currently done to help students 
from central city households with low human capital, the misconception that such 
                                                
136  Once again, an equity-based objection to the argument for 
localized school funding is, on this view, a category mistake, as it attempts to solve on
problem by creating another problem.  As Ho
spillovers – laudable though it may be – cannot generally form the basis of an 
argument for centralized school finance.”137 
Which is not to say, of course, that centralized funding will not 
 among some state supreme courts and state legislatures. According to Hoxby, 
, there is an easy explanation for this democratic phenomenon:  
 
136 Hoxby, supra note 12, at 62 (emphasis in original). 
137 Id. 
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 students typically experience unusually low spending so that they would be better 
off with their state’s median spending, and the mistaken instinct that centralized 









                                                
to embrace school finance reform].138   
There is, then, nothing finally inconsistent with affirming both the homevoter 
hypothesis (and a strong preference for localized school funding) and a concern that 
localized school finance imposes high social costs and causes a downward spiral o
“human capital spillovers.”  Fischel and Hoxby do not set themselves the task of 
deflecting the argument that localized governance may reflect the racial or class biases
homeowners, only that such governance is economically efficient and democratically 
accountable.  Alternatives, such as those offered by the Wyoming and Vermont courts or 
the authors examined in 
or both of these values. 
B. Subsidiarity and Localism in School Finance 
The bulk of this chapter has been a survey of how courts have viewed localis
with at least four possible views represented in the jurisprudence of school finance 
reform.  The academic commentary on localism and school finance offered by the au
surveyed in Parts II and III is only slightly clearer about the benefits and burdens of 
localism than the courts who have addressed the issue.  Some (Briffault and Ryan) are 
suspicious of localism and would presumably endorse the attitudes toward localism found 
in the Vermont and Wyoming decisions.  For them, equality of funding is the object of th
school funding debate, and localism – with its socioeconomic and racial parochialism –
 
138 Id. at 66 (emphasis added). 
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 undermines equality.  Reed offers some empirical evidence to support this conclusion, 
though, as I have argued in Part II, there are objections to Reed’s selection of states fo
study, and his decision not to engage authors (notably Fischel and Hoxby) who offer 
contrary conclusions goes to show how efficiency concerns are eclipsed in his argument
by concerns of constitutional equality.  It is the merit of Fischel and Hoxby’s work that 
they grab both horns of the efficiency-equity dilemma and, while defending localism and
Tieboutian efficiency, display an awareness of the equitable anxieties of other authors.  
For Fischel and Hoxby, however, the way out of the dilemma is found in their argument 











e cy) produces a system of school finance that is neither efficient nor equita
 We have, then, identified two aspects of the school finance debate as it is 
currently framed: (1) the treatment of localism by the courts leaves unanswered the 
question of why localism is important in the first place, and (2) the normative debat
localism is marked by interminable disagreement between localism’s boosters and 
detractors.  Reduced to its essentials, the boosters of localism seem to privilege
uity, and localism’s detractors seem to privilege equity over efficiency. 
It is at this point in the argument that the principle of subsidiarity might offer a 
way beyond the equity-efficiency impasse. Subsidiarity illuminates the school finance 
debate in at least two ways.  First, subsidiarity provides a thick, normative account of 
when and why localism is important.  The courts – such as the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
– holding that the importance of local control forgives inter-district inequality largely f
to explain why localism is important in the first place.  In turn, those economists who
212 
 defend local control and financing rely largely if not exclusively on the language of 
efficiency, characterizing residents as market consumers of public goods who rational
maximize their self-interest.  Subsidiarity’s devolutionary import favors localism but 
provides a normative principle beyond competitive efficiency whereby we can asses
when local control is important and worth preserving.  By the lights of subsidiarit
competitive efficiency alone is unable to capture many of the concerns at play in 
determining whether school finance should be left to local government.  While buil
on the insights of public finance economists regarding the importance of localism, 
subsidiarity uniquely provides a normative grounding for localism beyond Tieboutian 
competition or capitalized home prices.  That grounding is, as argued in Chapter One, 











                                                
nd a functional pluralist account of the social order. 
Second, subsidiarity provides a richer moral language to resolve the efficiency-
equity tradeoff that currently frames the school finance debate.  Conducting the d
those terms is unduly narrow, with efficiency counseling localism no matter the 
consequences for poor school districts and equity counseling equality or minimal 
standards of adequate funding no matter the consequences for local control, support fo
public education, or educational quality.  Both sides in the debate seem to occupy
Chesterton’s words, the “clean and well-lit prison of one idea.”139  The apparent 
confusion at the heart of subsidiarity with which I began Chapter One – the “small is 
beautiful” language from Pius XI and the “bigger is better” language from John XXIII –
 
139 G.K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 38 (1944). 
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 might more charitably be characterized as providing a capacity for discernment among
levels of authority and which tasks are best suited to certain levels.  On the one hand, 
subsidiarity’s appreciation of localism leaves intact the role of local financing for w
functioning school districts.  On the other hand, subsidiarity and related themes in 
Catholic social teaching – solidarity, the common good, the preferential option for th
poor – force us to consider how best to aid those districts that are chronically under-
funded and under-performing.  For example, the aforementioned problem of “munici













                                                
 governments in the case of school finance through targeted impact aid. 
Subsidiarity does not, then, resolve the school finance debate by urging adoption
of local financing no matter the consequences for distributive justice nor by urging t
localism be abrogated in the name of equality. Instead, as Arthur McGovern notes, 
subsidiarity serves “as a guiding principle, a principle with two parts: problems are better
solved at lower levels by smaller groups, but some require measures at a higher level 
larger institutions….only experience and empirical evidence can determine this (and 
analysts sharply disagree about both).”140 That said, we have some indication of what a 
school finance debate that took subsidiarity seriously might look like.  By assessing th
competencies that accord to each level of government, we might conclude that loc
financing of public schools should continue to be the norm.  It should not require 
elaborate capitalization studies to conclude that the willingness to invest in public 
 
140 Arthur F. McGovern, S.J., Entitlements and Catholic Social Teachings, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. 














attention of those working at the intersection of Catholic 
social thought and the law.
education will often correlate to localized financing.  Nonetheless, the imperative to 
address the obvious inequalities in the system of public education should lead to the
intervention of the higher authority – usually state spending but sometimes federal 
spending –  to use targeted “level-up” expenditures rather than, as often occurs when
financing is centralized, a “level-down” ma
 everyone worse off, if equally so. 
Let me conclude by attempting to draw a lesson for Catholic social thought
generally and the discussion of subsidiarity specifically.  Those in the theological 
academy who work in the area of Catholic social thought and lawyers with interes
Catholic social thought are understandably drawn to the grand issues of poverty, 
globalization, war and peace, and First Amendment struggles over establishment and fre
exercise.  But in a country of 25,000 units of local government – municipalities, towns, 
counties, school districts, etc. – attention to the workings of local government is sorely 
neglected by Catholic social ethics.  Undoubtedly the machinations of local government 
can be mundane – as anyone who has attended a school board meeting can attest –
is nonetheless a central aspect of American political life.  Indeed, two of the most 
important tasks of government – land use/zoning regulation and the present subject of 
financing and administering public schools – are largely controlled by local governments
Perhaps this examination of school finance and the proper place of local government in
the debate could serve as a reminder that much of political life proceeds in small way
and demands the sustained 
 CONCLUSION 
In an essay addressing moral agency and social structures, Alasdair MacIntyre 
argues that: 
[T]o have confidence in our deliberations and judgments we need social 
relationships of a certain kind, forms of social association in and through which 
our deliberations and practical judgments are subjected to extended and 
systematic critical questioning that will teach us how to make judgments in which 
both we and others may have confidence.1 
 
This dissertation has proposed the principle of subsidiarity as an extended answer to the 
challenge posed by MacIntyre. The chapters of this dissertation have ranged over a series 
of policy questions, but the central concept throughout has been subsidiarity as functional 
pluralism, as explained in Chapters One and Two. Amid different policy contexts, the 
argument of the dissertation counsels against always interpreting subsidiarity as a 
principle of devolution, which is a common mistake in the literature. 
More broadly, the account of subsidiarity offered here is consistent with recent 
work on the importance of civil society. In the introduction to the essays collected in Civil 
Society and Government, Nancy Rosenblum and Robert Post advance a similarly 
normative account of pluralism: 
In saying that civil society is the realm of pluralism, we are endorsing Isaiah 
Berlin’s observation of the historicity of human nature, his notion that human 
identities cannot be other than local and particular, and his belief that this 
diversity is not transitory. Civil society is not a residue on the way to a unified 
state in which citizenship eclipses other aspects of belonging, or on the way to a 
cosmopolitan order in which universality is our essence. Pluralism has a 
normative as well as a descriptive dimension.2 
                                                 
1 Alasdair MacIntyre, Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency, 74 PHILOSOPHY 311, 
316 (1999). 
2 CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT 3-4 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, eds., 2001). 
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In contrast to Rosenblum and Post, though, the principle of subsidiarity does not rest 
content with Berlin’s assertion of an irreducible plurality of values. Instead, normative 
pluralism—different ends pursued by different groups within society—in Catholic social 
theory is related to the intrinsically social character of the human person. “As these ends, 
though parts of the whole moral order, are still real ends” Heinrich Rommen writes, “it 
behooves rational, free beings to organize themselves and to act in performing the end by 
their own initiative.”3 
 What, then, does reasonable deliberation lead us to conclude by way of 
articulating policy prescriptions on such specific matters as physician-assisted suicide, 
federal preemption, and school finance? From the argument of the foregoing chapters, I 
should like to conclude with three reference points for thinking about subsidiarity with 
respect to these and other policy questions: the autonomy of groups, the circumscribed 
importance of efficiency, and the exercise of prudence. First, social analysis informed by 
subsidiarity should begin neither with the individual nor with the national government, 
but should instead take seriously the genuine autonomy (in the literal “self-legislating” 
sense) of groups. In the American constitutional order, such autonomy includes the 
sovereignty, properly understood, of the sub-national units of government, particularly 
the states. As the Supreme Court has observed on various occasions, “[t]he States entered 
the federal system with their sovereignty intact.”4 State control over contested moral 
                                                 
 
3 HEINRICH A. ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT 303 (1945). 
4 Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991), quoted in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 
713 (1999) and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 150 (1996). For a sharp criticism of the Supreme 
Court’s recent state sovereignty jurisprudence (particularly in cases interpreting the Eleventh Amendment) 
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 questions such as physician-assisted suicide, the states’ interest in reasonable regulation 
of pharmaceuticals and in reducing the costs of drugs, and the importance of local control 
over public education are all instances of the functional autonomy of groups, even if 
reasonable policy outcomes can differ and are sometimes subject to empirical analysis. 
 Second, any argument on such a range of policy questions must properly locate 
the importance of efficiency. As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, most of the 
prevailing debate on federalism is focused on efficiency and variations on the Tiebout-
sorting advantages of jurisdictional competition. Placing all of the federalism eggs in the 
fiscal federalism efficiency basket poses at least two problems, however. First, as 
Malcolm Feeley and Edward Rubin have argued recently, “Federalism…is a mode of 
governmental organization that grants rights to particular institutions, specifically to 
geographical subunits of the polity. An approach based on rational actor theory dissolves 
institutions into individual behavior….In short [fiscal federalism] is a theory of 
decentralization, not federalism.”5 Second, from the standpoint of Catholic social theory, 
efficiency is always a circumscribed good. As Robert Pecorella notes, “Market economies 
require a careful balancing of the social values of efficiency and equity….An 
overemphasis on efficient production promotes cultural tendencies toward a consumerism 
that affords material things a role in personal definition that both devalues human dignity 
                                                                                                                                                 
and informed by aspects of Catholic social teaching, see Patrick McKinley Brennan, Against Sovereignty: A 
Cautionary Note on the Normative Power of the Actual, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181 (2006). 
5 MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC 
COMPROMISE 80 (2008). 
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 and transforms the common good into the aggregation of individual utilities.”6 In the 
discussion of the three policy questions in Chapters Three through Five, I have attempted 
to give efficiency and competitive concerns their due—particularly in the discussion of 
the shortfalls of school finance reform efforts in Chapter Five—while avoiding the 
pitfalls properly diagnosed by the Catholic social tradition.  
 Finally, the discernment of specific policy prescriptions must always be 
undertaken with the guidance of prudence. As many commentators on Catholic social 
thought have noted, the level of generality at which the Church’s teaching on social 
questions is presented leaves a great deal to the appropriate exercise of prudential 
judgment. Indeed, the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church devotes two 
paragraphs to the importance of prudence, the first of which states: 
The lay faithful should act according to the dictates of prudence, the virtue that 
makes it possible to discern the true good in every circumstance and to choose the 
right means for achieving it. Thanks to this virtue, moral principles are applied 
correctly to particular cases. We can identify three distinct moments as prudence 
is exercised to clarify and evaluate situations, to inspire decisions and to prompt 
action. The first moment is seen in the reflection and consultation by which the 
question is studied and the necessary opinions sought. The second moment is that 
of evaluation, as the reality is analyzed and judged in the light of God’s plan. The 
third moment, that of decision, is based on the preceding steps and makes it 
possible to choose between the different actions that may be taken.7 
 
The policy questions taken up in Chapters Three through Five each involve the exercise 
of prudential judgment amid a tangle of ethical and legal (constitutional, statutory, and 
regulatory) sources. For each, the policy conclusions were, I submit, a reasonable but 
                                                 
6 Robert F. Pecorella, Property Rights, the Common Good and the State: The Catholic View of 
Market Economies, 5 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 235, 235 (2008) (emphasis in original). 
7 COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH § 547 (2004). 
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contingent application of prudential judgment. In Chapter One, we saw the relation 
between the early social encyclicals of Leo XIII and his call for a renewal of Thomism. It 
is fitting, then, to note Aquinas’ own assessment of prudence’s important role in 
government, for “prudence in its special and most perfect sense belongs to a king who is 
charged with government of a city or kingdom.”8 In determining how to apply 
subsidiarity to concrete questions, we should bear in mind Johannes Messner’s caution 
that “in actual life the order of subsidiarity, like the order of justice generally, will never 
take shape in perfect form…[Subsidiarity] concerns not least the much discussed 
relationship between individual and community, freedom and authority, a problem which 
arises anew in every historical epoch.”9 Or to paraphrase Elizabeth Anscombe (who was 
speaking about the quite different topic of the principle of double effect), the denial of the 
principle of subsidiarity has been the corruption of non-Catholic thought, and its abuse 
has been the corruption of Catholic thought.10 I hope this dissertation goes some small 
way toward addressing confusion about subsidiarity and its import both within and 
without the Catholic social tradition.
 
8 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-II, q. 50, a. 1. 
9 JOHANNES MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS: NATURAL LAW IN THE WESTERN WORLD 215 (J.J. Doherty 
trans., 1949) (emphasis in original). 
10 G.E.M. Anscombe, War and Murder, reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF 
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE: ETHICS, RELIGION AND POLITICS 54 (1981). 
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